David Poole writes:
> In this example, the clarity priciple doesn't depend on any definition
> of "near", as the adherents to fuzzy would like to claim. All we need is
> to make a test for whether the ship is near the land. I would ask the
> captain of the ship. "The captain of the ship would, if asked, concur
> that the ship is near the land" is a perfectly clear clarity priciple:
> we could bet on what the captain would say (we might need to have some
> protocol if the captain refused to talk to us on the grounds that we are
> just troublesome academics). We could even derive a probability
> distribution of what the captain would say conditioned on the distance...
On what basis is the captain supposed to answer your question? How does she
use the information about the birds? Are probabilistic means foreclosed to her?
Paul Snow
