Frances to list... 

Several newsletters of the aesthetics society as reported on its
website will have some articles based in part around the upcoming
book by Dominic Lopes entitled "A Philosophy of Computer Art"
which is due to be published soon. For those members who have not
yet seen the society website for the first article on "computer
art" go to: 
<http://www.aesthetics-online.org/articles/index.php?articles_id=
41>. 

It is claimed by this author that the influence of computers on
art has probably lead to the birth of a new art form, whereby
computer art forms make possible computer art works. As the
author further states, an object with a computer art form would
be a computer art work because: (1) it may just be art by virtue
of this form or event alone, and (2) it would be made by a
computer, and (3) it would be interactive, and (4) it would be
interactive due to its being made by a computer. The result of
these new forms and works together he claims would thus yield a
new class of art to be named computer art. To explore the
ramifications and implications of this definition, such objects
and forms and works found or deemed to be this kind of art are
examined by the author as to whether they indeed have any value
and content and worth and power that may be relevant to this sort
of artistic status. The initial task for the author thus is to
determine if any kind of art has this sort of relevance. 

The traditional objects of art after all it seems to him have
formal facts given to sense that are material and technical and
mechanical and structural and so on, which subsequently can lend
or lead themselves to becoming vehicles of further meaning. The
issue here is whether such a meaningful subsequence is caused
either intrinsically and inherently by the objects due merely to
these formal facts, or is caused deliberately due to human
habitat or habit or history. For the author, the sheer qualities
and properties of some art forms as a fit means do seem to be
more suitable at carrying and acquiring meaning easily, such as
those durable forms that appeal to the higher senses of sight and
sound and touch. In other words, it is assumed by him that some
vehicles intuitively found or deemed artistic may bear or yield
meaning more easily or more suitably than others, as to the
specific kind of art they are. One reason which may make this
fact so is that those kinds of artistic vehicles can usually be
placed in a context with similar art forms previously made, so
that there is some prior paradigm belief and collateral
experience on the part of the percipient, and hence an
expectation of a certain kind of art. The formal style of an
artist or school that is familiar may of course help reveal this.
The very genre of computers may also reveal its artistic effect,
assuming that computer forms and works can be meaningful as art.
The criteria in the definition may point to this as a truth,
especially the interactive criterion. It is claimed by the author
that a computer form and work is interactive because it emerges
from a historical context of interactivity and computation. If
the interaction consists in an attempt on the part of the
computer expert to move outside the normal context, then it is
held by the author that a creative artistic action occurs. 

It seems to me that the problem with computers as a vehicular
means of art however is that there is no historical context or
boundary for which computers can be related to. Furthermore, this
thesis implies that the forms and objects and works of art in any
genre or class are determined subjectively by humans in social
situations. This is an antirealist stance, and denies that art
can in any way whatsoever be an objective phenomenal construct,
or even an objectively relative construct. It denies to art any
realist support. My initial problem with this whole approach
actually is just what might be a work of computer art. If a
computer is merely the ways and means or tools of making an
artistic form and an artistic work, then the object put out by
the contraption is the form and the work, and not the contraption
or its inner workings. There may of course be a good definition
and exemplification of what a computer artwork itself might be,
but it escapes me. In the absence of any historical context,
which the author seemingly requires of art as a tone or token or
type, then interactivity alone may not be a sufficient condition
for the computer to yield art. Any hyperimage or hypertext that
is interactive on a computer or on the internet may yield an
object that exists only in cyberspace, but this ephemeral digital
effect could not possibly be a form and object that constitutes
any kind of art, let alone a new kind of art. 

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