William writes: "I think Lehrer is denounced because I suggested the book."
That's an understandable reaction, William. I sometimes have a similar suspicion about why you so seldom find merit in any aspect of the arguments of certain listers for whom you seem to have a confirmed dislike. Or indeed, why you so seldom will even address the text of their arguments; instead, you denigrate their motives and limitations, and respond with irrelevancies. In my first comment on the Lehrer, I criticized Lehrer's uses of 'brain', 'mind', body, 'soul', 'unity', ['spirit'], 'irreducible whole', 'came from','depended upon', 'art', and other terms while never describing what he has in mind with each term. I claim this is a fundamental failing on his part, but you ignore the criticism entirely. I cited Lehrer's inconsistency in talking of a 'human being' as an irreducible whole, and then going on to distinguish body, consciousness, soul, immaterial mind etc. I asked how Lehrer would reconcile his insistence on the immateriality of mind with Damasio's physicalist view. You're wrong, William, if you feel I cited these faults (in my judgment) in Lehrer only because you recommended Lehrer. And, as I say, just as you suspect my motives, I suspect yours in never addressing any of those counter-Lehrer observations. Instead you repeat an assertion you made before to the effect that it's reasonable if not certain, that consciousness requires a functioning brain. When you did assert it before, I responded by saying I'm strongly inclined to agree, though there are dualists who maintain that for all we know even a thermostat has a concomitant hovering bit of consciousness. You then went on to say: "I don't know why Cheerskep keeps using popular naive ideas regarding a pain being, say, in the leg and not in the brain when even schoolkids know that nerves and muscles, etc., body mechanics, are felt in the brain and the brain's unconscious monitoring locates the source of whatever the body is doing, pain or pleasure. Again, no brain, no pain. Perhaps I'm mistaken but I have my own trouble taking Cheerskep seriously when he seems to insist on elementary physiological errors." This was both irrelevant to the arguments I'd just made, and it is erroneous. At no time did I say a pain is actually "in" the leg and not the brain; indeed, I explicitly said that the dualist maintains the somewhat uncomfortable view that consciousness is non-spatial -- no matter what it "feels like" it isn't "in" the leg or "in" the head the way neural tissue is. You can see, I hope, why I have trouble taking you seriously when you erroneously insist that I insist on elementary physiological errors. Makes me wonder what is motivating you. . . ************** Make your life easier with all your friends, email, and favorite sites in one place. Try it now. (http://www.aol.com/?optin=new-dp& icid=aolcom40vanity&ncid=emlcntaolcom00000010)
