The "Akins Affair" brings to light some public policy positions that, when examined closely, reveal a religiously driven agenda. Just as the demand that "intelligent design" be taught along with evolution in science courses -- a position that has been ruled unconstitutional because it violates the separation of church and state, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kitzmiller_v._Dover_Area_School_District And for a fuller context see: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/evolution/intelligent-design-trial.html
It is remarkable that the media and various spokespeople who have made the connection of Akin's position to his beliefs in "personhood" have not gone further to point out that it is "personhood", whatever that might mean, is not the real issue but "ensoulment" is, that is, at what point in time does a mass of living cells become eligible for joining with a "soul" (for current purposes, assume a definition of "soul" from the Abrahamic religions, namely Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). It should not come as a surprise that issues of ensoulment have a long history but "personhood" is a relatively new concept that (a) tries to disconnect the concept from its religious roots, much like intelligent design attempted to present itself as a "scientific" position instead of a religious one and (b) attempts to use, in some cases, science to support its position that is misleading (e.g., an embryo has "personhood" because of totipotency). This is an area that requires informed discussed and critical thinking, especially as efforts increase to promote "personhood" laws at the state and federal levels (e.g., Akin and Ryan have submitted the legislation HR212 to promote this view; see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanctity_of_Human_Life_Act ). Here are some references that provide some background on the issues. It is neither exhaustive nor fully representative though I do think that they represent a mainstream scientific position. Consider: Louis M. Guenin (2001). Morals and Primordials Science June 1, 2001 292: 1659-1660, doi:10.1126/science.1062513 (NOTE: full text should be available) Quoting from the article: |Zygotic personhood, which does collide with embryo research, is an |implausible contradiction of the Catholic church's magisterium for most |of its history. Until 1869, the church followed Aristotle's view that not |until at least day 40 does an embryo develop sufficient human form to |acquire an intellectual soul, that which distinguishes human from beast |(Historia Animalium 583b). Until then, said Aquinas, “conception is not |completed.” Aristotle believed that form and matter correspond, a view |known as “hylomorphism,” from which it follows that a being without a |brain cannot house an intellectual soul. Hence the wrongfulness of abortion |was said to vary with time of gestation. Pope Innocent III in 1211 settled |on quickening (at 12 to 16 weeks) as the time of ensoulment. In 1869, |Pope Pius IX, without mentioning time of gestation, listed those procuring |abortions among the excommunicated. This was read to imply zygotic |personhood. Recently in Donum Vitae (1987), the church has conceded |that personhood is a philosophical question, and so we search its texts |for an argument for zygotic personhood. Scripture is silent. We find in |Declarato de Abortu Procurato (1974) that the church argues for zygotic |personhood by identifying a person with a genome. But the magisterium |cannot maintain this materialist thesis, this radical genetic reductionism, |without contradicting its belief in mind and soul. And even for materialists, |only a being capable of consciousness can be a person for purposes of the |duty not to kill. NOTE: there is some follow-up discussion in Science; links at the bottom of the page. K E Himma (2005). A dualist analysis of abortion: personhood and the concept of self qua experiential subject. J Med Ethics 2005;31:1 48-55 doi:10.1136/jme.2002.000828 NOTE: Full text is available here: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1734014/pdf/v031p00048.pdf Quoting from the article: |IV. MORAL PERSONHOOD AND ENSOULMENT |These four tenets of dualism imply, at the very least, that |moral personhood does not begin until the fetus is, so to |speak, inhabited by a soul. If persons are conceived as being |essentially composites (or unities) of bodies and souls, then a |genetically human fetus does not become a person in the |relevant moral sense of having a full-blown set of rights until |there is a soul that is associated in the right kind of way with |the body of the fetus. Of course, in this case, one might |reasonably think that a fetus lacking a soul deserves some |respect in virtue of being a human body that is an essential |ingredient to personhood, but such respect will arguably fall |short of that owed to a person. The concept of personhood is |supposed to mark the distinction between merely being |genetically human and being a bearer of rights; to the extent |that a fetus lacking a soul is not a person, it will not bear |rights. Even if such a being has moral standing, it will |necessarily be less than that of a person with a full set of the |basic moral rights. | |As a historical matter, classical theists have taken a |stronger view about the connection between ensoulment |and personhood: ensoulment is both necessary and sufficient |for moral personhood. In this connection, it is important to |realise that the concept of ensoulment picks out the moment |at which the soul is first united to the body and thus |presupposes the existence of a body.xii *****Thus, in so far as |ensoulment is necessary and sufficient for personhood, the |fetus becomes a person at that moment when it becomes a |composite of body and soul; prior to this moment, the fetus is |simply a material object and hence not a person—though, |again, it surely deserves some respect.****** The question then becomes when does ensoulment begin? Himma points out the following: |There has been a great deal of disagreement among |classical theists about when ensoulment occurs. Some |Jewish theologians, for example, have taken the position |that ensoulment takes place upon the birth of the child; thus, |on this view, the fetus becomes a person at birth. Many |prominent Christian theologians have also subscribed to a |theory of delayed ensoulment (or homanisation). Augustine, |for example, took the view that early abortion does not rise to |the level of murder because ‘‘there cannot be a living soul in a |body that lacks sensation due to its not yet being fully |formed’’.xiii Influenced by Aristotle, Augustine took the |curious position that ensoulment takes place in the male |fetus at 40 days and in the female fetus at 80 days.17xiv Of |course, theistic proponents of delayed ensoulment have |generally agreed that abortion is immoral, not because it is |murder, but because it makes possible sexual activity without |procreation. | |In recent years, classical theists have tended to reject |theories of delayed personhood. Indeed, the most predominant |view among Christian theologians seems now to be that |ensoulment occurs at the moment of conception and hence |that the fetus becomes a moral person at that time. At the |very least, this highly controversial view is the most common |view among lay theists in the United States who describe |themselves as Christians. According to this familiar view, |then, abortion always results in the murder of an innocent |moral person and hence should be legally prohibited from the |moment of conception. Again, I want to point out that the sources cited above are not definitive and other positions can be asserted. However, it seems to me that one cannot define "personhood" in purely materialist terms, this would be an extreme act of reductionism, but it doesn't really appear to me that people who would argue for a purely materialist definition of "personhood" are free from promoting a religious agenda -- a position comparable in intelligent design where the proponents are primarily Christians/religious. As the Dover ruling showed, the "scientific front" of intelligent design was maintained because of the U.S. constitution's separation of church and state. I have not yet seen similar arguments for "personhood" but perhaps it is time for professional organizations in the person-defining business (e.g., the APA and APS) start dealing with these issues. However, that might take a certain amount of political capital that they do not want to expend as well as some courage. -Mike Palij New York University m...@nyu.edu --- You are currently subscribed to tips as: arch...@jab.org. To unsubscribe click here: http://fsulist.frostburg.edu/u?id=13090.68da6e6e5325aa33287ff385b70df5d5&n=T&l=tips&o=19964 or send a blank email to leave-19964-13090.68da6e6e5325aa33287ff385b70df...@fsulist.frostburg.edu
