> At the time of the synchronization, the EB frame can neither be authenticated > nor its freshness verified.
I suggest:
> At the time of the synchronization, the EB frame can neither be authenticated
> nor its freshness verified. An attacker could have fabricated the EB, or
> may have simply replayed a previous EB (see RFC7416, many sections,
> including section-7.3.5). The pledge has no way to know at this point.
I think that you should move the attack description earlier.
The attack described is a kind of wormhole MITM attack, and I think it is
useful to reference 7416.
> that is normally in use in the network.
this is probably too vague. I think it's the active K1.
- The frames should be passed to the upper layer for processing using the
- promiscuous mode of {{IEEE802.15.4}} or another appropriate mechanism.
+ The pledge should be placed into promiscuous mode of {{IEEE802.15.4}}
+ (or another appropriate mechanism implementation specific mechanism)
+ in order that they can be passed to the upper layer for processing
+ despite the frames failing the security check due to lack of a key.
{I can put these into github if you like, but I will finish reading the
thread first}
--
] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh networks [
] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | IoT architect [
] [email protected] http://www.sandelman.ca/ | ruby on rails [
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