http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=3298

Forgery, Hyperbole, and Half-Truths

by Ray McGovern
March 21, 2003

 ... Summary: Retired and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
professionals write President George Bush with an "increased sense of 
urgency and responsibility" regarding the looming war between the US 
and Iraq ...

March 18, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity

SUBJECT: Forgery, Hyperbole, Half-Truth: A Problem

We last wrote you immediately after Secretary of State Powell's UN 
speech on February 5, in an attempt to convey our concerns that 
insufficient attention was being given to wider intelligence-related 
issues at stake in the conflict with Iraq. Your speech yesterday 
evening did nothing to allay those concerns. And the acerbic 
exchanges of the past few weeks have left the United States more 
isolated than at any time in the history of the republic and the 
American people more polarized.

Today we write with an increased sense of urgency and responsibility. 
Responsibility, because you appear to be genuinely puzzled at the 
widespread opposition to your policy on Iraq and because we have 
become convinced that those of your advisers who do understand what 
is happening are reluctant to be up front with you about it. As 
veterans of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, the posture we 
find ourselves in is as familiar as it is challenging. We feel a 
continuing responsibility to "tell it like it is"-or at least as we 
see it-without fear or favor. Better to hear it from extended family 
than not at all; we hope you will take what follows in that vein.

We cannot escape the conclusion that you have been badly misinformed. 
It was reported yesterday that your generals in the Persian Gulf area 
have become increasingly concerned over sandstorms. To us this is a 
metaphor for the shifting sand-type "intelligence" upon which your 
policy has been built. Worse still, it has become increasingly clear 
that the sharp drop in US credibility abroad is largely a function of 
the rather transparent abuse of intelligence reporting and the 
dubious conclusions drawn from that reporting-the ones that underpin 
your decisions on Iraq.

Flashback to Vietnam

Many of us cut our intelligence teeth during the sixties. We remember 
the arrogance and flawed thinking that sucked us into the quagmire of 
Vietnam. The French, it turned out, knew better. And they looked on 
with wonderment at Washington's misplaced confidence-its 
single-minded hubris, as it embarked on a venture the French knew 
from their own experience could only meet a dead end. This was hardly 
a secret. It was widely known that the French general sent off to 
survey the possibility of regaining Vietnam for France after World 
War II reported that the operation would take a half-million troops, 
and even then it could not be successful.

Nevertheless, President Johnson, heeding the ill-informed advice of 
civilian leaders of the Pentagon with no experience in war, let 
himself get drawn in past the point of no return. In the process, he 
played fast and loose with intelligence to get the Tonkin Gulf 
resolution through Congress so that he could prosecute the war. To 
that misguided war he mortgaged his political future, which was in 
shambles when he found himself unable to extricate himself from the 
morass.

Quite apart from what happened to President Johnson, the Vietnam War 
was the most serious US foreign policy blunder in modern timesÉuntil 
now.

Forgery

In your state-of-the-union address you spoke of Iraq's pre-1991 focus 
on how to "enrich uranium for a bomb" and added, "the British 
government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 
significant quantities of uranium from Africa." No doubt you have now 
been told that this information was based on bogus correspondence 
between Iraq and Niger. Answering a question on this last week, 
Secretary Powell conceded-with neither apology nor apparent 
embarrassment-that the documents in question, which the US and UK had 
provided to the UN to show that Iraq is still pursuing nuclear 
weapons, were forgeries. Powell was short: "If that information is 
inaccurate, fine."

But it is anything but fine. This kind of episode inflicts serious 
damage on US credibility abroad-the more so, as it appears neither 
you nor your advisers and political supporters are in hot pursuit of 
those responsible. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Pat Roberts 
has shown little enthusiasm for finding out what went awry. Committee 
Vice-Chairman, Jay Rockefeller, suggested that the FBI be enlisted to 
find the perpetrators of the forgeries, which US officials say 
contain "laughable and child-like errors," and to determine why the 
CIA did not recognize them as forgeries. But Roberts indicated 
through a committee spokeswoman that he believes it is "inappropriate 
for the FBI to investigate at this point." Foreign observers do not 
have to be paranoid to suspect some kind of cover-up.

Who Did It? Who Cares!

Last week Wisconsin Congressman Dave Obey cited a recent press report 
suggesting that a foreign government might be behind the forgeries as 
part of an effort to build support for military action against Iraq 
and asked Secretary Powell if he could identify that foreign 
government. Powell said he could not do so "with confidence." Nor did 
he appear in the slightest interested.

We think you should be. In the absence of hard evidence one looks for 
those with motive and capability. The fabrication of false 
documentation, particularly what purports to be official 
correspondence between the agencies of two governments, is a major 
undertaking requiring advanced technical skills normally available 
only in a sophisticated intelligence service. And yet the forgeries 
proved to be a sloppy piece of work.

Chalk it up to professional pride by (past) association, but unless 
the CIA's capabilities have drastically eroded over recent years, the 
legendary expertise of CIA technical specialists, combined with the 
crudeness of the forgeries, leave us persuaded that the CIA did not 
craft the bogus documents. Britain's MI-6 is equally adept at such 
things. Thus, except in the unlikely event that crafting forgery was 
left to second-stringers, it seems unlikely that the British were the 
original source.

We find ourselves wondering if amateur intelligence operatives in the 
Pentagon basement and/or at 10 Downing Street were involved and need 
to be called on the carpet. We would urge you strongly to determine 
the provenance. This is not trivial matter. As our VIPS colleague 
(and former CIA Chief of Station) Ray Close has noted, "If anyone in 
Washington deliberately practiced disinformation in this way against 
another element of our own government or wittingly passed fabricated 
information to the UN, this could do permanent damage to the 
commitment to competence and integrity on which the whole American 
foreign policy process depends."

The lack of any strong reaction from the White House feeds the 
suspicion that the US was somehow involved in, or at least condones, 
the forgery. It is important for you to know that, although 
credibility-destroying stories like this rarely find their way into 
the largely cowed US media, they do grab headlines abroad among those 
less disposed to give the US the benefit of the doubt. As you know 
better than anyone, a year and a half after 9/11 the still 
traumatized US public remains much more inclined toward unquestioning 
trust in the presidency. Over time that child-like trust can be 
expected to erode, if preventive maintenance is not performedÉand 
hyperbole shunned.

Hyperbole

The forgery aside, the administration's handling of the issue of 
whether Iraq is continuing to develop nuclear weapons has done 
particularly severe damage to US credibility. On October 7 your 
speechwriters had you claim that Iraq might be able to produce a 
nuclear weapon in less than a year. Formal US intelligence estimates, 
sanitized versions of which have been made public, hold that Iraq 
will be unable to produce a nuclear weapon until the end of the 
decade, if then. In that same speech you claimed that "the evidence 
indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program"-a 
claim reiterated by Vice President Cheney on Meet the Press on March 
16.

Reporting to the UN Security Council in recent months, UN chief 
nuclear inspector Mohammed ElBaradei has asserted that the inspectors 
have found no evidence that Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear 
weapons program. Some suspect that the US does have such evidence but 
has not shared it with the UN because Washington has been determined 
to avoid doing anything that could help the inspections process 
succeed. Others believe the "evidence" to be of a piece with the 
forgery-in all likelihood crafted by Richard Perle's Pentagon 
Plumbers. Either way, the US takes a large black eye in public 
opinion abroad.

Then there are those controversial aluminum tubes which you have 
cited in major speeches as evidence of a continuing effort on Iraq's 
part to produce nuclear weapons. Aside from one analyst in the CIA 
and the people reporting to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, there is 
virtually unanimous agreement within the intelligence, engineering, 
and scientific communities with ElBaradei's finding that "it was 
highly unlikely" that the tubes could have been used to produce 
nuclear material. It is not enough for Vice President Cheney to 
dismiss ElBaradei's findings. Those who have followed these issues 
closely are left wondering why, if the vice president has evidence to 
support his own view, he does not share it with the UN.

Intelligence Scant

In your speech yesterday evening you stressed that intelligence 
"leaves no doubt that the Iraqi regime continues to possess and 
conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised." And yet even 
the Washington Post, whose editors have given unswerving support to 
your policy on Iraq, is awash with reports that congressional 
leaders, for example, have been given no specific intelligence on the 
number of banned weapons in Iraq or where they are hidden. One 
official, who is regularly briefed by the CIA, commented recently 
that such evidence as does exist is "only circumstantial." Another 
said he questioned whether the administration is shaping intelligence 
for political purposes. And, in a moment of unusual candor, one 
senior intelligence analyst suggested that one reason why UN 
inspectors have had such trouble finding weapons caches is that 
"there may not be much of a stockpile."

Having backed off suggestions early last year that Iraq may already 
have nuclear weapons, your administration continues to assert that 
Iraq has significant quantities of other weapons of mass destruction. 
But by all indications, this is belief, not proven fact. This has led 
the likes of Thomas Powers, a very knowledgeable author on 
intelligence, to conclude that "the plain fact is that the Central 
Intelligence Agency doesn't know what Mr. Hussein has, if anything, 
or even who knows the answers, if anyone."

This does not inspire confidence. What is needed is candor-candor of 
the kind you used in one portion of your speech on October 7. Just 
two paragraphs before you claimed that Iraq is "reconstituting" its 
nuclear weapons program, you said, "Many people have asked how close 
Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don't know 
exactly, and that's the problem."

True, candor can weaken a case that one is trying to build. We are 
reminded of a remarkable sentence that leapt out of FBI Director 
Mueller's testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 
11-a sentence that does actually parse, but nonetheless leaves one 
scratching one's head. Mueller: "The greatest threat is from al-Qaeda 
cells in the US that we have not yet identified."

This seems to be the tack that CIA Director Tenet is taking behind 
closed doors; i.e., the greatest threat from Iraq is the weapons we 
have not yet identified but believe are there.

It is not possible to end this section on hyperbole without giving 
Oscars to Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell, who have outdone 
themselves in their zeal to establish a connection between Iraq and 
al-Qaeda. You will recall that Rumsfeld described the evidence-widely 
recognized to be dubious-as "bulletproof," and Powell characterized 
the relationship as a "partnership!" Your assertion last evening that 
"the terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the 
moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed" falls into the same category. 
We believe it far more likely that our country is in for long periods 
of red and orange color codes.

Half-Truth

Here we shall limit ourselves to one example, although the number 
that could be adduced is legion.

You may recall that a Cambridge University analyst recently revealed 
that a major portion of a British intelligence document on Iraq had 
been plagiarized from a term paper by a graduate student in 
California-information described by Secretary Powell to the UN 
Security Council as "exquisite" intelligence. That same analyst has 
now acquired from the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
the transcript of the debriefing of Iraqi Gen. Hussein Kamel, 
son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, who defected in 1995.

Kamel for ten years ran Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological, and 
missile development programs, and some of the information he provided 
has been highly touted by senior US policymakers, from the president 
on down. But the transcript reveals that Kamel also said that in 1991 
Iraq destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons and the 
missiles to deliver them. This part of the debriefing was suppressed 
until Newsweek ran a story on it on February 24, 2003.

We do not for a minute take all of what Kamel said at face value. 
Rather we believe the Iraqis retain some chemical and biological 
warfare capability. What this episode suggests, though, is a 
preference on the part of US officials to release only that 
information that supports the case they wish to make against Iraq.

In Sum

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Simply that forgery, 
hyperbole, and half-truths provide a sandy foundation from which to 
launch a major war.

Equally important, there is danger in the temptation to let the 
conflict with Iraq determine our attitude toward the entire gamut of 
foreign threats with which you and your principal advisers need to be 
concerned. Threats to US security interests must be prioritized and 
judged on their own terms. In our judgment as intelligence 
professionals, there are two are real and present dangers today.

1-- The upsurge in terrorism in the US and against American 
facilities and personnel abroad that we believe would inevitably flow 
from a US invasion of Iraq. Concern over this is particularly well 
expressed in the February 26 letter from FBI Special Agent Coleen 
Rowley to Director Mueller, a letter well worth your study.

2-- North Korea poses a particular danger, although what form this 
might take is hard to predict. Pyongyang sees itself as the next 
target of your policy of preemption and, as its recent actions 
demonstrate, will take advantage of US pre-occupation with Iraq both 
to strengthen its defenses and to test US and South Korean responses. 
Although North Korea is economically weak, its armed forces are huge, 
well armed, and capable. It is entirely possible that the North will 
decide to mount a provocation to test the tripwire provided by the 
presence of US forces in South Korea. Given the closeness of Seoul to 
the border with the North and the reality that North Korean 
conventional forces far outnumber those of the South, a North Korean 
adventure could easily force you to face an abrupt, unwelcome 
decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons-a choice that your 
predecessors took great pains to avoid.

We suggest strongly that you order the Intelligence Community to 
undertake, on an expedited basis, a Special National Intelligence 
Estimate on North Korea, and that you defer any military action 
against Iraq until you have had a chance to give appropriate weight 
to the implications of the challenge the US might face on the Korean 
peninsula.

Richard Beske, San Diego, CA

Kathleen McGrath Christison, Santa Fe, NM

William Christison, Santa Fe, NM

Patrick Eddington, Alexandria, VA

Raymond McGovern, Arlington, VA

Steering Group, Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity


------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-->
Make Money Online Auctions! Make $500.00 or We Will Give You Thirty Dollars for 
Trying!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/yMx78A/fNtFAA/46VHAA/FGYolB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------~->

Biofuel at Journey to Forever:
http://journeytoforever.org/biofuel.html

Biofuels list archives:
http://archive.nnytech.net/

Please do NOT send Unsubscribe messages to the list address.
To unsubscribe, send an email to:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] 

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 


Reply via email to