If could convince just one other individual that things of beauty and ugly exist in the same identical space as i have, for all many years, it would make Aesthetics a simple thing to understand. The only reason we can't come to a consensus on this, is because there is non. We all travel a different road of influences,teachings,conclusions, family cultures, from day one.So we cannot be expected to have the same taste on every thing. All we might expect is to find one like minded other a group of like minded others. To me it is that simple. I accept my taste and respect others taste. I like all Jazz, all the Classics,Country Western, Mexican rancheras, Cuban, old Argentina's popular songs,Folk, Gospel, every popular tune from 'just one more chance' to now. Realism & Abstract art plus what I do. mando
On Fri, May 9, 2008 at 9:57 AM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I wrote: > > > Now, either your "beauty" is a > > mind-independent object like that physical painting and that car, or > > it is solely > > notional, and therefore idiosyncratically different in each mind. > > In fact I should have amplified that to address alleged > "properties/qualities". But first here's Michael Brady's query about what I > did write: > > "I'm not quite sure what's in your mind when you say "notional": can > you explain? My quick conclusion is that, for you, notional denotes > things held in the mind. Do you use that term in a more specific or > precise way?" > > No, I don't. My notion of 'notional' is the entire flow of consciousness -- > and even the "unconscious". The "ideas", images, and feelings in our minds > are > "notional". The iron structure in Paris that we call the Eiffel Tower is > non-notional. Our mind's "idea", image, of the Tower is notional. (This > position is > based on what just about all of us believe, as distinguished from what we > can > "prove" to a confirmed solipsist. For instance, I have an unshakeable > belief > there are minds and bodies other than mine, and I feel certain every other > lister feels the same way. Philosophy is interesting to me only when it > starts > there, rather than with a square-one skepticism that none of us actually > holds > by.) > > Brady's further query: > > "Moving on, consider this question: Are proportions and various other > descriptions of the relationship of one thing to another part of the > object "out there" or are they exclusively in one's head? I believe > that, if there is an "out there" there, then the relationships are out > there in the objects. However, they are known to us "in here," as > matters of knowledge or cognition." > > I was just yesterday reading in a book by Van Quine, "Ontological > Relativity > and Other Essays" in which he was musing about the tendency of our minds to > reify things. That is, it's a peculiar tendency of our minds that the more > we > "think about -- entertain notions of --sets, classes, categories, > qualities, > properties, relations, meanings etc, the more we eventually come to think > of them > as "out there". But like the other estimable philosophers of the twentieth > century -- Wittgenstein included -- Quine seemed to refuse the ultimate > hurdles. Since he was perhaps the leading mathematical logician, when Quine > began to > suspect there are no non-notional sets -- a key element in his logic -- he > shied away. I believe lots of things those guys accepted as > mind-independent > entities are chimeras, and "relations" are one of them . The alleged class > they've called "relations" has confounded philosophers for millenia. > Aristotle, in a > baffled bit of waffling, called "relations" the most "minimal" of beings. > > (And you may recall my early observation that those who believe in > relations > have to accept the almost comic implication they are the most numerous > objects > in the world -- far more numerous than stars and sub-atomic particles, > because there has to be an infinity of relations not just between each of > those > particles and other objects but between each of those relations and other > relations, and each of THOSE relations must be related etc. The > implications of a > belief that relations are some sort of non-notional entity are, if we think > about > them, so ludicrous I'm the one who is baffled: by how anyone can believe in > them.) > > Brady: > "Thus, the properties that we deem to comprise beauty are resident in > the objects, in some way that can be perceived by us and reduced to > our understanding." > > Well, by now I hope I've conveyed that what you call the "properties" in > any > object neither comprise nor constitute "beauty" (or "art"), any more than I > believe the constituents of Grandma's stew constitute "deliciousness". When > Grandma took the stew back into the kitchen and added something to make a > guy like > it, she didn't add "deliciousness", she added salt. The "deliciousness" is > notional, in us, not non-notional in the stew. > > When Mabel got her nose "fixed", and began getting modeling jobs, it wasn't > because the surgeon added "beauty" to her face. He added a different-shaped > nose. The combination of her "new nose" with her eyes, mouth, etc. prompted > photographers to say, "Beauty!" But all that Mabel brought to the studio > was a > collection of specific elements -- the reaction to those elements -- > "Beauty!" -- > was in the minds of the observers. What they saw was the elements; the > "beauty" was their name for what they felt. > > When philosophers have encountered non-notional objects, and the result is > "sense data", the "thinkers" have called the "capacity" to occasion those > sensations the "properties" of the object. "Beauty" and "deliciousness" are > not > sense data. They are the results of the mind's reception and processing of > sense > data. The same holds for what some people call "artness". > > Beginning way back in Plato's day, thinkers -- and the rest of us -- have > tended to "universalize" these specific capacities of objects to occasion > specific sense data. Plato spoke of them as "qualities"; Aristotle said its > "properties" are what "make a thing what it is" -- a remark that has led to > 2,500 years > of philosophical blunders. > > Take the "qualities" of color and, say, softness. They vary in "degrees" > from > one individual object to another. "That apple has geenness!" "No -- it's > more > like blue-greenness!" "That object is soft." "How soft? When would you say > it > no longer has 'softness', and you'd call it 'hard'?" I don't question that > each object does indeed occasion infinitely varying sense data, nor do I > deny > that univeralizing and unitizing makes for a handy, serviceable way to talk > about the objects and the sensations they are said to "cause", but the > subsequent > reifying has been philosophically disastrous -- especially when the > reifying > of alleged non-notional entities is of inherently notional "reactions" like > "deliciousness", "beauty", "evil", "good luck", "holiness", and "art". > > But, for the sake of fellow listers, I should stop there. In theater, > it's > notoriously dangerous to choose to have an extremely boring chap as your > central character. The more faithfully you portray him, the more boring > your play > will be. Similarly, the more one describes the tedious confusions of, say, > phenomenologists or analytic philosophers, the more tedious and > incomprehensible > one becomes, except, perhaps to other nerdy philosophers like them. > > "The human figure that stands 8 heads high is out > there; we perceive that person or drawing, make the measurements that > reveal > those proportions, and pronounce that particular ratio beautiful or not." > > If by "pronounce" you have in mind the likes of your shouting your > personal, > "Hurray!", okay. But if, like Frances, you believe that "deeming" makes for > an > "is-ing" "out there", I'm not with you. The familiar line, "Beauty is in > the > eye of the beholder," is on the nose. > >
