Derek writes:

"that raises the very interesting question of how works that were not created 
as 'art' have become 'art'.   I refer you to Malraux for the answer. (No 
other theorist, amazingly, has even discussed the problem!)"

I can name one other very minor theorist who's discussed it: Cheerskep. Many 
times, in fact, all in my attempt to throw a ridiculous light on listers' 
assumption of an absolute metaphysical status for "Art". 

The current argument between many of the listers about whether or not XXX 
"was/IS" "science", and YYY "was/IS" "art" reflects the delusion vividly. 
Recall 
Frances's robotic repetition that if her chimerical panel of experts "deem" 
something art, that makes it "BE" art. 

Though listers waver a great deal, I'm persuaded they think of their dispute 
as not just about whether or not to CALL something "art" or "science".   They 
actually believe there is a metaphysical fact-of-the-matter concerning whether 
xxx "IS" art or yyy "IS" science. It dizzies me to see smart people believing 
that with an inaudible "pop!" a work that "was not" art now "becomes" art -- 
like, say, a new star being created in the heavens.

And notice, the form of their argument is to summon up what they think of as 
"reasons" for believing that something IS art or science. This implies there 
are somehow mind-independent metaphysical standards somewhere that a work must 
satisfy to BE art or science. For example, some listers feel we have to know 
what the creator thought he was doing when he created the work, what his 
motivations were. Some might say that if he was just trying to placate the 
gods, the 
work could not BE art. Others, if told by a portrait painter that he was just 
trying to make something that looked like the sitting subject so he could 
turn a dollar, might say the painting could not then BE art. 

Some listers talk about "bad art", but other listers will claim that a work 
is either art or rubbish, so the notion of "bad art" is ridiculous. 

Some listers would apparently claim that nothing could "be" art until "THE 
concept" of artness, or "our current concept", was conceived by someone -- or 
does it take a community of experts to conceive of it? Then, presumably, a 
creator would have to have the aim of doing "that thing" to have his work BE 
art. 
The counter-assertion that there is no "THE" concept of art -- people's notions 
of it vary wildly -- consistently falls on deaf ears. "Everyone knows what 
art IS, they just have a tough time putting it into words. In any case, there 
simply is no question that art IS."

Some years ago, Bruce Attah posted on our forum the nine characteristics 
that, he said, when manifest in a work were what made it BE art (very like 
Aristotle's muddled claim that a "thing's" "properties" are what "make it BE 
what it 
IS".)   Attah would no doubt claim he was exposing the metaphysical truth -- 
he felt he was discerning factual stuff about the metaphysical category/quality 
of artness. But Attah's "definition" was finally exposed as no more than his 
own personal preference for certain characteristics he wanted in works he 
would CALL art. But stipulative decisions have no ontic power. For example, 
Attah 
insisted that to BE art an object had to be a "thing" -- which he described as 
"a hard object that can be looked at" -- that is "made". When it was pointed 
out to him that Benedetto Croce held that an "act of art" can take place 
solely in the mind -- as when an artist imagines a painting in detail, a 
composer 
imagines a musical work, a poet thinks up a poem without writing it down -- 
Attah was in a bind. Croce was asserting that a notional entity can be art -- 
even though there is no hard "thing" that is "made".

Attah could say, "I don't call that art!" But that didn't work for him 
because he believed he was showing what art IS, not simply what people 
variously 
CALLED art. Or he could simply insist, "That's NOT art!" and maybe stamp his 
foot 
for emphasis. Asked "How do you know?" he would have to be circular and say 
because a work has to be a thing made. 

Confronted with someone who claimed the alleged mind-independent quality of 
"artness" and the category of all artworks, and the quasi-Platonic "form" of 
"art" were all chimeras, he would dismiss the adversary out of hand. He'd say, 
"Of course art IS!" -- just like other listers claiming that sin IS, and 
science IS. "You could   look science up in the dictionary!" You could also 
look up 
'angel', 'hell', and 'unicorn'.

The most dizzying aspect of the current forum debate is seeing smart, grown 
men asserting that art IS this, and science IS that, without ever describing 
what they have in mind with either word. 

Wiliam Conger does take a couple of stabs at describing his notion of 
"science", but never his notion of "art".   A long look at William's -- or 
anyone's 
-- notion of "science" might help listers wrap their minds around the idea that 
maybe "art" is indeed solely a notion with no "corresponding" non-notional 
entity. 

William is not alone in feeling experimentation is a necessary element of 
science: Dream up a hypothesis, then test it with an experiment satisfying cert
ain demands of "the scientific method". But this would push William into the 
uncomfortable position of asserting that Einstein was not doing "science" when 
he 
came up with his special theory of relativity -- without ever testing it 
himself. Indeed no one did, since the means weren't at hand at the time. 
Consider 
the wrangle: "Einstein wasn't doing science. That was cosmology." "That was 
science." "Was not." "Was!" "Wasn't!" It's breath-taking to see people 
believing 
they are talking about an "is-ness" here, and not simply disagreeing about 
how they want to use the word. 

This is comparable to Attah's claim that what the painter, composer, poet 
does in his mind is not "art" until they set it down in a publicly examinable 
way. "Is!" says Croce. "Is not!" says Attah. "Is!" "Isn't!   One wonders if 
Attah 
would claim a mathematician IS not "doing mathematics" if he doesn't write 
down the formulas he devises.

To argue as they do, listers must feel they see art (and science) for what it 
IS, otherwise how could they ever assert xxx IS or IS NOT art? But if they 
have a notion of art that they in some way believe replicates what art IS, why 
not describe that notion? Still, Derek, William et al will not do this. The 
last time I asked Derek to describe the notion behind a word he was using he 
said 
that would require him to describe human consciousness, and he could not do 
that.

The sight of educated adults arguing -- "That's art!" "No -- that's NOT art!" 
and "That's science!" "No that's NOT science!" -- and thinking they are 
talking about metaphysical facts-of-the-matter makes a fellow despair. It 
betrays a 
conviction they will deny: a belief in metaphysical "essences", not unlike 
Plato's celestial "forms" and Aristotle's "properties". However no one who uses 
the word 'art' this way will describe that "essence". Given I maintain such an 
"essence" of anything, including art, does not exist, I'd settle for their 
describing their notion -- but that won't happen either.

Maybe I can trick them into revealing some of their notion. Writers talk 
about the art of politics, war, conversation, etc. I wonder what grounds 
certain 
listers would assert for either accepting or condemning those usages -- i.e. 
what the writers' usage has in common with what the listers have in mind when 
they use the word, or what "essential" element the writers leave out. But I 
shouldn't ask that, because now someone will address only that question, ignore 
everything else in this message, and feel he has "answered" my arguments.



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