Thanks, Mike. Bad news for me, I guess. My message as it came back to me via Databack was broken up, and the copy via you was a basket of stammering shards (see below). what are you on -- a Mac or a PC with Windows?
In a message dated 3/24/08 1:59:51 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > I use MS Outlook Express ver. 6 to manage my email. Your post below has > broken paragraphs in the "preview" window, but if I open the email into its > own window the text has mostly solid paragraphs. About three lines seem to > have exceeded some maximum length and resulted in a dangling word or two. > > An example of this is: > > > "works" in Ohio but not in the Andes because it "has meaning" only where > > English is > > regularly spoken. But why is that? Why doesn't it "have meaning" in a > > (I don't know how teh above will appear.) > > > Mike Mallory > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[email protected]> > Sent: Monday, March 24, 2008 9:42 AM > Subject: Feedback from listers needed on this test. > > > > I've been whining to Databack that postings arrive with the paragraph > > shattered by line-breaks so I get a long line, then a line with two words, > > then a > > long line, then a one-word line. But it now occurs to me that it may not > > be > > Databack's doing, but, rather, the result of a weakness in my AOL server. > > So I now > > ask listers to tell me if they receive this posting with solid paragraphs, > > or > > paragraphs shattered by inapt line breaks. (The paragraphs at the very > > bottom > > have line breaks because they were not keyboarded by me, but copied from a > > received posting.) Many thanks to those who report back -- Cheerskep > > > > Derek quoted Cheerskep: > > > > "If I utter "doggy" to a shepherd in the remote Andes, no picture of a dog > > will arise in his mind. But if 'doggy' "has a meaning", why doesn't that > > happen? Because he hasn't been exposed to repeated association of the > > sound, > > "doggy", with real dogs that his parents pointed at when they said the > > word." > > > > Derek then responded: > > > > "Isn't the answer to this just that a word has meaning only in its > > relevant > > speech community?" > > > > But, for openers, this makes the unwarranted assumption that there exists > > an > > entity, or property, or action that Derek believes he "refers to" when he > > says > > 'meaning'. > > > > And he is required to "account for" the fact that this "meaning" of a word > > exists only in a "relevant speech community". Derek would say that 'doggy' > > "works" in Ohio but not in the Andes because it "has meaning" only where > > English is > > regularly spoken. But why is that? Why doesn't it "have meaning" in a > > non-relevant speech community? > > > > It's reasonable to ask Derek to describe as precisely as he can what he > > has > > in mind when he says, "a word has meaning" -- in particular what he has in > > mind > > with the word 'meaning' and the word 'has'. > > > > In my previous posting, '"Signs", "meanings" and associations', I argued > > that > > the alleged "referent" of 'meaning' is a chimera, there are no such > > things. I > > claimed to "account for" everything we think of as "communication" without > > ever having to cite a "meaning". An atheist might say that to assume the > > existence of "meanings" is as unwarranted as assuming the existence of > > souls or > > guardian angels. > > > > My argument also "accounts for" why 'doggy' draws a blank in the Andes: > > The > > shepherd was never subjected to the repeated juxtaposition of the > > utterance > > "doggy" and a parent's pointing at a real dog -- thus affecting an > > association in > > the shepherd's mind. Everything about communication that Derek would > > require > > three entities to explain -- a sign (e.g. an utterance), a meaning, and a > > consequently stirred notion -- I'd explain with two: the sign, and the > > notion > > summoned up by the associating mind.. > > > > Derek's would-be explanation of why "'Doggy' has meaning only in > > English-speaking countries" raises more (unanswerable) questions than it > > answers. > > > > I should spend a moment on a usage of 'to mean' and 'meaning' that will > > always be with us and is allowable if serviceably restricted. > > > > All instances of the verb form, 'to mean', when ascribed to an entity that > > is > > non-sentient -- that can't have notions, intentions -- are wrong because > > they > > "refer to" a chimerical action, and they are dangerous because they lead > > us > > to assume many other chimerical entities. Inert ink, and even the sound > > waves > > of utterances, do not "mean". They are the occasion for all sorts of > > wildly > > varying notion in our wildly varying minds. (Our minds vary in their > > receiving > > apparatus, their store of remembered notions from which the mind will > > retrieve > > things to associate with a newly received sensation, and the retrieving > > apparatus.) > > > > Derek cites public signage that, it seems to him, "have meanings which > > sometimes stretch beyond a given speech community - e.g. a basic image of > > a man (and > > not a woman) on what looks like it could be a toilet door can be found in > > lots of countries. Arrows for pointing are also pretty well universal." > > But the > > communicating effectiveness of these signs can all be accounted for by the > > "associating" mechanism. And the associating explanation avoids the absurd > > entailment that an inert steel road sign is assiduously "meaning" > > twenty-four-seven > > regardless of there being no traffic. > > > > The act of "meaning" can, with some safety, be ascribed to a human. We > > often > > say, "He means --" or "I mean --." "John means he is penniless." All that > > one > > has in mind with a sentence like that is this: "John has in mind some > > information, a notion, that he wants you to "get". The language he used to > > convey that > > notion may not have done the job. I'll rephrase his attempt to articulate > > his > > notion." > > > > It's very understandable that we slide from ascribing the act of meaning > > to a > > person to ascribing it to a non-sentient entity. "John's letter means --" > > "That road sign means --" "That poem means --" But when we do we're on a > > slippery > > slope. If we're not careful we soon find ourselves arguing about "the > > meaning > > of" a poem or novel or painting -- and we're not talking about the notion > > we're convinced the creator "meant" to convey. > > > > > >
