http://www.motherjones.com/news/update/2003/31/we_489_01.html
West Wing Pipe Dream Beyond yellowcake: Dissecting the over-hyped threat of those aluminum tubes. By Tim Dickinson July 28, 2003 Lost in the now radioactive State of the Union scandal is the fact that the attempted procurement of African uranium wasn't the only false claim the president uttered that night about Saddam's nuclear aims. The 19 words that followed the now-infamous "16 enormously overblown" ones have proved to be every bit as untrue, and the intelligence underlying the claim nearly as shoddy. "Our intelligence sources tell us," President Bush told to the nation on January 28, "that he [Saddam] has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production." The claim, paired with the alleged uranium buy, painted a damning picture of Baghdad's atomic ambitions. The truth is far less frightening. Saddam did indeed attempt to purchase some highly-refined aluminum tubes. But they were not, as alleged by the Bush administration, to be used in a uranium-enriching centrifuge; rather they were intended to be used in the production of conventional rockets -- at least according to the United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency, the closest thing to an impartial authority in this case. What's more, this was well known at the time Bush delivered his address. Indeed, two weeks before the State of the Union, the IAEA said that the tubes "were not directly suitable" for uranium enrichment. Months earlier, the Department of Energy had reached the same conclusion -- as had intelligence experts at the State Department. So why did the President allege a nuclear use for the tubes? According to Greg Thielmann, who directed the office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research until September 2002, "This administration has had a faith-based intelligence attitude. It's top-down use of intelligence; 'We know the answers, give us the intelligence to support those answers.'" Here, a timeline of how the aluminum tubing allegation became a lynchpin in the case against Saddam Hussein -- and how that claim ultimately unraveled. September 8, 2002 The Bush administration leaks word to The New York Times' Judith Miller and Michael Gordon that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly tried to acquire aluminum tubing "specifically designed" for a nuclear weapons program. Officials told the Times reporters that they believed the tubes were to be used as components of a centrifuge needed to enrich uranium. Unnamed Bush officials cite the "diameter, thickness and other technical properties" of the tubes in their assessment. -- From the Source: Read the Times article Later the same day, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice appears on CNN's Late Edition, saying the aluminum tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs." -- From the Source: Read the CNN transcript of Rice's appearance September 8: Tag-teaming for the administration on NBC's Meet the Press, Vice President Dick Cheney says that Saddam Hussein "is trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium -- specifically aluminum tubes." -- From the Source: Read the Meet the Press transcript of Cheney's appearance September 9: State Department spokesman Richard Boucher tells reporters: "They've tried to buy the specialized aluminum tubing that's needed for centrifuges. They're trying to separate out nuclear material. When are they going to succeed? And how long do you wait to find out if they have or have not?" -- From the Source: Read the transcript of the White House briefing September 12: Making a case for pre-emptive war, President Bush tells the United Nation's general assembly, "Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon." The same statement appears, verbatim, in the White House's "Saddam Hussein Fact Sheet." -- From the Source: Read the text of the president's speech September 13: In the first public indication of ambiguity about this intelligence, The New York Times reports "some experts in the State Department and the Energy Department" have raised questions as to whether the tubes were actually intended for conventional artillery. "Other, more senior, officials" the paper reports, "insisted that this was a minority view among intelligence experts. "'This is a footnote, not a split,' a senior administration official said.'" -- From the Source: Read the Times article September 19: Testifying before the House International Relations Committee, Powell says: "You have been reading stories about these aluminum tubes. There may be a debate; some say in the newspaper today, about whether they're for centrifuges or for something else. The fact of the matter is that he is going after this kind of technology, so his intention has not changed." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of Powell's testimony September 23: The Institute for Science and International Security -- an independent organization whose nuclear research on Iraq has been quoted by the White House -- releases a report calling the aluminum tube intelligence ambiguous, citing dissenting views from senior scientists in the Department of Energy. "The debate over the purpose of the tubing left some dissenters perplexed. 'Always the same answer, no matter what the objections were,' one said. Inevitably, this situation led to speculation. Did the CIA have information about the tubes it was not sharing to protect important secrets? Or was the CIA arguing a view not really based in the facts? The recent statements emanating from the CIA suggest that it is not as certain about the intended purpose of this shipment as first stated. ... ISIS has learned that U.S. nuclear experts who dissent from the Administration's position are expected to remain silent. The President has said what he has said, end of story, one knowledgeable expert said." -- From the Source: Read the ISIS report September 24: In a white paper from Downing Street, the British government says of the aluminum tubing: "There is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear programme." -- From the Source: Read the British intelligence dossier October 2: The National Intelligence Estimate (a highly classified synthesis of the work of six intelligence agencies) issues its key points on Iraq's possible nuclear program. A portion of the document, declassified in July 2003, says that "most agencies" believe the attempt to purchase the aluminum tubes "provides compelling evidence" that Hussein is attempting to enrich uranium. By "most" the NIE specifically means four of the six agencies. Dissenting are the Department of Energy, and the State Department's INR, which makes this eye-popping assessment: In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program. [emphasis added] -- From the Source: Read the declassified National Intelligence Estimate October 5: Knight Ridder Newspapers reports: "Several senior administration officials and intelligence officers who spoke under the condition of anonymity assert that the decision to publicize one analysis of the aluminum tubes and ignore the contrary one is typical of the way the administration has been handling intelligence about Iraq." October 7: Speaking in Cincinnati, Ohio, President Bush says: "Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons." -- From the Source: Read the text of the president's speech December 2: Responding to a question about Iraq's claim that it attempted to procure the tubes for conventional weaponry, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer says: "I will say this is something that the President has said publicly, that Iraq did, in fact, seek to buy these tubes for the purpose of producing, not as Iraq now claims conventional forces, but for the purpose of trying to produce nuclear weapons. And so it's, on the one hand, mildly encouraging that Iraq would now admit to what it's been doing. But on the other hand, a lie is still a lie, because these -- they sought to produce these for the purpose of production of nuclear weapons, not conventional." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of the White House briefing December 19: Colin Powell holds a news conference, during which he repeats the claim: "We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high strength aluminum tubes, which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear weapons program. The Iraqi regime is required by Resolution 1441 to report those attempts. Iraq, however, has failed to provide adequate information about the procurement and use of these tubes. Most brazenly of all, the Iraqi declaration denies the existence of any prohibited weapons programs at all." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of Powell's news conference January 9, 2003: Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Association, reports that the "aluminum tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets: "While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it." -- From the Source: Read the text of El Baradei's report In response, a senior Bush official tells The New York Times, "I think the Iraqis are spinning the IAEA." -- From the Source: Read the Times article January 23: Answering a question from New York Times reporter Michael Gordon following a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz tries to downplay the IAEA report: "Gordon: Given that we're talking about matters of war and peace, does the administration plan to make a further report and provide intelligence information to address these concerns stated by the IAEA in its public report, and to buttress its claims that Iraq has resumed the production of weapons of mass destruction? And if not, is this because of targeting concerns, sources and methods, or do you simply not have reliable information that would stand up in a public forum on this? Wolfowitz: I think the short answer, Michael, really is there is a lot of evidence; as the evidence accumulates, our ability to talk about it undoubtedly will grow. But we don't have a lot of time; time is running out." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of Wolfowitz's comments January 24: Updating the intelligence on the ground, the IAEA tells The Washington Post that "It may be technically possible that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium, but you'd have to believe that Iraq deliberately ordered the wrong stock and intended to spend a great deal of time and money reworking each piece." The newest batch of tubes Iraq tried to purchase "actually bear an inscription that includes the word 'rocket,' according to one official who examined them," the Post elaborates. -- From the Source: Read the Post article January 28: In the State of the Union, Bush follows the infamous uranium claim with the aluminum allegation: "Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide." -- From the Source: Read the text of the State of the Union address January 29: U.N. Ambassador John Negroponte replies to a reporter's question about the disputed use of the tubes: "Are we convinced that those tubes were designed and were intended for enrichment of uranium? The answer is definitely, yes." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of Negroponte's comments January 30: Defending the administration's claims about the aluminum tubes, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer says: "The president stands by every word he said." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of the White House briefing January 30: In a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ambassador Negroponte says of the aluminum tubes: "We believe their characteristics are not consistent with a rocket program and are intended for nuclear centrifuges." In the same committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, responded to a questing by Senator Joe Biden (D-Delaware): "Armitage: On the question of why we spend so much time on things that are difficult to prove, I don't know, perhaps, particularly on the aluminum tubes we miscalculated. Clearly there's a difference of opinion in the intelligence community which we came up and briefed forthrightly and, indeed, deliberately. Biden: I agree, you did. Armitage: Well, the reason we did it deliberately was to show you we're not playing hide-the-bacon here, there is a difference of opinion. I believe ... that the view is shifting on this more to the side that this has a relationship to nuclear activities rather than rocket motors. But perhaps we miscalculated, and I take your comments as a sign to, as we used to say in the Navy, KISS, keep it simple, sailor, go with your strong points." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of Armitage's testimony (Microsoft Word format) February 5: Secretary of State Colin Powell, laying out the Administration's intelligence about Iraqi WMD before the UN Security Council, gives a balanced assessment: "By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are differences of opinion; there is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts and the Iraqis themselves argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher." -- From the Source: Read the text of Powell's presentation A slide from Powell's accompanying presentation, however, gives a rather one-sided view: -- From the Source: View all the slides February 11: Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee CIA Director George Tenet testifies: "Iraq has established a pattern of clandestine procurements destined to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. These procurements include but go well beyond the aluminum tubes that you have heard so much about. ... Now aluminum tubes are interesting. And I know there is controversy associated with it. Except that when you look at the clandestine nature of the procurement and how they have tried to deceive what's showing up, and then you look at the other dual-use items that they're trying to procure, we think we have stumbled onto one avenue of a nuclear weapons program. And there may be other avenues that we haven't seen, but that he is reconstituting his capability is something that we believe very strongly." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of Tenet's testimony (PDF format) March 7: The IAEA says it finds the Iraqi claim that the tubes were intended for conventional rockets credible: "Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme." El Baradei adds: "After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq." -- From the Source: Read the text of El Baradei's report March 9: In an interview on CNN's Late Edition, Powell says: "The issue of the centrifuges -- and I know that Dr. ElBaradei has said he doesn't see any evidence that the centrifuges, the aluminum tubes, were being used for centrifuges -- but we still have an open question with respect to that and we see more information from a European country this week that suggests that that is exactly what those tubes were intended to be used for. Our CIA believes strongly, and I think it's an open question." -- From the Source: Read the CNN transcript of Powell's appearance March 10: The Institute for Science and International Security issues a follow-up report: "A critical question is whether the Bush Administration has deliberately misled the public and other governments in playing a 'nuclear card' that it knew would strengthen public support for war. For over a year and a half, an analyst at the CIA has been pushing the aluminum tube story, despite consistent disagreement by a wide range of experts in the United States and abroad. His opinion, however, obtained traction in the summer of 2002 with senior members of the Bush Administration, including the President. The administration was forced to admit publicly that dissenters exist, particularly at the Department of Energy (DOE) and its national laboratories. This dissent is significant because the DOE has virtually the only expertise on gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs in the United States government." -- From the Source: Read the ISIS report March 16: Back on Meet the Press Cheney says: "I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the International Atomic Energy Agency and this kind of issue, especially where Iraq's concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don't have any reason to believe they're any more valid this time than they've been in the past." -- From the Source: Read the Meet the Press transcript of Cheney's appearance March 19: War begins. June 9: In a retrospective of the aluminum claims, Newsweek reports that the aluminum tube claims had been doubted early on within the intelligence community: "The strongest evidence that Saddam was building a nuke was the fact that he was secretly importing aluminum tubes that could be used to help make enriched uranium.... At the CIA, Tenet seems to have latched on to the tubes as a kind of smoking gun. He brought one of the tubes to a closed Senate hearing [in September 2002]. But from the beginning, other intelligence experts in the government had their doubts. After canvassing experts at the nation's nuclear labs, the Department of Energy concluded that the tubes were the wrong specification to be used in a centrifuge, the equipment used to enrich uranium. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) concluded that the tubes were meant to be used for a multiple-rocket-launching system. (And Saddam was not secretly buying them; the purchase order was posted on the Internet.) In two reports to Powell, INR concluded there was no reliable evidence that Iraq had restarted a nuclear program at all. 'These were not weaselly worded,' said [Greg] Thielmann, [who recently resigned from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research]. 'They were as definitive as these things go.'" -- From the Source: Read the Newsweek article June 30: The New Republic reports: "Many of the intelligence analysts who had participated in the aluminum-tubes debate were appalled. One described the feeling to TNR: 'You had senior American officials like Condoleezza Rice saying the only use of this aluminum really is uranium centrifuges. She said that on television. And that's just a lie.'" -- From the Source: Read The New Republic article (pay) July 2: Speaking at U.C. Berkeley, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D.-California) takes Bush and Cheney to task: "This administration took part fact and part supposition -- subjective information delivered to them by the intelligence community -- and they shaped it to reach a preconceived conclusion for the use of force. ... I am deeply disturbed that I didn't know at the time that the aluminum tubes ... could possibly be used in gas centrifuges, but also in vacuum cleaners. We were told definitively that they were for gas centrifuges. The administration cherry-picked information that bolstered the case" -- From the Source: Read the Berkeley release on Tauscher's speech July 11: Condoleeza Rice, speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One, defends the aluminum claim, saying it was written into the National Intelligence Estimate: "The NIE ...has the yellowcake story in it, had the aluminum tube story in it. Now, if there were doubts about the underlying intelligence to that NIE, those doubts were not communicated to the president, to the vice president, or to me. ... The president of the United States went up to give the State of the Union on the basis of information that was in his National Intelligence Estimate and that everybody thought to be true." -- From the Source: Read the transcript of Rice's comments July 18: Asked about the dubious claims in the State of the Union speech, a senior administration official tells The Washington Post: "The president is not a fact-checker." -- From the Source: Read the Post article ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Free shipping on all inkjet cartridge & refill kit orders to US & Canada. Low prices up to 80% off. 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