By Badru D. Mulumba
July 2, 2003-Monitor
The real Lt. General David Tinyefuza will announce his arrival; he will not sneak in, says a journalist who covered Tinyefuza during Operation North. He will be anxious to show that he is in charge. That is Gen. Tinyefuza.
It could be the defining moment both of his military and political careers. If he succeeds, David Tinyefuza would prove to the Doubting Thomases what many analysts have always said; that if any one could stop Joseph Kony, it was always him. But if he fails, Gen. Tinyefuza could see the stature he built up during Operation Desert Storm go up in smoke. Last week’s appointment of Gen. Tinyefuza as co-ordinator Operation Iron First also offers him the opportunity to show that stories of his ruthlessness are possibly unfounded. And, in Tinyefuza, Museveni may just have a chance to step down knowing that the more than a decade-and-a-half-old rebellion is over. Ending that war, despite countless ultimatums, ranks among Museveni’s biggest failures. Now, once again, the political careers of two men whose rivalry is said to be legendary seem to be too closely inter-linked. The period was the bush war 1981-85. It is said that one day the National Resistance Army rebel group led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni had just passed an order: no soldier would be allowed to have a woman in the camp. It was meant to shore up the discipline of the forces. The exception, says a bush war veteran who joined the rebellion in 1982, was the commander in chief. “Why Museveni?” he recalls Tinyefuza querying. Such was the rivalry between Museveni and Tinyefuza that at one time, around 1984, there was that inexpressible feeling in the camp that the maverick, though considered dangerous and divisive, Tinyefuza would be left in the bush. Dead. Like a leopard, Tinyefuza does not seem to have changed his spots. Then came his acrimonious attempt to quit the army back in 1997. Back then, many thought the general was preparing himself for a possible bid for State House – perhaps in 2001. Today, however, he has been seen as withdrawn and a bit of a Museveni loyalist but nobody is ever certain of the general has up his sleeve. Sometimes he has accused Museveni — while appearing before parliament in 1997 — of incompetence in co-ordinating the war against the Lord’s Resistance Army. Sometimes he has worked with him like when he commanded Operation Desert Storm in 1991. And sometimes he has campaigned for Museveni — like in 2001. It is said that after the 1991/2 operation, Tinyefuza usually boasted that he had cut the strength of the Lord’s Resistance Army to just under 10 percent of its strength before the operation. Specifically, he reportedly said that about 300 rebels were remaining. These rebels, according to a journalist at the scene at the time, were thought to have fled into the Sudan as Tinyefuza’s operation intensified. It is believed that no other person to command the war in northern Uganda can say the same for themselves. “We remember that in 1996 when there was an inquiry,” says Reagan Okumu (Aswa MP) “Tinyefuza said that the government must end the military operations within three months. If it can’t, it should abandon it and talk to Kony. If the government can’t, [Museveni] should pack his bags and leave.” Okumu adds, “We hope he still remembers that.” It is a public secret that Museveni never took kindly to Tinyefuza’s testimony to Parliament. In the aftermath, there were accusations that Tinyefuza had used the wrong forum and speculation that he faced demotion. This never came to pass. Months later, he was appointed a presidential advisor but the writing was still on the wall. *** The real President Museveni is not known to take kindly to former colleagues publicly accusing him of incompetence, as Tinyefuza himself would testify. “I see it two ways. One: there is desperation and the president needs someone who can make a difference. You remember the Congo success story,” says Okumu. Last March, Museveni appointed Tinyefuza co-ordinator of the UPDF in Congo when the UPDF went to war against the Congolese UPC rebels. But the person on the ground was Chief Political Commissar Brigadier Kale Kayihura with Tinyefuza working largely out of Kampala. But the Kony war is not the Congo war. It is run on longer. And, it has led to a whole generation of Acholi grow up knowing no other life than one of conflict. There is also the belief some of them harbour that government wants to decimate them. It is in the psyche of the people in the north right from the leaders. “Well, politically, Museveni wants his third term. And, he wants to isolate and depopulate the areas that are anti third term,” says Omara Atubo (Otuke MP). “[The war] is just politics. It is a continuation of politics using military means.” The war has continued and it is now regarded as the Museveni waterloo. Adds Okumu: “Who hasn’t the president tried? Among the top leaders, you know Salim Saleh is still there.” All President Museveni generals have been in northern Uganda at one time or the other — either after, or as they moved through the ranks. The exception, says Okumu, was Elly Tumwine. “But as you know Tumwine was Army Commander at the time this conflict set off; so he is not considered a military genius,” Okumu says. “The president is desperate because these generals have failed.” It is an observation that Mr Norbert Mao (Gulu MP) shares. “I thought that for the last decade or so, we have been building a new generation,” he says. Mao recalls that Tinyefuza wanted to retire from the army and was conscripted against his will. “Now, we are having a desperation.” “It has shown that he is going round and round,” says Atubo. Significantly, the deployment of Tinyefuza comes at a time when government leaders, including Museveni have trashed the Amnesty Law. The law that was seen as a win for peace advocates seeks to encourage rebels to surrender. “I think the president is ready to handle the north with all brutality. He does not want to accept any other opinion.” Something Gen. Tinyefuza seems to confirm. “If you are going to turn the tide of war, you can not do it with kid gloves,” he said in an interview. “Quinine is bitter. I have my young child, every time I administer it, he does not want to take it.” It is not a tea party, he said. “Some of these politicians think that you can eat your cake and have it back,” he says. “They want you to preach the gospel according to St. Mark. Sometimes, force is necessary in some cases. There is no short cut.” So, is he the hero-turned-villain he is made out to be? Or is he simply misunderstood? “It is not really brutality against the people. It was against the politicians,” says an observer who worked in Gulu in the general’s day. “With Tinyefuza, once he believes in something, and he sets out to do it, you have to expect some inconvenience.” Hero, or villain, Tinyefuza’s appointment is telling. First, it underscores the fact that the president seems to now believe that his brother Salim Saleh who was touted by analysts to be the man to end this conflict when he announced he was going to northern Uganda last year, is not really the man after all. Saleh has always seemed to have a special interest in ending the war. In fact, up to now, Museveni has in a way, been the co-ordinator of the operation. Ugandan journalist, now working with Radio Francais Internationale Mr Billie Okadameri was a Gulu based reporter for the local papers when Tinyefuza’s operation was going on. “The real Lt. General David Tinyefuza will announce his arrival,” says Okadameri. “He will not sneak in; he will be conspicuous to show that he is in charge. That is Tinyefuza.” Adds Okadameri: “Tinyefuza, typically will not arrive in Gulu this or next week. I don’t think that people should expect to see Tinyefuza rushing into the north.” The typical Tinyefuza will take time to study this conflict. “Then, once he starts, he will not accommodate any interruptions. If he thinks the military solution is way to go, I think he will go into fully,” he says. He adds, “You can’t deploy Tinyefuza and don’t give him real power, otherwise, he will not take it up. He will want power to demobilise the division commander if he does not really think that he is doing the right thing.” But if the UPDF is as factionalised as it is said to be, then Tinyefuza could have a few odds against him. It is said that his recall from northern Uganda resulted from complaints from other commanders. “I would think of the latter. I think he has always been the independent minded,” recalls someone who got deeply involved with Tinyefuza. “Apart from Mugisha Muntu [former army commander], he is one soldier the president can’t beat intellectually,” he says. It is thus expected that the appointment is already sending jitters down the army leadership in the north. It is said that Tinyefuza’s style is to go after the bosses, not the low-ranked soldiers whenever something went wrong. For instance, if there was a problem, Tinyefuza would reportedly remark that if anything went wrong even at the smallest level, there was a leader. That leader, he reportedly would say, had to be held responsible. “Normally, morale might go up because the foot soldiers in the north might get what they want — logistics, welfare,” the observer recalls. “I think the morale would go up. Even Kony, I think he may not be amused.” His style was to sermon other officers to Gulu and have them wait four days to see him as he finalised military operations. He reportedly assumed the powers of the Commander in Chief. And while the Army Statute said that a soldier found guilty by the military tribunal would only be executed after the Commander-in-Chief has been informed, Tinyefuza, it is said, would first execute, then inform. If it is true that the president believes that he is the man to end this rebellion, it should also mean that Museveni is standing Tinyefuza up for bigger things — ultimately. The general’s declared wish is to put an end to “this barbarism.” But his unstated wish, it is whispered, is most certainly likely the taking of the reigns of power some day. Analysts close to the military think that Tinyefuza might be on the way to replacing Museveni, should the latter retire the army. He is closely linked to the post of Chief of Defence after the army is restructured. “That is where Tinyefuza would (possibly) go first before becoming a political leader. The generals who really move things in the army have gone. Saleh, James Kazini,” says one observer. “With Kazini out of the way, I think he wanted to put someone slightly above the army commander,” he adds. That would mean that he could command the army commander to do things in the operational areas. “I think it is something for the morale of the soldier,” the analyst says. “If you have someone like Tinyefuza, he is literally going to be the boss of [army commander] Aronda Nyakairima. It is not going to be the other way round. He will develop the concept himself.” Tinyefuza might be a star general. But he will have to face up to a bit of garbage from the past, if anything, for his political future and for the success of the military operation. Mao recalls that leaders from northern Uganda such as Atubo and Zachary Olum were detained and treated like garbage. Says Mao: “Tinyefuza just declared martial law. It was a virtual State of Emergence. He declared a media black out and he arrested people arbitrarily. People were herded into Pece stadium.” He adds that it was ‘unwise of the president’ to return Tinyefuza. “But you know we have a president who is desperate,” he says. “People like Tinyefuza may get a cold shoulder. I really think that the president is at the end of his wit. He is virtually now going back to the old group. He is so desperate and he has resorted to desperate measures not based on real reason.” Okumu tells of tales of rape of women — and men — by male soldiers during the operation. “The leadership was cut off,” Okumu recalls. “I think what took place in the north was incomprehensible of what government can do to its people. Major Reuben Ikondere suffocated people to death.” It is said that the government right from Museveni thought, rightly or wrongly, that people in the north, and all their leaders were rebels. “Government never wanted to listen to them, because they believed that everybody was a rebel,” Okumu says. “They will not see that kind of humiliation again. I hope we have a new image.” Okumu says that the key is reconciliation. The Acholi will give Tinyefuza a second chance. “The Acholi culture allows people to reconcile; We have no problem. So Tinyefuza’s going back to the north depends on his approach. I have seen him reconcile with Zachary Olum - a man he frog-jumped. I have seen him talk to Atubo.” But speaking to Atubo, one senses a lingering bitterness, despite efforts at reconciliation. “For me, I had enough problems with Tinyefuza,” he says. “But his record as the butcher of the north is there. That is a stigma that he has to face.” There are ghosts for Gen. Tinyefuza to exorcise.
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© 2003 The Monitor Publications
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