You made a comment in the previous thread that I think is rather
interesting:
"Get your checkbook out and stop being stingy. :) "
That's a nice thing to say when you're saying it to someone else. But
if they tell you that you have to spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars or millions when they have metrics that require them to reduce
the costs or it's their job.
I'm not trying to minimize the importance of security and least
privileged access. Reality is though that we don't control what the
rest of the company does, no matter how much 'for their good' it might
be. We don't own the data, we don't own the groups. We own the
servers, the OS and the security model itself. We can simply provide
the tools and try and steer them down the right path, while trying to
make sure it's a path that they can walk down. The minute we make a
path that's too difficult to walk down, the path will get changed on
us for a more managable model, with only a chance that we're involved
at all. More likely it will be someone who has no knowledge of the
environment and is building a straight forward "MS says...."
environment that could potentially be worse than what is already in
place, but the people who are now making the decisions aren't very
busy listening to us any more.
On 8/1/06, *Matt Hargraves* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
Without going with an Access-Based Security (ABS) model, there are
few ways to make sure that all of the people who need access to an
object are the only ones who are getting access. Local server
security groups (which are difficult to manage), a smallish
environment, user-based ACLs on rights and objects, or a very
strange environment, there is no other way to have a 100% accurate
security environment for resources.
Access based security is nice because it is very granular, but the
problem with it is that it has a very high level of maintenance
and has a lot of room for error and a lot of inherent cost in
hardware. The larger the environment, the larger the number of
points of failure in the security model. You have 100,000 shares
in an environment (or more) and the number of people required to
manage that resource start getting restrictively high.
Does John the Crankshaft mechanic need access to share
"\\servername\share80385"? Probably not 95% of the time, but that
one or two times a year that he does need access, do you really
want to make him wait between 2 hours and potentially as high as 2
days to gain that access just so that you an have 100 people
controlling 1,000 shares and the ACLs each?
I can't argue that RBS is the only way to go, but there's nothing
wrong with going with a hybrid. RBS base with an ABS overlap ends
up with a security model where you've got the potential for
granularity, but a system where a resource has a team that may
need access to an object, they can be granted that access and if
there are individuals who need access above and beyond what the
RBS model would grant, the access can be granted. Users who
change roles are automatically removed from the groups they are no
longer members of (via the HR software, SAP or whatever) and when
someone moves into a role where they now require access to a
resource (or set of resources), they are automatically granted
that access via the same mechanism.
The alternative is a forest root with disjoined domain that holds
users, then a resource subdomain and an Exchange subdomain. 2-3
times as many DCs, added cost that goes with that (power, a/c, NOC
space), added overhead of maintaining that somewhat complex
environment... the alternative for larger environments is to buy
2-3 times as many Exchange servers due to large token sizes. Not
to mention the bloating of your DIT database causing reduced
performance on your DCs.
An exclusive RBS is a best-case scenario that almost never
exists. But it should be the basis of a security model. The
alternative is a bloated environment and a bloated management
structure for that environment.
An exclusive ABS is another best-case scenario that rarely exists
outside of smaller environments, where management of resources is
easier to control because the people who are controlling the
resource know everyone who needs access to their resource.
Considering how large the companies you commonly work with are,
it's suprising to see you recommending a difficult to manage
model. With hundreds of thousands of users and possibly a nearly
identical number of shares (or worse... more) and a large number
of applications, it's hard to see where an ABS is practical.
On 7/31/06, *joe* < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
If I am fixing security bugs in my program is it ok to get 80%
of them and leave the remaining known 20%?
Do you have a lot of faith in a firewall that stops 80% of the
bad traffic? Or an AV scanner that finds 80%?
If I set up a shared folder to get files shared out to
multiple folks, is it ok if only 80% of the people I give
access to really need the access? What if in that shared
folder are personal files about you or your wife or your kids
or maybe some compromising photos of you and your mistress[1]? :)
How about the flip side, if I set up a shared folder and only
80% of the folks who need the access get it, is that good?
Would you have a list of people in the DA group where only 80%
really needed the access? Or again on the flip side, only 80%
of the people who required it got it?
Security should be very tightly controlled. Especially for
access.
Role based security fits squarely in this hole, IMO. It is
probably more a problem with the implementation and the
definition of the roles than anything because if you really
got into defining really granular roles that you should, you
are almost at the point of doing resource based security
anyway which again, IMO, is by far the more secure way of
handling resource security. It is rare that the data access
requirements of everyone listed as a CrankShaft Engineer, for
example, are identical in a company. Sure, a good portion of
the folks will all access the same things but it isn't good to
say well then, the Role Crankshaft engineers gets all of these
accesses. Those of you don't really need the access but are in
the role... don't look at that data... Pshaw. I just said this
the other day on another list but good fences make good
neighbors. You don't trust people not to do bad things, you do
everything you can to prevent them from having the opportunity
to do the bad thing in the first place. With resource based
access, you give the people who need the access to the
resource the access. It is much easier overall to figure out
who has the access and remove folks who don't need it.
joe
[1] Not sure why anyone would need to those photos but if they
were being shared, certainly the fewer the better and most
certainly only the folks who are absolutely required.
--
O'Reilly Active Directory Third Edition -
http://www.joeware.net/win/ad3e.htm
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of
*Alex Alborzfard
*Sent:* Monday, July 31, 2006 4:32 PM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
Can you elaborate on why you think 80/20 concept in security
is sloppy joe (no pun intended!)?
Alex
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *joe
*Sent:* Monday, July 31, 2006 3:14 PM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
It is a sensitive spot with me, I think 80/20 is a great
concept, but in security it is a bit sloppy.
--
O'Reilly Active Directory Third Edition -
http://www.joeware.net/win/ad3e.htm
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *Al
Mulnick
*Sent:* Monday, July 31, 2006 12:29 PM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* Re: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
Darned if you weren't the only one to pick up on it. :)
On 7/30/06, *joe* < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
Argh there it is.... 80/20 in a security discussion. Oi!
:)
--
O'Reilly Active Directory Third Edition -
http://www.joeware.net/win/ad3e.htm
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *Al
Mulnick
*Sent:* Saturday, July 29, 2006 10:06 AM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject: *Re: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
Agreed. Very useful.
Guido, I'm curious. You mentioned this:
"However, many companies have organized their AD with a
geographic OU structure, which doesn't necessarily match 100%
to their site structure, but certainly gets pretty close. And
since the delegation model is often configured such that local
admins manage particular aspects of the users and computers in
their site, it is a common practice to move a user account
from one OU to another when the user is relocated to a
different location within the company. As such the OU
structure is often a good starting base to build policies for
which credentials to replicate to which RODC…"
How many of your customers do you see that travel between
those sites and what would be the implications in your scenario/s?
This has been a problem that I have seen many times in the
past. I'm just curious what you've seen and how it's been
solved. In my case, I see everything from no technical
resource on site (sometimes not even opposable thumbs that we
can count on) to a local administrator. Often this depends on
historical vs. business logic. To date, most designs I have
been involved with have been the 80/20 of "yep, that'll take
care of most of your issues, but there will be exceptions and
here's the plan for that". Some have also favored business
unit logical lines. What I mean by that is a business unit's
computing resources are deployed as cookie cutter as possible
with the idea that almost the entire business unit will not
need what a different business unit needs per se. Another
factor is the geographical and co-location of business units
and some shared resources that the units might have. Typically
a blend of the two approaches(base for *all* users anywhere,
and business unit centric) has worked out since the
co-location of business units makes sense for some organizations.
But I'm wondering if you've seen differently? If anyone else
sees another way of solving the issue, I'm interested in
hearing about it if you can share. I wonder about it because
trying to get them to fit into an OU by geography can be a
tough approach with lots of touch times. They will constantly
move in and out of many different geo's during a given time
period. The users move around a lot as well and some have
high turnover.
Interesting.
Al
On 7/29/06, *Grillenmeier, Guido* < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
But very useful idle chatter nonetheless ;-)
/Guido
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of
*Eric Fleischman
*Sent: *Saturday, July 29, 2006 8:35 AM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject: *RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
You basically articulated my point for me. J
> And once tools exist to automate this knowledge whether by
populating groups or attributes (such as office or address)
> or leveraging an OU structure, it really doesn't matter which
mechanism is used to configure the RODC policies.
Yup. My contention is that in many cases, I think this will be
non-trivial for customers. They will have trouble knowing
where security principals are….especially computers. So we
need to spend engineering effort here (the Auth2 list should
help with this though).
> However, many companies have organized their AD with a
geographic OU structure, which doesn't necessarily match
> 100% to their site structure, but certainly gets pretty close
Yes, and because it is not 100%, they'll either need to move
users around across their OUs (which has other implications,
like on delegation) or use groups to work around it. ;)
My contention is not that OUs are a bad idea for this sort of
policy. Only that:
- For many customers they will not work. Groups will
work for all customers, even the ones that are already
organized by OU….simply provision a group with the OU
membership and you have it.
- If I ran the world and got to choose ever engineering
dollar that we spend, I would want to solve as many problems
as I can. Far more customers will have trouble figuring out
what security principals are where than there are customers
that have a 100% site to OU mapping.
My $0.02. Since I don't make this call, maybe this is idle
chatter. ;)
~Eric
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of
*Grillenmeier, Guido
*Sent:* Friday, July 28, 2006 11:15 PM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
Ofcourse OUs don't fix the underlying challenge of knowing
which user belongs to which site. And once tools exist to
automate this knowledge whether by populating groups or
attributes (such as office or address) or leveraging an OU
structure, it really doesn't matter which mechanism is used to
configure the RODC policies.
However, many companies have organized their AD with a
geographic OU structure, which doesn't necessarily match 100%
to their site structure, but certainly gets pretty close. And
since the delegation model is often configured such that local
admins manage particular aspects of the users and computers in
their site, it is a common practice to move a user account
from one OU to another when the user is relocated to a
different location within the company. As such the OU
structure is often a good starting base to build policies for
which credentials to replicate to which RODC…
I do agree that a lot of the same customers tend to have a
security group that matches the OU a user is located in,
simply because an OU is not a security principal and thus you
can't use it for permissioning (another long missed feature
from Netware). The problem is that without automation tools
(and there are still plenty of customers without these), the
"OU-specific users group" won't necessarily be updated as
consistently when a User account is moved from one OU to another.
I am sure that at some point it is a performance thing – not
sure how this password replication mechanism actually works in
the background, but I think an RODC needs to make decisions at
the time of logon of a user: during the logon process the RODC
must determine if it should cache (and then continue to
replicate) the user's credentials or not. And I guess a
user's group-membership is analyzed faster than figuring out
the OU that a user belongs to.
Naturally, query based security groups wouldn't help to
improve performance, but if you could add some nice processes
from MIIS to AD that periodically and dynamically populate AD
groups based on LDAP queries (without the need to support
another database), this would certainly help. And the I would
be all for using groups instead of OUs ;-)
/Guido
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of
*Eric Fleischman
*Sent: *Friday, July 28, 2006 11:02 PM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
> And currently this is all based on group memberships. I hope
to see an option coming up to use OU's instead.
To be clear, OUs are a "Guido likes the way this looks"
feature, not a "this helps the problem" feature.
The crux of the problem is figuring out who to cache on a
given RODC. If you know this…by OU membership or something
else…constructing a group with said membership is trivial.
However, if you don't know this, OU based policy is not going
to help.
With that, I'll state in public that my vote is not to build
OU based policy. Why? Because it doesn't fix the problem.
Instead, I want to spend our engineering dollars building
tools to help users find who should be cached where…ie,
tackling the problem itself head on. Whether you then organize
by OU or just populate groups is the easy part.
~Eric
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of
*Grillenmeier, Guido
*Sent:* Friday, July 28, 2006 1:33 PM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
Could be worth to note that an RODC can also be a DNS server
for the respective BO. As it is designed for one-way
replication from a writeable DC, it does not allow direct
dynamic updates of DNS records that are requested to be
updated by clients that use the RODC as a DNS server (same is
true for password changes) => these are basically forwarded to
the next writeable DC and then replicated back to the RODC.
Sounds complicated, but makes sense as the RODC should be
regarded as an "untrusted" DC.
I am certainly a friend of combining RODC with Server Core for
BO environments. Combine this with the Admin Separation
features of RODC and you have a great BO story. Admin
Separation means that you can make a non-domain admin a member
of the local admin group on an RODC, without granting him/her
admin rights in AD. Server Core will obviously not only be
useful for BOs – they can also host writeable DCs in a
company's datacenters.
Biggest challenge I see is configuring the policies for
storing credentials on RODCs – it's the typical challenge of
matching mobile objects (users and notebooks) to non-mobile
devices (an RODC in a site). And currently this is all based
on group memberships. I hope to see an option coming up to use
OU's instead.
I do agree with Al, that the original blog entry that started
this discussion was a little misleading and didn't do the
features of RODC justice.
/Guido
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of
*Eric Fleischman
*Sent: *Friday, July 28, 2006 9:42 PM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
Hi Al,
Take your workstation and take a sniff of a logon. All traffic
you throw at the DC will work against the RODC. The only WAN
traffic in that scenario would be the auth itself, a tiny amt
of work. (assuming GC and all that is satisfied locally)
So, the statement that authentication is your biggest use is
true, kinda…you need to more carefully define the operation. I
suspect you don't mean auth in the Kerberos sense, you mean
"user logon" really. Unless your branch has a bunch of apps
that do Kerb work and no clients….then you can correct me and
we have a totally different conversation on our hands. :)
Answering some questions of yours, from this and other forks
of the thread…..
> What conditions would make it so that the password policy
would be configured such that the password replication
> was not allowed?
There is a policy (not group policy, administrative one
defined in AD itself) which defines what can be cached there
and what can not. The statement made (I think first by Dmitri,
but I then commented on it further) was that by default, this
policy allows almost nothing to be cached. You could tweak
this in your enterprise and change what is cached, anything
from the near-nothing default to almost every secret in the
domain. You can choose.
> Would that just be that the RODC is no longer trusted (i.e.
it was abducted or otherwise compromised?)
Well, we never know if an RODC was compromised. Rather, RODC
was built such that you the admin can assume they are
compromised, and fully understand the scope of compromise in
your enterprise should it happen one day, and respond to said
event.
So, I say you should look at this problem the other way….
Treat your RODCs /as if/ they were about to get compromised,
then make real decisions around how much work the recovery
from said compromise would be vs. actually having an
environment that is useful, reliable, easy to manage, etc.
That's what I was talking about re: the knobs….you can turn
said knobs and make decisions that work for you. And we'll
have documentation that will help you do this.
> Or is that something that some admin can configure and hurt
themselves? Better yet, if that were true, is there any value
left in the
> RODC that can't get a password hash?
I think I answered this but please holler if it is still unclear.
> Outside of "GP work" what else comes to mind that is
off-loaded to the local site that you can think of?
Take a network sniff of your clients talking to your DCs for a
day. Almost all of that stuff. J You could have apps, you have
logon itself, etc.
> Perhaps I'm looking at this sideways?
Every environment is different. It is entirely possible that a
secret-less RODC is totally uninteresting in your enterprise.
That said, I would argue that you probably haven't done enough
investigation yet to really know if that's true or not…it's
not personal, why would you? This has likely never been
relevant. Almost no one does this sort of analysis unless they
absolutely have to.
Take some data, please report back to us. I'd love to look at
said data with you if you're unclear as to what would fall in
what bucket.
Hope this helps. Please holler back with questions.
~Eric
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *Al
Mulnick
*Sent:* Friday, July 28, 2006 10:34 AM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* Re: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
More clarity is always welcome.
I suspect I'm trying to get my mind around the GPO providing
that much value that I would want to put a DC in the local
brach as part of the design vs. trying really hard to use as
little of the GPO as possible and making sure that the changes
are as infrequent as possible.
Authentication and name resolution are my biggest uses for a
local DC in a branch. Outside of Exchange of course.
Everything else I try to keep as compartmentalized as I can
because if my WAN is a concern such that I can't use
authentication across the wire (or can't trust it) then I have
some big concerns about the branch environment and how
autonomous it is.
Outside of "GP work" what else comes to mind that is
off-loaded to the local site that you can think of?
Perhaps I'm looking at this sideways?
On 7/28/06, *Eric Fleischman* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
To add a bit more…
> The part that makes me wonder about the "story" is if it
stores no secrets is the server doing anything for me?
The short answer is yes.
The bulk of the work that a DC does, even in the auth code
path, may not involve the secret. So even if the secret
checking work is "outsourced" to a hub DC, there is a lot more
work that the local DC can perform for the user. For example,
if it is an interactive logon, consider all of the GP work
alone that is done that is now local.
At the end of the day, you have a knob….you can make real
security trade-offs based upon what attack surface you can
accept & mitigate, what administrative story you want, etc.
You get to choose what secrets end up on the RODC. The product
is built such that you can turn these knobs as you see fit but
the default knob setting is "more secure".
I hope between my response and Dmitri's you are clear that the
belief that it stores "nothing locally" is incorrect. If more
clarity is required please just holler.
~Eric
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of
*Dmitri Gavrilov
*Sent: *Friday, July 28, 2006 9:48 AM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
The set of passwords that **can** be sent down to the RODC is
controlled by password replication policy. The passwords are
sent down by RODC's request, but the hub also checks whether
the user (whose pwd is being requested) actually attempted to
authenticate at RODC (the hub can induce this info from the
traffic is sees). The pwd hash is sent down only if both are
satisfied: pwd policy allows it and the user actually
attempted to logon there.
Pwd policy is "empty" by default, i.e. nobody is in "allowed
to reveal" list. It is admin's responsibility to populate this
list. We might have some UI that helps with this process.
Once the hash is sent down, there's no way to remove it from
RODC, basically because we do not trust that RODC will remove
it, even if instructed to do so. Therefore, the only way to
"expire" the hash is to change the password. We store the list
of passwords that were sent down to RODC in an attribute on
the RODC computer object (the hub DC updates the list when it
sends a pwd). So, if the RODC is stolen, you can enumerate
whose passwords were down there, and make these users reset
their passwords. There's a constructed attribute that returns
only the users whose * *current** passwords appear to be on
the RODC.
WRT what data is sent down – currently, we send everything,
sans a handful of "secret" attributes, which are controlled by
pwd replication policy. There's a DCR to be able to configure
the list of attributes that can go down to RODC (aka RODC
PAS), but it is not yet clear if we will get it done or not.
Note that the client data access story on RODC becomes quite
convoluted because you don't know if you are seeing the whole
object or only a subset of it. We do not normally issue
referrals due to "partial reads".
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of
[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
*Sent:* Friday, July 28, 2006 8:22 AM
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
RODC stores password hashes only for a pre defined list of
users and they are not stored on a permanent basis. [I'm
unclear how the latter is achieved.]
The goal is such that if the RODC were removed from the office
then no password secrets could be extracted from that machine.
neil
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *Al
Mulnick
*Sent:* 28 July 2006 16:08
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Subject: *Re: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and
Server Core
The part that makes me wonder about the "story" is if it
stores no secrets is the server doing anything for me? Is
there a point to deploying the server in a remote office other
than just being able to point to it in the closet and say,
"see, I do to earn my paycheck!"
I'm sure there's more, but I don't yet know which parts are
public information and which are NDA.
Can you tell I'm concerned about the story being created? I
like stories; don't get me wrong. But I'm concerned that the
story being spun up might be missing the mark and lead a few
people astray.
Safe to note that there are some features that differentiate
the RODC from a NT4 BDC and that make it appealing in some cases.
But if it actually does not store anything locally, ever, then
I'm not sure it's worth the time to deploy one now is it?
Al
On 7/27/06, *Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP]* <
[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
FYI:
http://blogs.msdn.com/jolson/archive/2006/07/27/679801.aspx
<http://blogs.msdn.com/jolson/archive/2006/07/27/679801.aspx>
Read-Only Domain Controller and Server Core
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