Us in SBSland have newsgroups and MVPs.
<don't have a TAM either>
Brian Desmond wrote:
*Technical Account Manager. When you spend ample money with MS, you
get one of these. I think a PSS contract is enough to have one.
They’re sort of your MS/Customer bridge. *
* *
**Thanks,***
**Brian Desmond***
[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
**c - 312.731.3132**
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] *On Behalf Of *DeStefano, Dan
*Sent:* Friday, September 23, 2005 12:26 PM
*To:* [email protected]
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security
Excuse my ignorance, but what is a TAM?
Dan
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] *On Behalf Of *ASB
*Sent:* Friday, September 23, 2005 5:46 AM
*To:* [email protected]
*Subject:* Re: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security
And knowing it, I can always take extra precautions.
The knowing it consists of "don't do it, because you can't secure it"
There are no extra precautions to take. Certainly, you can increase
your auditing, but you could do that now without knowing anything else.
basically, 25% more prepared and secure against this type of attack
is better than 0%.
The more people that know, the higher the potential of attack. And, as
folks have pointed out, since there are no viable workarounds, it
doesn't help anyone to have the number of potential attackers increased.
Call your TAM and see if he or she will provide enough details for you
to feel comfortable.
-ASB
FAST, CHEAP, SECURE: Pick Any TWO
http://www.ultratech-llc.com/KB/
On 9/23/05, *Kamlesh Parmar* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
I have to disagree a bit here...
Certainly, obscuring of information is not the way to feel secure.
If I don't know, how it is done, then how do I know, that I will be
able to detect it, and trace it.
And knowing it, I can always take extra precautions. Which I think,
better than not knowing it at all.
basically, 25% more prepared and secure against this type of attack is
better than 0%. and certainly it helps calibrate how much paranoid I
have to be. :-)
I would like to know, how it is done, as our team is currently
migrating some good number of domains to single domain. And we are
going to give local guys rights to logon to DC for some system
maintenance purposes, till final single domain is cleaned up and we
revert back to core team for day-to-day maintenance.
So I am very much interested in knowing it.
On 9/23/05, *joe* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>
wrote:
The docs are wrong. Many of us have been hounding MS on this for
years. They really started straightening out docs with K3. Some of the
older 2K docs still suggest this security boundary at the domain. It
really came to a head when Lucent put out a paper on this and it
started getting quoted in the newsgroups and some of us just flamed
the crap out of it.
No one here or anywhere should really publish how to exploit rights on
a DC to take over a forest. The answer is pretty self-evident if
someone understands the underpinnings and processes used in AD and
since we can't fully protect against it, it is better left
undocumented. If there was a guaranteed safe way to protect ourselves,
then we could publish that workaround and some time later publish the
issue.
joe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *DeStefano, Dan
*Sent:* Thursday, September 22, 2005 2:09 PM
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security
I thought that in ad domains are considered security boundaries. In
the cert exams, namely the 70-219, they are considered as such. Also,
how would a domain admin of a child domain elevate his privileges?
Dan
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *Phil Renouf
*Sent:* Thursday, September 22, 2005 1:28 PM
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* Re: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security
Even as a domain admin of a Child domain they will still be able to
munge your forest or elevate their priviledges. The security boundary
in AD is at the forest, not the domain.
Phil
On 9/22/05, *Gideon Ashcraft* < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
The only thing to do is to make him an admin of that site, or better
yet make that site a child domain and make him a domain admin of that
child domain. I know from experience that using a DC as anything but a
DC is a freakin pain in the ass, my predecessor set a DC up as a
print/file server and another as a SQL server (finally able to demote
that one now, soon hopefully). But my citrix profiles are on the
domain controller, and after months of trying to set delegation up
properly in AD and setting up permissions in the appropriate folders
on the DC, the only way I was able to get my Helpdesk admin set up to
create accounts with my scripts so that I didn't have to do it was to
make him a domain admin. My company is too damn cheap to get me
another server to put the citrix profiles somewhere else. Oh yeah, and
its an app server for network install of office (can you feel my pain).
So, if there is only one server in the site and its a DC, the only way
to get him to do anything is to make him a domain admin (make it a
child domain so he can't climb up the tree)
Gideon Ashcraft
Network Admin
Screen Actors Guild
ct: RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security
Look through the archives.
The short answer is... "Just don't do it". You can't possibly secure
this regardless of what anyone says. If someone says it can be made
safe, stop asking them technical questions about Domain Controllers
and Active Directory.
Either you trust the person or you don't. If you don't trust the
person, then don't put the person in a position to show you the
meaning of screwed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *van Donk, Fred
*Sent: *Tuesday, September 20, 2005 4:52 PM
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security
I have a contractor in a remote site. There is only 1 server in that
site which is a DC.
He needs to administer that server.
-Create shares
-Make file/share permissions
-Change user passwords in the User OU for that site.
He is not allowed to log on to any other server is the domain.
When I make him a "Server Operator" he can logon to any server in the
domain.
Any idea on how to lock him down to that one server and then how to
lock him down on that one OU where he should only be allowed to change
the passwords of the users.
Thanks!
Fred
NOTICE: The information contained in this transmission is privileged,
confidential, and intended only for the use of the individual or
entity named above. If you are not the intended recipient, you are
hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or the
taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this transmission
is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in
error, please notify Eze Castle Integration, Inc. by e-mail and
destroy the original message and all copies. Thank you.
List info : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx
List FAQ : http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx
List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/
