Posted by Eric Muller (visiting from <a 
href="http://www.isthatlegal.org/";>isthatlegal.org</a>):
IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT, Part 4 (Or, "The Robinson Rebuttal"):

   OK, enough about research methods and terminology and book covers.
   Let's get to the meat of Michelle's claim, shall we? Her argument is
   that intercepted and decrypted Japanese "chatter" about efforts (a
   small number claimed to have been successful) to recruit Japanese
   aliens ("Issei") and American citizens of Japanese ancestry ("Nisei")
   was "the Roosevelt administration's solid rationale for evacuation."
   (page 141) It's a claim of causation she's making: notwithstanding the
   scholarship of the last 30 or so years, based on exhaustive perusal of
   available archival records, which shows the overpowering influence of
   racism and various sorts of nativist and economically motivated
   political pressure on the various decisionmakers' actions, these MAGIC
   decrypts, viewed by only a few of the key decisionmakers, were "the
   Administration's rationale"--a rationale grounded in military
   necessity. I'll have a fair amount to say about this, possibly later
   tonight (it has been a long day), and definitely tomorrow. Right now,
   though, I wanted to pass along to you a first reaction to Michelle's
   book from my friend Greg Robinson of the University of Quebec at
   Montreal, whose book [1]"By Order of the President: FDR and the
   Internment of Japanese Americans" is the definitive scholarly account
   of the genesis of the Administration's decision to evict and detain
   all of the West Coast's Issei and Nisei. (Here's [2]a review of Greg's
   book from The Atlantic online, and here's [3]an excerpt from the
   book.)

     Several years ago, I wrote a book on the decisions behind the mass
     removal and confinement of the Japanese Americans, commonly, if
     inaccurately, known as the internment, and in particular the role
     of President Franklin Roosevelt. I based it on several years of
     research in a number of archives around the country. The book was
     published by the Harvard University Press in 2001. In the time
     since, I have done further research in this area, which has
     confirmed me in my conclusions. Since the book was published, I
     have read a number of critiques by various defenders of Executive
     Order 9066, especially by bloggers, who seem to constitute a large
     and vocal group. I have preferred to let the work speak for itself,
     and I have never before responded to any critics, even when their
     comments distorted what I actually said. However, I feel that I
     must break my silence in the case of Michelle Malkin's book.

     First, Malkin is a bestselling author whose book is being put out
     by an established publisher, and her status as a celebrity will
     make many undiscriminating or unknowing people buy the book and
     take her arguments at face value.

     Also, Malkin, unlike all other writers I have seen, deliberately
     impugns the motives of those who disagree with her. Although she
     sets herself up as a disinterested seeker for truth with an open
     mind, she is gratuitously nasty towards all others: "Unlike many
     others who have published on this subject, I have no vested
     interests: I am not an evacuee, internee, or family member thereof.
     I am not an attorney who has represented evacuees or internees
     demanding redress for their long-held grievances. I am not a
     professor whose tenure relies on regurgitating academic orthodoxy
     about this episode in American history." Well, I am none of these
     things, apart perhaps from being a professor, and I was not even
     that when I researched and wrote my book. I am mindful, however, of
     the wise counsel of Sidney Hook, who in his "Ethics of Controversy"
     reminded people "[b]efore impugning an opponent's motives, even
     when they legitimately may be impugned, answer his arguments."
     Since there is a great deal to criticize in Malkin's arguments from
     a logical and historical point of view, I will start by focusing on
     that.

     The analysis of the book should start with the material the author
     includes on MAGIC (the decrypted intercepts of the Japanese code),
     which by her own statement constitutes the heart of her argument.
     There is a certain boredom born of repetition in any such
     discussion, since the author's material is mostly if not entirely
     lifted from the work of the late David Lowman, to whom the book is
     dedicated. (As the author states in [4]the August 3, 2004 entry on
     her blog: "After reading a book by former National Security Agency
     official David Lowman called 'MAGIC: The Untold Story of U.S.
     Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents from the West
     Coast during WWII," published posthumously by Athena Press Inc., I
     contacted publisher Lee Allen, who generously agreed to share many
     new sources and resources as I sought the truth.") Lowman's work
     has frequently been refuted and discredited. (Lowman first tried to
     make the case that the evidence of the MAGIC cables justified
     Executive Order 9066 in testimony before the Subcommittee on
     Administrative law and Governmental Relations of the House
     Committee on the Judiciary in June 1984. At that time, John Herzig,
     himself a retired Lieutenant Colonel and former intelligence
     officer, and Peter Irons effectively rebutted his testimony. Lowman
     did not resurface until 2000, when he put the same information in
     the book Malkin mentions. According to the Los Angeles Times's
     review, the editor of Lowman's book himself expressed doubts as to
     the credibility of Lowman's conclusions.

     Since there is nothing new in the author's case for MAGIC, my
     rebuttal will be brief. (For a more detailed presentation of the
     matter, John Herzig's "Japanese Americans and MAGIC," Amerasia
     Journal 11:2 (1984), is still unequalled).

     Let me divide it into three parts: first, that the MAGIC cables do
     not present the image of a Japanese American spy network; Second,
     that the people who pushed the case for evacuation would not have
     had access to the MAGIC excerpts in any case; thirdly, that those
     who did have access to MAGIC did not base their decision on it.

     First, an examination of the MAGIC cables provided by the author
     does not provide any case for implicating the Japanese Americans in
     espionage activities. Most of the cables discussed (a tiny handful
     of the thousands of messages decrypted) come from Tokyo or Mexico
     City and refer to areas outside the United States. Those cables
     that do speak of the United States detail various efforts by Japan
     to build networks, and list hopes or intentions rather than actions
     or results. For example, the author quotes (p. 41) from a January
     31, 1941 cable from Tokyo which orders agents to establish
     espionage and to recruit second generations. It does not say that
     such recruitment took place, and furthermore that recruitment was
     to take place even more among non-Japanese. Similarly, the author
     cites excerpts listing census data transmitted on the Japanese
     population of various cities--hardly secret information. The author
     relies most strongly on a memo from the Los Angeles consulate to
     Tokyo from May 1941. The author claims "the message stated that the
     network had Nisei spies in the U.S. Army" (p. 44). In fact, the
     message states "We shall maintain connection with our second
     generations who are at present in the U.S. Army." This speaks again
     of agents to be recruited. There is no evidence that any
     individuals had been recruited as agents, still less that they were
     actively giving information. Replies back from Los Angeles and
     Seattle state that they had established connections with Japanese
     and with "second generations." The rest of the cables she cites
     recount information given to Japan in fall 1941, long after any
     discussion of recruiting Japanese Americans had ceased, with no
     clue as to the source of the information given. The sum total of
     the information is that Japan unquestionably tried to build a spy
     network in the US during 1941. It is also clear that the Japanese
     wished to recruit Japanese Americans, as well as non-Japanese.

     Even assuming for the sake of argument that the MAGIC excerpts did
     show some credible risk of disloyal activity by Nisei on the West
     Coast, those who made the case for internment did not rely on them.
     The author herself notes that access to the MAGIC encrypts was
     limited to a dozen people outside the decrypters, and notably says
     that President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and
     Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy had access to the MAGIC
     cables. This leaves her in the position of asserting that the
     essential reflection and decision was made by those three figures,
     and the reasons or motivations of all other actors were irrelevant.
     However, the record amply demonstrates that West Coast Defense
     Commander General John DeWitt (and his assistant Karl Bendetsen)
     were largely responsible for making the case for evacuation, and
     that their judgment of the situation and their recommendation for
     mass evacuation overcame the initial opposition of McCloy and
     Stimson. DeWitt's motivations for urging evacuation--notably his
     comment to McCloy that "a Jap is a Jap," and his reliance on
     arguments about the "racial strains" of the Japanese in his Final
     Report--indicate that his conduct was informed by racism.

     Finally, there is no direct evidence to support the contention that
     the MAGIC excerpts played a decisive role in the decision of the
     figures who did have access to them to authorize mass evacuation,
     and considerable evidence that leads to a contrary inference.
     Throughout all the confidential memoranda and conversations taking
     place within the War Department at the time of the decision on
     evacuation, transcripts which show people speaking extremely
     freely, the MAGIC excerpts are not mentioned a single time. In
     particular, there is no evidence that President Roosevelt ever saw
     or was briefed on the MAGIC excerpts the author mentions, let alone
     that he was decisively influenced by them. As I detail at great
     length in my book "By Order of the President," throughout the 1930s
     Roosevelt expressed suspicions of Japanese Americans, irrespective
     of citizenship, and sought to keep the community under
     surveillance. As early as 1936, he already approved plans to arrest
     suspicious Japanese Americans in Hawaii if war broke out. As of
     early 1941, before FDR could have received any MAGIC excerpts, the
     Justice Department and the military had already put together lists
     of aliens to be taken into custody (the so-called ABC lists). These
     were not based on suspicion of individual activities, but of the
     suspected individuals' position in Japanese communities. Roosevelt
     continued to believe in a threat despite receiving reports of
     overwhelming community loyalty from the FBI and his own agents,
     reports he called "nothing much new."

   More to come.

References

   1. 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/067401118X/qid=1091665691/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i1_xgl14/002-2050039-1485644?v=glance&s=books&n=507846
   2. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/books2001-12-11.htm
   3. http://print.google.com/print/doc?isbn=0674006399
   4. http://michellemalkin.com/archives/000337.htm

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