Re: 'It might be useful in these kinds of artistic disputes to continue classifying the humanal arts or humanities.. etc"
You can classify jazz, rock and pop how you like. I will still say they are impoverished musical forms. DA ----- Original Message ----- From: "Frances Kelly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[email protected]> Subject: RE: [???] Re: Music and all that jazz Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 21:10:37 -0400 > Frances to Derek and members... > > You mused in essence that music in the form of jazz and > rock and pop and folk songs are a seriously impoverished > musical form, and that you could no more convince yourself > that any of these are a masterpiece of human creation than > you could convince yourself that a toy aeroplane is a real > one. > > It might be useful in these kinds of artistic disputes to > continue classifying the humanal arts or humanities as > being of say the fine arts and the liberal arts and the > applied arts. After all, some arts are formal or exact, > while other arts are referential or descriptive, yet still > other arts are instrumental or practical utilities. With > regard to artifacts of music, it seems they may all be of > humanal art to some degree by virtue of merely being > identified by experts as music, but not all music clearly > will be found or held or deemed as being fine art. Some > aural objects of fine art may even be sonic and not music > at all, while some music may be simply applied artistic > craft. The thorn here persists as to how objects are even > conferred with the status of art, whether all artworks > have something in common as members that fall within a > group called art, if that usual or normal type of class > exists objectively, and what separates objects as art from > those that are not art. It seems that the aesthetic or > artistic "experience" might best be found as the sound > differentia of what might be identified as art and also as > music. If the experience however fails to be accepted as > doing this, then the differentia of art from nonart must > be found elsewhere, and there does not seem to be any good > alternates as candidates to fill this need. The obvious > alternates to the experience of art might be the material > or form or content or context or function or intent of art > , but these seem unlikely and unsuitable. Finding a fit > differentia seems imperative, because ordinary objects > found or made as extraordinary art and its music clearly > do something unique that objects held or deemed as not > being art or music do not do or do not do as well. The > reasonable feelings of forms in artworks might indeed best > rely on the iconic similarity that the structure of forms > and feelings might be found to share, and on the relation > that occurs between forms and feelings when these poles > are brought together; but the form must be of value, and > the feeling must be intense and worthwhile, both > individually and communally. The further justifying and > classifying of aesthetic or artistic experiences might > also be a further task for experts to research. The early > pragmatist inquiries of Peirce and Langer and Dewey and > Morris and later of Sebeok and Arnheim and Quine and many > others might for example be revived and blended with > renewed profit. > > The human body and brain in life is too often now taken > for granted as common and ordinary and dispensable, likely > because of familiarity and similarity in its habits of > conduct, such as the making of simple sounds that are > found musical, but if a masterpiece of natural evolution > and a miracle of neural creation were sought, then no > better exemplar could be found than is substantively > manifested by the mere presence of such an organism and > its art. There is nothing trivial nor confused here. One > point for experts to consider is the fact that only humans > engage in acts of playing and gaming for no other reason > than for these acts or for their own fun. humans can for > example make toys and for the sheer joy of it, then play > with the toys for the mere sake of the play alone. These > primal acts of doing things, such as marking and sounding > or dressing and grooming, for their own sake and for no > other sake, are perhaps the very origins of aesthetic and > artistic acts.
