Frances to Michael with regards and thanks... My sweeping windy statements so far are an attempt at applying what is known by me about pragmatism to an assessment of whether a global theory of architecture might be possible to frame. Here are some of my assumptions in reply to your probing queries or remarks. (1) Only normal human organisms are driven toward art and science and then by naturally compelled traits, but while art is given more by pure disposition, science is taken more by sure deliberation. In any event, the feeling of art and the knowing of science must be a reasonable feeling and a reasonable knowing. (2) The phenomenal being and natural existence of art is a precursor to and prepares for science in the sense that any playing in mind on the forms of art are less degraded and degenerative than are any sorting in mind on the laws of science. My thought here goes somewhat to the ideas of Vico in regard to the natural origin and dispositional evolution of humanity. In other words, humans will and must play at art in the same way that they grow hair, but humans need sort objects by the means of science only if they want to or choose to in the same way that they may trim that hair if they so desire. (3) For normal humans, the playing and gaming with objects for sheer fun, or the grooming and preening of their bodies for mere joy, are naturally disposed tendencies, and when such acts are done for their own sake solely alone and for no other reason, then this is likely the origin and source and root of art. It is true of course that nonhuman animals also engage in such acts, but they are compelled to do so for some ulterior reason, and not for its own sake. (4) In regard to primitive persons being intelligent and in using the ways and means of science, they can and will for example sort plants by classes into food and nonfood, and if food into cooked or uncooked, and if cooked into dry or wet, and so on. The point here is that they do not need to do this kind of scientific act, yet they will still be driven to eat some food to live. With artistic kinds of acts like playing for fun and grooming for joy for its own sake they must do it, because this kind of action is an intrinsic part of being human; while sorting and classing objects is not. There is also a holistic analogical continuity to art that science seems to lack. (5) The issue of art being limited to only certain kinds of objects, or of what objects might be the limit for art, is likely addressed by the force and power that the form of eligible or agreeable objects have to reflect worthy values and to evoke intense responses. (6) The issue of what the substantive difference or differentia is between art and science becomes less sharp and more fuzzy as the two acts evolve. Their probable merging and blending would certainly seem to be a reasonable eventuality. The act of art here is meant to broadly include for example theistic religion and metaphysic phenomena and hypothetic philosophy and hermeneutic history and semic language and artistic art. The notion that artistic acts are of pure feeling and that scientific acts are of sure knowing still seems to have a reasonable ring to it, but this notion of mine is tentative, thus some further probes into pragmatism will be done to try and sort out this thorny snarl of twine. (The term "artistic art" or simply "artistics" is coined by me in an attempt to segregate this kind of say fine art and applied art from other kinds of art like religion or philosophy or history. The broader term "aesthetic object" is further used to embrace the dyad of "natural aesthetic objects" and "cultural aesthetic objects" like "social artistic objects" and other kinds of art like "theal religious objects" and so on.) (7) The results of the world are as the world phenomenally exists, which is as the world seems to be, and these existent results are given uncontrolled to sense, at least when the normal human is in a relation with those objective results. It is the relation joining the objective with the subjective that causes the results to be given passively in an instance as an occurrence to sense. (8) The relevant tenet in pragmatism that might be applied to the issue of any substantive differences existing between art and science deals with the progressive evolving hierarchy of stuff and the temporary dominance of stuff as it grows. This is to say that stuff will exist altogether and will also exist as some kind of stuff in each situation or instance of its occurrence. In regard to signs for example they will advance as an icon into an index to a symbol, but will dominate as only one kind of sign in each situation of semiosis as the event warrants it. It is the object referred by the sign as both object and sign lay in a ground together that will determine the kind a sign will be. In regard to acts for another example they will advance as an art into a tech to a science, but will dominate as only one kind of act in each situation of activity as the event warrants it. It is the object referred by the act as both object and act lay in a ground together that will determine the kind an act will be. The support for this kind of thinking is the phenomenal categories as posited by realist pragmatism.
-----Original Message----- From: Michael Brady [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009 10:37 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Architecture and Philosophy: Review Frances wrote: > There seems to be more similarities between art and science than > there are differences. They are for example both acts of only normal > humans, and tend to be engaged in naturally by instinct without any > undue nurturing. There however seems to be a clear deference, if not > a clear difference, between art and science. Science is likely > driven to take objects by intelligence and knowledge. Who or what is doing the driving? This is not a silly quibble about the passive voice: If science is an exercise of the mind ("intelligence," "knowledge"), then how is the motivation chosen by the person? hHow is it put into operation? What does the human do (choose, decide, etc.) in order to initiate the scientific approach (being "driven")? > Art is given uncontrolled to sense for its own sake solely alone. > Art need only appeal to primitive emotional feelings in the complete > absence of even any primal knowledge. Again, who or what is doing the giving? Is art exclusively a human product? Or are there some artifacts or artworks that are not made by humans? If art is solely a human product, how is it "given," which implies it's outside the human who receives it? > Art initiates in life as being an essential part of the normal human > organism, and thus readily prepares for science, because science > cannot generate itself without the human being and its artistic > initiation, along with such acts as creation and invention and > innovation. You seem to imply that the human making of art is a precursor to human science ("really prepares for science"), somewhat like ancient religions engendered alchemy and astrology, which led to the sciences of chemistry and astronomy; that the fabricating of images led to more ordered organization of knowledge, which led to science as we understand the term. Is this a fair summary of your understanding? > For science to consume art is not for science to embrace art > totally, but rather for science to be guided by art. While humans > likely cannot survive and thrive without the act of art, which they > will engage in despite themselves, they can exist quite well without > the act of science, aside from their primal intelligence and innate > curiosity to know the stuff around them. This is a rather sweeping assertion: art is essential to human survival but science is not. On what basis do you make a distinction between the objects of "primal intelligence and innate curiosity," which you seem not to deem organized knowledge, and "the act of science," which is? > Art is limited as to what objects can be art, but once objects are > smartly agreed to be art, the works and say their beauty will
