Frances to Cheerskep and others... To label an object like an idea with a verbal tag can often set up a meaning for that idea that becomes engrained in concrete and nearly impossible to change in mind. Some of the thorny terms used in ordinary language have been listed here before, but there are a few that may deserve further review. Terms such as "like" and "same" and "have" and "is" and "you" are agreeably dangerous.
LIKE... If an object were felt to be "like" its sign, then it may be a mere potential "likeness" with no evocative force or power, but if it were felt to be a virtual "likeness" then it will have some evocative force and power. To be "like" a sign however is not to be the "same" as a sign. With any model whose form is "like" its master, the "likeness" will always be iconically symmetrical in that each will be "like" the other, but not necessarily the "same" as the other. SAME... For an object to be considered the "same" as its sign or the "same" as another object, usually means the object will signify some iconic degree of formal similarity, but it can also imply identity or contiguity or familiarity. In any event, the best key to use for determining "sameness" will be found in the force and power the target has in relation to the original. A new object called the "same" as an old object, where the "sameness" is merely a potential, would fail the test of "sameness" because anything potential is not empowered with the evocative force of the other original, therefore the new in relation to the old would not be the "same" as the old. If on the other hand the "sameness" is a virtual one, then this state would contingently pass the test of "sameness" because anything virtual would have almost the "same" evocative force and power as the original. Finally, if the "sameness" of the new is identical with the old, then this state would definitely pass the test of "sameness" because to be identical is to be enforced and empowered as equivalent. The highest form of iconic similarity or "sameness" is therefore identity. Any token twin or copied clone would be the "same" as its mate, and this duplication or replication is a stronger degree of iconicity than to be "like" its mate. HAVE... For an object as a sign to "have" something may be to wrongly imply that the sign indexically possesses a property external to the sign, as if carried by a vehicle in addition to what the object may be. All signs will iconically bear or yield or endure an object of information, but they need not indexically "have" information. If on the other hand an object does in fact "have" something, then a connective condition of contiguous indexicity would be found. IS... If an object "is" sensed, then this is to simply find that it will seem to exist phenomenally. This may further entail that the phenomenal object be either objective or relative or subjective. To find or hold or deem that a sensed object "is" of something assigns an existent objective status of "isness" or occupying "thisness" to it, which indexic assignment may indeed be warranted. An object that "is" felt or sensed or known will be an existent token fact, and all things must be such because they are phenomenal, and this makes the material properties of the object technically relative. For example, to hold that the ocean water in winter "is" cold would really be to claim that it seems cold, which state would be relative to the organism using the water or to the signer testing it. YOU... To find that "you" said something stupid would be to assign ownership to the statement uttered, but the risk here would be to attack the messenger rather than the message. It is after all the stated utterance that is stupid, and not the speaker. To find that "you" are nice is however to assign something completely different. Some "collateral experience" on the part of the signer would likely be required for them to be aware of the "meanings" used for these terms, or to know the difference. The theory of "collateral experience" in regard to semiotics is however not completely clear to me.
