I think this is right, Ms Sullivan. Cheerskeps two basic starting points (again insofar as I understand him) seem to be the notion of 'reference' and the problem of vagueness. For some reason he does not think words refer (why? I do not know, nor have I seen an argument that supports this claim). For all intents and purposes, he seems to be trying to effect a shift from the metaphysics of meaning to its pragmatics. That would be fine and reasonable, of course, were he simply to come out and say, "Pragmatics, not semantics!" As it stands, he reminds me of the congenial sentinel in Kafkas "Vor dem Gesetz," who stands guard of an open door.
On Thu, Jul 15, 2010 at 8:03 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Given that Cheerskep's argument is invalid, what is he talking about? I > have always thought he was talking about the difficulty of defining the > identity of blurry terms but that he had carried his position to an > untenable > extreme. > KAte Sullivan
