Imago's sober response is very welcome. wc
________________________________ From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Sent: Saturday, August 22, 2009 2:15:47 PM Subject: Re: Ayn Rand: Chapter 3: Art and a sense of life I am not sure I understand your response (below), Mr Miller. Surely, an incoherent or contradictory position is worse than one someone simply disagrees with, or one that turns out to be materially false. In point of fact, if Rands proposal for aesthetics entails contradiction or incoherence, it is hard for me to see how it has any merit at all. One might as well say, that squared circles work well enough (are serviceable, as another lister might say) to convey some idea that resides at the core of ones theory of geometry. The very thought makes no sense. >From a theoretical perspective incoherence or contradiction annihilates theory. And so Rand cannot be considered in the same circle of thinkers as Goodman, Aristotle, Ranciere, or any of the other thinkers this list has discussed with some measure of depth. That something works for her is not a criterion for determining its merit or its truth. In any case, it seem to me that Rands disagreements with certain artworks have absolutely nothing to do with them qua artworks, nor are they aesthetic. She disagrees on ideological grounds. Bad metaphysics. Arouses sympathy for those who do not work hard enough. Expresses broken sense of life. etc. Whatever the backwardness of Tolstoys nationalism and Religiosity, for instance, the Death of Ivan Ilyich is structurally perfect. Quite literally perfect. What difference could it make, therefore, to say that it does not exalt an individual's effort? Where does such a criterion come from, and what could it possibly have to do with the work being considered? How could such a claim be objective? Whither Rands Objectivism? There seems to be little more than a pretence to philosophy, rather than anything philosophical. On Sat, Aug 22, 2009 at 12:17 PM, Chris Miller <[email protected]>wrote: > I also doubt that that Rand can defend her philosophical hierarchy in > light > of her other commitments (her attachment to a sense of life that she calls > "Romantic"). > > She is going to keep on loving Victor Hugo, even though she "disagrees with > virtually all of his explicit philosophy" > > > (Just as I love Christian, Buddhist, Fascist, Egyptian, Hindu, and Aztec > art > -- without any particular attachment to any of the metaphysics or > ideologies > involved.) > > > But still, she was willing to voice her philosophic concerns -- and her > dissatisfaction with all the books that she liked was properly addressed > by > writing some of her own. Which gave her, as William might say, her > vocation > as an artist. > > Can we call her an elitist? > > > She certainly priveleges her sense of life that " involves the exaltation > of > an Individual being and his or her striving, rather than anything else" , > which seems to be a truth that she holds to be self evident ( though it may > not be evident to you, I, or most of the world's population.) > > I consider that attitude to be dysfunctional, but it is rather democratic, > is > it not? > > Everyone, even slaves and peasants, can strive and exalt themselves. > > So if she is promoting elitism, it is only the kind which everyone can > join. > > Obviously, I don't agree with Rand's philosophy of art or share much of her > "sense of life", but I don't see how it's worse than anything else that's > been presented to this listserv over the past decade. > > It works for her. > > > > > >Yes I understand that Rand asserts this. My contention is rather that she > cannot defend such an assertion in light of her other commitments. More > modestly said, I have seen no evidence that she can defend such a > hierarchy, > and I doubt whether such an ordering is even coherent, given her > psycho-epistemology. To reformulate my question (and objection), if each > of > us has a sense of life, then every action or argument, every work of art > and > ever word of philosophy can be traced back to it as an expression of that > very sense of life. Were we Heideggerians, we might speak of a Stimmung (a > mood, or an attunement to the world that envelopes us). If this is true, > then placing philosophy is a dominant position simply expresses another > sense of life. Hence, unlike the hermeneutical character of mood in > Heidegger, Rands sense of life remains utterly subjective. To be sure, we > may share a sense of life, but the grounds for our solidarity are not > 'rational'. > > Now, should we accept my claim, then it further follows that the grounds or > criteria for differentiating among 'senses of life' are neither objective > nor open to further investigation. They are brute facts established by > fiat. My charge of elitism thus arises from this petitio principii: other > senses of life are worse because they are not mine, and mine involves the > exaltation of an Individual being and his or her striving, rather than > anything else. This is simply not an argument, let alone a sound or valid > one. > > > ____________________________________________________________ > Easy-to-use, advanced features, flexible phone systems. Click here for > more > info. > > http://thirdpartyoffers.netzero.net/TGL2231/fc/BLSrjnxcAB5IjhaFqh5Njn3twlIcG6 > 5gdPeiWkR2MNOkqK4d4T1axL5oEDG/
