"Evolution could only require that an artist impress the people he knows, and Dutton does suggest that the human attraction for the art of dead people is flagrantly counter-evolutionary."
All suggestions in this statement are ambiguous therefore highly questionable. Evolution requires nothing. Requirements to survive create process we call 'evolution'. There is no such thing as counter-evolution; even death. Boris Shoshensky To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Reading Dutton: Chapter 10 - Four Characteristics of Great Art Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 15:12:57 GMT In his discussion of intention (Chapter 8), Dutton did not deny that "The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art" (Beardsley), he just gives two instances, from literature, when intention must be known (irony and anachronism) plus the "ever present" issue that involves the identity of the author. But further speculations concerning intention do seem unavoidable in each of his four characteristics of great art, especially #3 ("Purpose - a sense that the artist means it) and #4 (Distance: "There is a cool objectivity about the greatest works of art: the worlds they create have little direct regard for our insistent wants and needs; still less do they show any intention on the part of their creators to ingratiate themselves to us") And he certainly did not require that great art "somehow symbolize ambiguity, too" by offering an "open ended potential for enlivened subjective experience for both the artist and his/her audience." (but why should he, if he agrees with William that "Anything is infinitely complex or simple, as one chooses"? How can such an assertion be denied?) Does this mean that Dutton is proposing that a great work of art is " a machine intended to perform certain operations or a set of directions" ? That would make works of art seem a bit cold, limited and mechanistic, unless we allow that they are significantly different from all the other things that we call machines. But perhaps, according to Dutton, they are, since nowhere does he suggest that a great work of art "is intended to lead one to a particular goal." -- instead, he's only listing certain kinds goals that should be apparent if we are going to call something "great" Does he "require the artist to have foreseen the broadest and most profound symbolization of subject matter, style, etc". ? Evolution could only require that an artist impress the people he knows, and Dutton does suggest that the human attraction for the art of dead people is flagrantly counter-evolutionary. But his "four characteristics of great art" would seem to require that artists present the "the broadest and most profound symbolization of subject matter, style, etc". in order to achieve greatness, though he never uses the word, 'symbolization', and he's such an easy going, amenable fellow, it's hard to imagine him requiring anyone to do anything. Which is to say that Dutton would prefer to let evolved human instincts do the requiring, so he can be a cheerful scientist instead of a demanding, proscriptive art critic ............................................................................. .................. >Intentionality is workable in mechanistic ways, such as machine is intended to perform certain operations or a set of directions is intended to lead one to a particular goal. Even artworks can express intentionality and as they are recognized so they might lead to some particular knowledge or experience. But what of the associative thoughts, experiences, etc., surrounding those intentions, despite their being hidden, ignored or overlooked? We can never say that they are fully irrelevant to our experience even when they may deter us from the supposed correct intentions. If I notice the artist's intentions that guided the making of art, what am I supposed to do with them except to follow them as a set of directions, presumably to lead me to some subjective experience that imitates that of the artist? I suggest that this possible only in general terms, in superficial terms, if not actually banal terms. No one can fully convey his or her subjectivity to another because, obviously, subjectivity is not objective. So let's say a given artwork can convey an intended subject matter and it can even evoke the cultural memory or narrative associated with it, and perhaps the artist can slant it a bit one way or another to evoke some lesser associations, perhaps unique to him or her, and let's say I get it because I'm versed in both the subject matter and its associative content and am able to imagine myself experiencing something akin to the artist's subjectivity conveyed through some uniqueness of presentation. But in the end I am still awash in my own subjectivity and nothing can fence it out from my efforts to remain caged in the artist's intentions through his/her artwork. I think this is what E. Gombrich had in mind when he wrote, "There is no wrong way to experience an artwork." David Hume insisted that we cannot escape our objectivity and thus all that we know is a sense impression and ideas constructed with them, shaped largely if not exclusively, by "cultural habits and customs". That was the basis of his famed skepticism. We can't , he argued, ever know anything with real objectivity because all our knowing is subjective. So we symbolize the objectivity and those symbols rely on patterns and associations, only some of which have a seemingly causal relationship to the supposed (make-believe) reality. This is what led Hume to question the truth of causality. How can we be sure that A causes B when we are limited to symbols and our associative subjectivity? A may cause B, and C,D,E,F, etc., in any combination or inclusion or exclusion. Only by pragmatic experience can we assume, ultimately through belief alone, that A can cause B. Thus even when causality is extended to natural Laws, we must withhold ultimate certainty. If I can't be certain that the sun will rise or that gravity is eternal or that even the eternal is not relative to my subjectivity, and must rely on symbols, which are "as-if" metaphors that require my leap of belief and are not exact copies because they are subjective, how am I to be sure that I can notice another's intentions, or even imitate them, or be sure that the other has those intentions or is even aware of them? And that is the substance of the Intentional Fallacy. To approach art as if it was a machine, something to be examined and used according to the implicit directions for its use and goal, is, to me. alarmingly naive and superficial. Yes, a real machine may not work as intended if I try to impose another use and goal for it, but perhaps it will do another job better. Artworks, if they symbolize proscriptive intentions, are merely illustrations, like ordinary signs or maps. But if they somehow symbolize ambiguity too, by which I mean additional symbols of subjectivity, (only a few of which the artist can symbolize due to the fact that subjectivity cannot be fully exemplified), then there is at least an open ended potential for enlivened subjective experience for both the artist and his/her audience. The point is that the best intentions are those which symbolize far more than are intended. None are excluded and thus all are relevant and all are "truthful" and all are causal without defined or limited effects. My trouble with Dutton's notion of intentionality is that he requires the artist to have foreseen the broadest and most profound symbolization of subject matter, style, etc. That's impossible due to the cage of subjectivity and the inability of anyone to have full experience or acquaintance with "cultural habits and customs" that invisibly shape our symbols and associations, most of which normally evolve over generations or even millennia, far beyond the life experience of any individual. I would respond to him that the best approach regarding intentionality, which is the container word for meaning, is to avoid intentionality, to try to contradict meaning at every turn, because in this
