Fair enough Cheerskep. If no one has any interest in Rancihre, then I will happily retract my suggestion. As I remember, however, the discussion of *The Future of the Image *had at least three people interested, but was derailed by an argument involving the superior thought of Malraux. In fact, I believe that one or two of the contributors in that debate has been silent since.
Mr Conger: I believe a number of people have tried to persuade Cheerskep that his position is ultimately self-defeating, but he seems to be very able in shrugging off this line of critique. To be sure, 'meaning' does not inhere in the physical marks, nor is it a stable, univocal phenomenon. But one cannot coherently generalise in the manner that Cheerskep does, for more or less the same reasons you have identified below. On Sun, Sep 27, 2009 at 1:51 PM, William Conger <[email protected]>wrote: > Although I think I am in Cheerskep's corner re this IS stuff, I'm not > really > completely convinced. If there is nothing external to experience then how > can > there be an experience since the one who experiences must be an existence? > Or > if there is no external art then how do we ever come to terms with anything > we > say is an art experience? The odds of two people agreeing when the choices > are infinite must be set at zero. Cheerskep wants to discuss the different > experiences of art, that is, aesthetic experiences, but why does he want to > do > that when a strict adherence to his view would eliminate any externalist, > observable, justification or corroboration, except by pure coincidence? In > other words, if we say there is no ISness to art (the unobservable zero) > then > how can we ever come to an agreement about the uniformity of art > experiences, > except by coincidence or fatigue (the have-it-your-way decision) or > intimidation (power of authority)? Without being > a philosopher, one can still note the problems with extreme views, their > exclusionist nature. > > wc > > > > ________________________________ > From: > "[email protected]" <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Sent: > Sunday, September 27, 2009 11:44:06 AM > Subject: Re: Reading Rancihre > > In a > message dated 9/27/09 12:04:09 PM, [email protected] writes: > > "Ranciere". > Rancieree was ventured by the forum in the recent past, and the book > addressed > failed to sustain lister interest. > > > For what it is worth, I do not think > that questions of ontology are > > particularly pressing. In fact, I think that > Danto has solved the problem > > (i.e. the distinguishing feature of art is > conceptual, not perceptual), > > although I may not agree with all of the > conclusions he draws from his > > solution. > > > > How pressing they are varies > from one person to another -- i.e. "pressing" > is not an absolute condition, > there is no mind-independent Platonic ontic > category of "pressing matters". > It's pressing to one if one is interested. > > But I agree that much lively and > edifying discussion in philosophy of art > can be carried on without addressing > the "matephysical status" of art. For > example, a closer examination of the > experiences called 'aesthetic > experiences' would be interesting to me. > > I > can't claim familiarity with Danto's notions of conceptual and > perceptual, so > I have no idea what he had in mind. This I know: > aestheticians > wrangle > endlessly and vacuously about the alleged > category/quality/ontological-status > of a general thing called "art" and about > individual works. "Now that's > art!" > "No, it isn't!" "You're both balled up! That's like arguing over > whether a > given act is a 'sin'or a given person a 'genius'. The 'is' there is > utterly > misplaced because it suggests a mind-independent category." > > What in the > early pages of the Kivy discourged me was his ostensible > acceptance that a > given work either "is" or "isn't" art. But I admit I did not > initially read > enough to confirm that that is his position throughout the > book. > > Here's one > example of the stunting effect (for me) of Kivy's position. I'd > want to > examine certain experiences occasioned by contemplating various > events/objects > that are very seldom called "art" -- e.g. a sporting contest, > "real life > drama". My reason is that the feeling I've derived from such > events has > sometimes been for me indistinguishable from the "aesthetic > experiences" > ordinarily associated with, say, works by Van Gogh, Shakespeare, > Keats, > Mozart > et al. But if Kivy takes the position that a public event or a natural > vista > "is" not a "work of art", therefore we need not consider the > experiences it > occasions, he is, by fiat, barring sufficient discussion of > what is > for me > the most interesting subject in "philosophy of art": the aesthetic > experience.
