> Words don't have "meanings"; they have associations > I simply don't see how words can have associations but not meanings. This sentence is sophistical.
Again, my criticism is quite straightforward: if you want to focus upon pragmatics, then you need to explicitly say so. Blurring the difference between semantics and pragmatics is not productive. For all the fascinating examples, and analogies you have included, I still do not see an argument. On Thu, Jul 15, 2010 at 12:29 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > In a message dated 7/15/10 11:43:41 AM, [email protected] writes: > > > > For some > > reason he does not think words refer (why? I do not know, nor have I seen > > an > > argument that supports this claim). > > > I realize I've been silent, Imago, but I'm not hiding -- I'm merely > temporarily engaged in finishing up a non-forum project. In the meantime, > to > read > someone else's argument that in part supports my claim, you might look at > Peter Strawson's famous essay "On Referring". Strawson was responding to > Russell's even more famous essay, "On Denoting". > > Strawson argues there that words can't "refer", only people can. Strawson > is right about the first part of that argument. > > Yes, I've also read Frege, Wittgenstein,Grice, Davidson, Donnellan, Kripke > et al. In a real sense, I don't blame Kate for wondering what I'm talking > about because I try to jam too many topics into one posting. Recall the > subject line of the original posting in this thread: "The "trinary" view of > "what there is"." The core point I was trying to make was that almost all > philosophers explicitly concede their belief in the "existence" of a > material > world, and many (most?) philosophers concede there is another "substance" > besides "materiality" -- i.e. "consciousness"; but almost none seems to > perceive > that they are also tacitly accepting that there is a third kind of "thing" > -- > mind-independent abstractions, of which one allegedly is mind-independent > "the meanings of words". I believe they are profoundly wrong in that tacit > belief. That's one of the things I was trying to talk about, Kate. > > Words don't have "meanings"; they have associations. If I say to you, > "Ekorre," what comes to mind? But if I say that word to a Swede, what comes > to > his mind is a notion of a squirrel. "Oh, but that's only because he was > taught > the meaning of 'ekorre' and I wasn't." No; such "teaching" is solely > association, repeated juxtaposition. That associating activity in a > learning > mind > accounts for everything that "words have meanings" is said to do, and it > avoids the multitudinous errors entailed by the concept of "meaning" there. > > It's dizzying to ponder how people who believe words "have meanings" think > the words got those meanings. That the associating lump of links that is > our > minds would, after sufficient juxtaposition, connect an utterance with a > notion - that's easy enough to accept. But they are saying it's more than > mere > association. They claim there is a "real", "actual" "the meaning of" of > each word, a mind-independent ontic entity presumably out there in > Plato-land. > Picturing how any utterance or scription could come to "have the meaning" > invites parody. Is the meaning injected with a syringe? When? By what > injector? Using what policy for choosing? Did "God" create these meanings? > Which did > he create first -- the meanings or the words? Where did he keep them till > humans came along? Etc. > > "Foopgoom!" is a sample utterance of an alleged "word" that I've often used > on this forum. It is in my mind strongly associated with my notion of > something very specific in the material world (I'm not a solipsist; though > it > is > unprovable, I accept there is a material world.) I'm thinking of writing a > movie called, "It's a Wonderful Philosophy", with a character named > 'Foopgoom' who is sad because he knows he's only a "Word, Second Class". > His > quest is > at last to get Plato to give him a "Meaning", after which he can happily be > a "Word, First Class". > > Ockham's razor would have us discard the notion that there is a > mind-independent entity, its "meaning", for everything we call a "word". > But a > philosophic barber with an Ockham hope would be disappointed. The word > 'meaning' > will always be with us. An optimistic philosopher might try to confine its > use > to something like this: "We can say the notion that comes to my mind when I > hear/read a given word is 'its meaning for me'. That way we avoid talking > about 'THE meaning'!" It's a fair try, but it will never catch on. > > There's obviously far more to say about all this, and though I know won't > get it all said, I'll try to add at least some bits of interesting stuff. > Till then...
