On Jun 20, 2009, at 10:21 PM, armando baeza wrote:
> mando, wrote;
>
> See Reply on #7
> mando
>
> Frances to Chris and others...
> 1
> This topical issue of sensible "qualities" existing in things,
> and their debatable status as being mainly general and objective
> or special and relative or universal and subjective, has
> unreasonably remained unsettled and incomplete and unfinished,
> despite the valiant efforts of learned scholars here who are
> reportedly expert in this phenomenal field of study.
> 2
> It is likely that all objects found in nature and culture will
> have intrinsic formal "qualities" given uncontrolled to sense
> that are innately felt. Those "qualities" may be mainly of say
> brightness or roughness or hardness or heaviness or roundness or
> coldness or loudness or sourness or highness or nearness, and
> then may be mainly of say ideality or continuity or nicety or
> ugly or sublimity or unity or beauty. These objective "qualities"
> alone, aside from any life with mind to subjectively feel or
> sense them, would admittedly be pointless and meaningless and
> useless, therefore the objective must be relative to the
> subjective, if anything is to be made of this topical issue. The
> identity of any such "quality" in the form of an object is
> perhaps by way of feelings that may be similar in structure to
> those forms, so that the phenomenal structure of the objective
> form is probably like the neural structure of the subjective
> feeling we feel for the form. The mind after all is also of form
> and of matter, so that even physical matter in effect is effete
> or weak mind, because matter obviously grows by habit in the best
> way possible. What is given of the objective to the subjective is
> realized by the relative, in that only token manifestations of
> material substance in the form of signs that stand for stuff can
> be sensed. If a tonal quality like a fleeting impression, or a
> typical law like a normal class, is to be felt or sensed at all
> it must be done so via a token fact like a technical member. It
> is this conforming relation of the subject to the object that
> makes them both seem real to sense in mind. Without the relative,
> no object can be made subjective, and no subject can be made
> objective.
> 3
> These felt "qualities" like niceness and beauty found by sense in
> any ordinary object may also be necessary for art, but they alone
> however would likely not be sufficient or efficient to make the
> ordinary object an extraordinary "aesthetic object" of nature or
> culture. The identity of formal "aesthetic qualities" like purity
> and ugly and sublimity and beauty and unity, as properties
> embodied in and carried by objects of nature and its culture as
> say works of nonart and as works of art, is made possible by
> experiencing the force and power that the form of the object is
> indeed able to evoke in users. If the force of the form in being
> original and unique furthermore bears or has the power that is
> able to immediately evoke intense responses of mainly an
> emotional kind, then the artwork is likely a lofty work of high
> fine art.
> 4
> The good of an object and its quality, be it an aesthetical or
> ethical or logical good, is however not to be found in its value
> or need. The act of innocent enjoyable murder will have value as
> an object if for example it merely satisfies the pleasurable
> sexual needs of a disturbed sadistic pervert. The value however
> is independent of any aesthetical or ethical or logical concerns.
> The need furthermore is a subjective psychological determination,
> and is also aside from the action or object or value and from any
> norm of what ought to be good. If such an act is nonetheless
> admired by a normal percipient to be nice and fine at least for
> them solely alone, then it might potentially be emotionally felt
> by them subjectively to be a beautiful act and even an artistic
> work. The needing and feeling by such persons of such actions
> however does not and will not make the object beautiful or
> artistic, nor should they. Some other aspect must clearly be
> considered as causing or sourcing or making the object to be
> found or held or deemed as being beautiful and even artistic. It
> is further not likely that such an aspect could lay merely in the
> given form of the object or in its referred content or in the
> interpreted effect of the object, nor in its assigned meaning or
> conferred worth, nor even in its function or context or usage.
> 5
> The start of realizing what makes say purity or nicety or beauty
> or even ugly in objects that are reasonably agreed to be art or
> not art must be found initially in the form of the object as
> given uncontrolled to sense, but even then aspects of the form
> alone are inadequate to do this making, because the form of fakes
> and forgeries and frauds might do this as well or better, not to
> forget the form of those unsettled and incomplete and unfinished
> works of art that are nonetheless held as aesthetically and
> artistically finalized. It seems to me that the form of art to
> bear or carry or yield a "quality" like beauty as an embodied or
> engrained property must have some force and power that the form
> of nonart and unart or bad art does not have. This enforced and
> empowered fact would it seems to me make the ordinary object of
> nonart and unart or bad art into an extraordinary work of fine
> art.
> 6
> The phenomenal differentia of "qualities" sensed in the forms of
> ordinary objects as being bad or good, whether those objects
> exist as part of nature or in its diverse culture, will be found
> in any object bearing or having the ability to conform to their
> dispositional tendencies, which is to grow habitually in the best
> way possible, because things are inclined to evolve in the
> direction of good end goals, aside from any bad exploratory paths
> temporarily taken. The differentia thus is simply found in the
> bent or trait. The aesthetic and artistic differentia of natural
> and cultural objects and their forms with their "qualities" is to
> further be found in the force and power they have to reflect
> worthy values and to evoke intense responses in extraordinary
> ways. The differentia of artworks is found in the ability of
> their form to be empowered and reflective and evocative in ways
> not possible with ordinary objects of nonart. The form of an
> aesthetic object to be agreed as a work of art must bear and
> yield this power, and to further show this power as being able to
> reflect worthy values and to evoke intense responses.
> 7
> It still seems reasonable for me to conclude that the sentient
> percipient is brought into a relation with the objective object
> of sense, and not merely with their subjective sense of the
> object.
> Fk.........
>
> I feel that no individual can sense an object objectively.
> We are not made like a camera, all particular objects reflect
> the particular knowledge in our individual minds, which can
> only be a subjective sense.
> mando
>
>
> It is the object with its form and "quality" after all
> that is held to be nice and pretty and beautiful and ugly, and
> that may even be held as artistic, but it is not the sense of the
> object that is held to be so.
> FK
>
> But only to the individual minds that sense the object, and agree.
> mando
>
>
> Chris wrote...
> "Beauty is a property of things perceived by humans, who can
> judge and evaluate abstractly. And since beauty is considered to
> be a culmination or perfection of specific qualities or
> characteristics, there is also ugly, the deficiency of those
> qualities. But these qualities are socially valued. Remember:
> there are no ugly things "in Nature." (taken from Michael's new
> blog) Not by me (is beauty considered to be a culmination or
> perfection of specific qualities or characteristics) -- because I
> can't identify them so that I might say "this one has a little of
> it, and that one has a little more, while that one must be ugly
> because it doesn't have any" Can anyone else here identify any
> such specific qualities or characteristics?
> "Nature,by nature, does not differentiate between beauty or
> ugly,people do." (Mando) That's what Michael said, too, but
> you're wrong unless you distinguish between beauty/ugly and
> attractive/unattractive.
