Posted by Jonathan Adler:
The Recurring Question of *Chevron* Deference & Agency Jurisdiction:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_19-2009_07_25.shtml#1248127466


   Unless you�re an avid follower of federal energy law, there�s no
   reason you would have noticed the U.S. Court of Appeals for District
   of Columbia�s recent decision in [1]Connecticut Department of Public
   Utility Control v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. In this case,
   a panel held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has
   jurisdiction to review the installed capacity requirement set by a
   regional transmission organization that administers regional
   electricity transmission. Those not focused on energy regulation
   (myself included) might be tempted to ask, �Who cares?� But not so
   fast. CDPUC v. FERC raised an interesting an important administrative
   law question that has bedeviled and divided federal appellate courts
   for years: Whether courts should grant Chevron deference to agency
   statutory interpretations that implicate the an agency�s regulatory
   jurisdiction.

   In CDPUC v. FERC the D.C. Circuit answered this question in the
   affirmative. �We afford Chevron deference to the Commission�s
   assertion of jurisdiction,� the panel stated with no elaboration,
   citing to a 1994 D.C. Circuit decision and Chevron itself. What the
   panel failed to note, is that several other circuits disagree with
   this approach. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit itself has not always taken
   this view, and the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the question
   directly � though Justices Scalia and Brennan debated the issue in
   [2]Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore.

   The Second, Third, Fourth and Ninth Circuits have all held that
   Chevron deference should apply in the jurisdictional context. The
   Seventh and Federal Circuits have gone the other way. Just this past
   March, in [3]Tafas v. Doll, the Federal Circuit reiterated its
   position that �an agency's determination of the scope of its own
   authority is not entitled to Chevron deference.� Two weeks ago, the
   Federal Circuit [4]agreed to rehear Tafas v. Doll en banc.

   The D.C. Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, has been less consistent on
   the subject. In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC -- the case relied
   upon in CPUC v. FERC -- the D.C. Circuit declared it would �review
   FERC's interpretation of its authority to exercise jurisdiction over
   transportation with the familiar Chevron framework in mind.� Yet in
   some prior cases, the D.C. Circuit has expressly declined to defer to
   agency interpretations of statutory provisions defining the scope of
   an agency�s jurisdiction. As the court explained in its 1987 decision
   in ACLU v. FCC:

     it seems highly unlikely that a responsible Congress would
     implicitly delegate to an agency the power to define the scope of
     its own power. When an agency's assertion of power into new areas
     is under attack, therefore, courts should perform a close and
     searching analysis of congressional intent, remaining skeptical of
     the proposition that Congress did not speak to such a fundamental
     issue.

   My own view is that the D.C. Circuit had it right in 1987 is wrong
   today. [This also, interestingly enough, places me on the side of
   Justice Brennan in Mississippi Power & Light.] As Nathan Sales and I
   argue in an article forthcoming in the University of Illinois Law
   Review, [5]�The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency
   Jurisdiction and Statutory Silences,� courts should not defer to an
   agency�s statutory interpretations that implicates the existence or
   scope of an agency�s jurisdiction. We argue that such deference is not
   required by existing precedent, is inconsistent with the Chevron
   doctrine as currently understood, and is also unwise. A draft and
   abstract are on SSRN [6]here; the article will be published later this
   year.

   I do not know whether CPUC v. FERC is a good vehicle for presenting
   this issue to the Supreme Court. Nor do I know how much the Federal
   Circuit will focus on this specific question when it rehears Tafas v.
   Doll. But I do know this is an important question of administrative
   law, and one the Supreme Court will, sooner or later, have to address.

   For some prior posts on this subject, see [7]here.

References

   1. 
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200906/07-1375-1186743.pdf
   2. 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=487&invol=354
   3. 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/tafas-v-doll-some-rules-valid-others-invalid.html
   4. http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1352o.pdf
   5. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1213149
   6. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1213149
   7. http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1219370782.shtml

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