On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 12:25:14 +0000, Hugo Landau wrote: > 1. Clarify the specification to state that the root certificate must > always appear in the chain at the end. Clients should be advised to > pop the root certificate if they are procuring certificate chains > for non-DANE applications only. Failure to do so will result in > unnecessary but harmless transmission of the root certificate > during TLS handshakes. > > 2. Don't include the root certificate but provide a way to retrieve it, > e.g. via a Link header. > > 3. Clarify the specification to state that the root certificate must > not appear in the chain, and that roots must be retrieved using the > AIA URL inside the final certificate in the chain if it is needed. > This minimises the chance of clients for non-DANE applications > messing up and provides a viable method for discovery of the root > CA for applications which need it. > > I'd support option 1 or option 3 equally. Either way, I think this > should be clarified. > > Thoughts?
There's one more option which I'd actually prefer.
4. Root certificate does not appear in the chain but it's expected
that clients already know it. E.g. look in /etc/ssl/certs/.
Rationale is that the client shouldn't blindly trust that the chain
received by the acme server is valid.
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