Boris writes: "If you would trust my understanding of your position in its entirety including your refusal to admit that Notion is our reaction or reflection to objective independently occurring processes without titles until we give it to them."
Boris, I can't trust your understanding of my position because at no time do I deny that notion is produced by our observation of events outside our heads. And further notion is generated by our reflecting on our experiences and ideas. With your phrase "objective independently occurring processes without titles until we give it to them," your point may be that a specific event like the San Francisco Earthquake (or a specific object like Mount Everest) does not "have its name" until we "give it to it". Or you may have in mind generic events such that the kind of event that took place in 1906 in San Francisco did not have the generic title 'earthquake' until "we gave" events like that the title 'earthquake'. In either case, my position is that when doing philosophy it is a mistake to think that any object or event "has" a "name" or "title". This is not to say there cannot be communal consensus agreeing to "call" an object, say, "Porkchop Hill" or "Pikes Peak" or "Everest". But the notion that the object thereafter carries out an action that we call "having", or that the entity it "has" is its "name", are delusions that have come with evolution of "language". Consider: Would you say that if all human consciousness were extinguished tomorrow, the mountain in Asia would still in some way "have" an entity called a "name"? We concoct notions that we call "names", and we promptly reify these "names"; that is, we come to believe they somehow have an existence that is beyond a mere bit of consciousness and yet they are not "physical". It is thought to be a third kind of entity, a non-notional "abstraction" like alleged "categories", "qualities", "sets", Platonic "forms", "absolute standards", "THE meanings of", "relations", "language", "referents", "beauty", "sin", "justice", "terrorism", or even "art". Boris, you go on to say: ""Standards", "qualities", "art" are things we named to communicate to each other in order to find commonalities in the subjectively sensed world." Note the ambiguous term "things" there. Exactly what's at issue is the KIND of "thing". We certainly entertain notions that we eventually are convinced are roughly like notions in other people's minds. An attempt to "communicate" usually amounts to trying to occasion the stirring in someone else's mind of a notion serviceably like the one in our mind. And language is often a marvelous tool to help us do that especially in the kitchen (and the garden, and the machine shop) My notion of Cleopatra is not identical to yours, but we can reasonably believe they have enough "in common" so that when you say "Cleopatra" you can have confidence you will occasion in my mind a serviceably similar notion. There is no "THE meaning of" 'Cleopatra'. But we've both over the years been exposed to similar stories and alleged pictures of her; our minds link those notions with the sound "Cleopatra", and those amazing storage and retrieval engines, our brains, will, upon hearing the sound "Cleopatra", do a serviceably similar job of retrieving stored associated notion. You conclude: "We have to accept that Plato and few others on that level were smart enough to know that our notions created by independently existing events in the environment we are exposed to." As I say at the top this posting, at no time have I denied this. (Though it's helpful to consider that it's not the external event that is causing the notion; it's our observation of the event. That's why I keep saying those external events and objects are the "occasion", not the cause. ) On Jun 30, 2010, at 7:35 PM, Boris Shoshensky wrote: > If you would trust my understanding of your position in its entirety > including your refusal to admit that Notion is our reaction or reflection to > objective independently occurring processes without titles until we give it to > them. "Standards", "qualities", "art" are things > we named to communicate to each other in order to find commonalities > in the subjectively sensed world. We have to accept that Plato and few others > on that level were smart enough to know that our notions created by > independently existing events in the environment we are exposed to. > Boris Shoshensky > > > ---------- Original Message ---------- > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: The "trinary" view of "what there is". > Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 19:03:39 EDT > > Brady wrote: > > "We all accept the working premise that the remains of ancient art are > representatively distributed across the range of quality. The best of the > ancient Greek or Sumerian or Chinese art are in fact the best." > > After some remarks of mine, Boris wrote: > > "Brady did not say that abstract entities are mind- independentb&.. our > brain b& creates "standards", "qualities", "art"." > > Agreed, Boris, Brady certainly did not say it. But the essential thrust of > my posting (The "trinary" view of "what there is".) is that he, and > philosophers before him going back through Plato, tacitly believe and "imply" > that > such things are mind-independent. > > You say, "our brain b& creates "standards", "qualities", "art"." I reply > that our "brain" creates only notions - ideas, images, feelings - bits of > consciousness -- and these notions vary from mind to the other. > > When Brady says, " The best of the ancient Greek or Sumerian or Chinese art > are in fact the best," he is attributing qualities to the works, he is > emphatically not saying, "This is only my, Brady's, feeling about those > works." > > You, Boris, go on to say, "We forget too often that mind is a part of the > reality also." Certainly my posting did not forget that (assuming "mind" is > your word for "consciousness"). I asserted that I am a dualist - I believe in > my consciousness - and yours - and I believe in the material world: Mount > Everest is a material entity that would persist if all consciousness were > extinguished tomorrow. I should interject that I believe my brain is a > material > object, and I'm ready to concede my consciousness depends on my brain's > being around. Analogies prove little, but perhaps I can use two to convey my > idea here: I believe that once the bulb is smashed, the light will be gone, > but I also believe the light and the bulb are not the same thing. I believe > the same sort of thing about a magnet and a magnetic field. Earlier > philosophers spoke of consciousness as an "epiphenomenon" of the brain. > > The kinds of entities I do not believe in are such non-notional, > mind-independent abstractions as "categories", "qualities", "sets", Platonic > "forms", > "absolute standards", "THE meanings of", "relations", "language", > "referents", "beauty", "sin", or even "art". > > The list is far, far longer than that. Take such familiar words as > 'justice' or 'terrorism'. I guarantee that people will argue all night about > whether > a given event "is" justice or not - and they are not talking only about > their feeling. "That wasn't justice!" "Yes it was!" "Wasn't!" "Was!" "The > bombing of Dresden was a terrorist act!" "No - it was an act of war!" > "Terrorism!" "War!" > > Such disputants are not saying, "Well, that's the scornful term I'd call it > because of the way I feel about it." For them it's not a matter of simply > "calling". Their suppressed assumption is that a given act either is or isn't > in the mind-independent category of "terrorist acts"; it has the "quality" > of "terrorism". > > This forum has been haunted from day one by many listers who believe that > certain works are in some absolute way "art". They are not talking solely > about the way they choose to use the word 'art' because of the way they feel > when they contemplate the work. They would say they feel that way because the > work "is" art. > > You conclude: > "I think Cheerskep is breaking in through the open door." Would that it > were so, Boris. But the door is not open, and I'm clearly not breaking > through.
