Such sensations as you describe are clearly attributed to physical structures, cells, nerves, brain function. You'll need to come up with something else to justify your view. \\\
--- On Thu, 12/18/08, [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote: > From: [email protected] <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: Neurology and "Art" > To: [email protected] > Date: Thursday, December 18, 2008, 8:08 PM > William writes: > > "While it is true that the science deals with material > and events that are > measurable, it is also true that your alternative essence > of consciousness, > presumably not material and therefore not measurable, > cannot be demonmstrated at > all, in any way whatsoever, except by means of subjective > declaration." > > I'm not sure what your notion of > "demonstrated" is, but most of us would say > conscious feelings can indeed be demonstrated. "Here > -- taste this," says the > chef. "Good, no?" "Smell this. Listen to > this. Doesn't this back rub feel > great?" One kid punches another in the upper arm, and > says, "There -- you're > always doing that to kids. How do YOU like the > feeling?" > > If your notion of "demonstrable" is "capable > of being shown to exist", of > being "pointed at", I think most of us would > agree that if I pinch your nose, and > you pinch my nose back, you will have done a good job of > "demonstrating", of > "pointing at" the feeling I had just inflicted > even though the result of the > first pinch was your feeling, not mine. > > As for the "measurability" of material things, > realize that only certain > aspects of material things have fixed dimension and thus > can be measured. The > human consciousness occasioned by people's encounters > with a material thing don't > have fixed dimension. You may be able to measure the > temperature, but what may > be intolerably hot or cold to me may not be so to you. By measure I mean mean something that can be noted independently of belief. > > All that can be measured about a sonata is its notes. > > The old "scientific" notion that what cannot be > seen or touched should be > disregarded as non-existent is silliness. All that > measurability proves is > measurability. What makes it silliness except your saying so? If it can't be measured, then the method is lacking, not the measurability. > > (And, in truth, all that we can ever measure is notion, not > the material > itself. The activity of measuring results in sense data. > All measurements are OF > sense data.) I think I'm saying that nothing cannot come from something. Something will cause something else. A material cause cannot have an immaterial effect. There has never been an example of an immaterial effect from a material cause. No matter what is claimed to the contrary. > > There is very little "sacred" at all about > measurability. There's nothing sacred about that which cannot be material except the falsely attributed desire for something that is ideal and therefore unreal. > > Let's see you measure your reaction to a Mozart > concerto. I can't do it but the proper apparatus could probably measure the patterns of cell activiation in my brain and might someday be able to record in some symbolic form the patterns those cells produce in consciousness. Physical means lead to physical ends. Non-physical ends are what we call that which we don't yet know how to measure. > > > > Aw, shoot, William, please be a little slower to impute > emotions to me, > especially when the imputation is denigrating and it so > exposes my pusillanimous > true feelings. You write: > > "It should not be so scary to realize. . ." > > Damn. I didn't realize my fright was visible from so > far away. And then: > > "To worry about Shakespeare's creative thoughts. . > ." > > There again, I thought my pretending to celebrate > Shakespeare would veil my > real concern, but you saw right through me to my worry. > > You write: > > "It should not be so scary to realize that the brain > is what gives rise to > all that we think, feel, imagine, and that shared symbols > enable us to > communicate these conditions to others. Thought, after all, > may not be so stupendous as > we might wish." > > Here's a question for you, Michael, and probably some > other listers. Fancy > philosophers talk of "modalities of existence". > Material things, they'd say, are > one "kind" of entity. Notional or > "conscious" things are another kind of > entity. Some philosophers (e.g. Plato) will assert > there's another modality of > thing that's independent of both material and mental > things -- "qualities", > "categories", and even other > "abstractions". And there are those who believe in > > entities of another modality still different from those > first three: angels, God, > grace, karma, the soul, and more. > > I'll keep my question narrow: Do you feel any > inclination to agree conscious > stuff is different from material stuff? I don't ask > that merely rhetorically. > I was, in a weak moment in college, pre-med. I have great > respect for what > scientists, biologists, neurologists do, and what their > "subjects" are. And I am > in general fairly "hard-headed". Still, I cannot > escape the sense that a > thought or feeling is something different from the material > neurons that, let's > accept for a moment, "give rise" to this > "consciousness". > > If you agree with me on that, I hope you're also like > me in observing from > your reading about neurology that absolutely nothing > you've read even BEGINS to > explain that "giving rise to". Nor, for me at any > rate, does any of what I > read begin to say anything of utility or enlightenment > about matters "aesthetic". > > > I was born and brought up a Catholic. Eventually I became a > heathen -- not > because I wanted to, not because I knew I was a > "sinner" and I was anxious to > reject the "truth" of my status, not for any > reason other than that I no longer > could believe the assertions of my former faith. The > articles of faith implied > all sorts of absurdities and, to my mind, inconsistencies > that simply could > no longer win my belief. > > Similarly with neurology. People with the conviction that > neurology does or > will "explain" aesthetics or > "consciousness" seen to me "of the > faith". This is > no great condemnation of neurology -- it has all sorts of > other > justifications. And certainly philosophy of mind, which has
