3.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Eric Paris <[email protected]> commit d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 upstream. If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared. Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it easier to attack. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- security/commoncap.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -514,6 +514,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binp } skip: + /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ + if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + + /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit */ -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
