Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-05-05 Thread Francois Gouget
On Wed, 30 Apr 2008, Steven Elliott wrote: I have some concerns about the location of the socket file that wineserver uses. Since by default the current location is in /tmp my concern is that anyone can stop anyone else from using wine just by creating a directory named /tmp/.wine-500.

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-05-05 Thread Marcus Meissner
On Mon, May 05, 2008 at 08:47:52AM +0200, Francois Gouget wrote: On Wed, 30 Apr 2008, Steven Elliott wrote: I have some concerns about the location of the socket file that wineserver uses. Since by default the current location is in /tmp my concern is that anyone can stop anyone else

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-05-05 Thread Alexandre Julliard
Steven Elliott [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Maybe I'm making some bad assumptions about why the socket file can't be placed in ~/.wine (that not all users have a writable home directory). I'm guessing based on the snippet from my original post that includes Since that might not be possible in

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-05-05 Thread Steven Elliott
On Mon, 2008-05-05 at 09:11 +0200, Marcus Meissner wrote: On Mon, May 05, 2008 at 08:47:52AM +0200, Francois Gouget wrote: In /tmp I see the following: .X0-lock .X11-unix/ fgouget/ gconfd-fgouget/ vmware-fgouget/ xmms_fgouget.0 So it seems like if there

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-05-05 Thread Steven Elliott
On Mon, 2008-05-05 at 12:16 +0200, Alexandre Julliard wrote: Steven Elliott [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Maybe I'm making some bad assumptions about why the socket file can't be placed in ~/.wine (that not all users have a writable home directory). I'm guessing based on the snippet from my

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-05-03 Thread Steven Elliott
On Thu, 2008-05-01 at 06:45 +0200, Ove Kaaven wrote: Maarten Lankhorst skrev: Wine checks ownership of the socket and directory, so race conditions aren't really a problem. This means that despite being put in a public directory there is no chance of a race condition. I don't see a

wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-04-30 Thread Steven Elliott
I have some concerns about the location of the socket file that wineserver uses. Since by default the current location is in /tmp my concern is that anyone can stop anyone else from using wine just by creating a directory named /tmp/.wine-500. As far as I know the only risk is denial of

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-04-30 Thread Maarten Lankhorst
Hello Steven, 2008/4/30 Steven Elliott [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I have some concerns about the location of the socket file that wineserver uses. Since by default the current location is in /tmp my concern is that anyone can stop anyone else from using wine just by creating a directory named

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-04-30 Thread Ove Kaaven
Maarten Lankhorst skrev: The latter won't work, they could create the directory and then delete it after wineserver started. I don't think it is really a problem, by the time someone else can put that directory in /tmp chances are that they can do a lot more malicious things then just making

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-04-30 Thread Maarten Lankhorst
Hell Ove, 2008/4/30 Ove Kaaven [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Maarten Lankhorst skrev: The latter won't work, they could create the directory and then delete it after wineserver started. I don't think it is really a problem, by the time someone else can put that directory in /tmp chances are that

Re: wineserver socket file and DOS attacks

2008-04-30 Thread Ove Kaaven
Maarten Lankhorst skrev: Wine checks ownership of the socket and directory, so race conditions aren't really a problem. This means that despite being put in a public directory there is no chance of a race condition. I don't see a security risk here, if someone is evil they could create that