Although I think I am in Cheerskep's corner re this IS stuff, I'm not really completely convinced. If there is nothing external to experience then how can there be an experience since the one who experiences must be an existence? Or if there is no external art then how do we ever come to terms with anything we say is an art experience? The odds of two people agreeing when the choices are infinite must be set at zero. Cheerskep wants to discuss the different experiences of art, that is, aesthetic experiences, but why does he want to do that when a strict adherence to his view would eliminate any externalist, observable, justification or corroboration, except by pure coincidence? In other words, if we say there is no ISness to art (the unobservable zero) then how can we ever come to an agreement about the uniformity of art experiences, except by coincidence or fatigue (the have-it-your-way decision) or intimidation (power of authority)? Without being a philosopher, one can still note the problems with extreme views, their exclusionist nature.
wc ________________________________ From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Sent: Sunday, September 27, 2009 11:44:06 AM Subject: Re: Reading Rancihre In a message dated 9/27/09 12:04:09 PM, [email protected] writes: "Ranciere". Rancieree was ventured by the forum in the recent past, and the book addressed failed to sustain lister interest. > For what it is worth, I do not think that questions of ontology are > particularly pressing. In fact, I think that Danto has solved the problem > (i.e. the distinguishing feature of art is conceptual, not perceptual), > although I may not agree with all of the conclusions he draws from his > solution. > > How pressing they are varies from one person to another -- i.e. "pressing" is not an absolute condition, there is no mind-independent Platonic ontic category of "pressing matters". It's pressing to one if one is interested. But I agree that much lively and edifying discussion in philosophy of art can be carried on without addressing the "matephysical status" of art. For example, a closer examination of the experiences called 'aesthetic experiences' would be interesting to me. I can't claim familiarity with Danto's notions of conceptual and perceptual, so I have no idea what he had in mind. This I know: aestheticians wrangle endlessly and vacuously about the alleged category/quality/ontological-status of a general thing called "art" and about individual works. "Now that's art!" "No, it isn't!" "You're both balled up! That's like arguing over whether a given act is a 'sin'or a given person a 'genius'. The 'is' there is utterly misplaced because it suggests a mind-independent category." What in the early pages of the Kivy discourged me was his ostensible acceptance that a given work either "is" or "isn't" art. But I admit I did not initially read enough to confirm that that is his position throughout the book. Here's one example of the stunting effect (for me) of Kivy's position. I'd want to examine certain experiences occasioned by contemplating various events/objects that are very seldom called "art" -- e.g. a sporting contest, "real life drama". My reason is that the feeling I've derived from such events has sometimes been for me indistinguishable from the "aesthetic experiences" ordinarily associated with, say, works by Van Gogh, Shakespeare, Keats, Mozart et al. But if Kivy takes the position that a public event or a natural vista "is" not a "work of art", therefore we need not consider the experiences it occasions, he is, by fiat, barring sufficient discussion of what is for me the most interesting subject in "philosophy of art": the aesthetic experience.
