We regularly puzzle ourselves by using the word 'meaning' with two
different notions in mind. To make that clearer, first consider the way we
also use
the word 'sound' with two different, quite distinct senses in mind - and how
that practice pushes us into bafflement. We've all heard the alleged
profound conundrum, "When a tree falls in the forest, and there's no one
around to
hear it, does it make a sound?" The bogus puzzle hinges on the fact that
sometimes what we have in mind with the word 'sound' is the mind-independent
vibrations in the air outside our skull, and sometimes it's the aural/mental
experience in our mind. Throughout these postings, with the word 'sound' I
hope to have in mind the aural notion. For those external vibrations
instead of 'sound' I'll use the word 'noise'. Thus my answer to the conundrum
would be that though there is noise in that forest, there is no sound (not
counting what animals might hear). There is no right or wrong to either of
these
usages. But my stipulated distinction dispels the puzzlement for me. ("Oh
but not all noise is "noise"b&")
About 'meaning'. We've all been in the following situation: We hear someone
use a word, and we suspect he has it "wrong". We ask him to describe what
he has in mind. He does it, and that often prompts us to say, "But that's not
the meaning of the word!" When we say that, we're in the grip of the belief
that "THE meaning of the word" is somehow a mind-independent entity.
We've also been in the situation where we are observing two people in a
discussion, and one says something that convinces us he is not "understanding"
the other. "That's not Mike's meaning," we might say. Here we are thinking
of the 'meaning' not as some sort of mind-independent entity, but as an
entity in Mike's mind, his notion.
Unfortunately, these two notions of "meaning" have no obvious different
verbal handles to distinguish them the way 'sound' has 'sound' and 'noise'.
Recall - I'm a dualist. Though I can't prove it, I believe there are
material things outside my skull. And I believe "consciousness" - comprising
my
feelings, images, ideas - is the other kind of "thing" that "exists". There is
materiality, and consciousness. (I shrink from calling consciousness, as
some philosophers do, a "substance", but that's only because my idiosyncratic
collection of notions that I associate with 'substance' contains too much
that feels, to me, alien to consciousness.)
What I do not believe in is a third kind of entity -- non-material,
mind-independent "abstractions" like "meanings", "categories", "qualities",
etc. I
certainly believe we have conscious bits, "notions", of all these things.
In commenting on the second usage of 'meaning' above - "an entity in Mike's
mind, his notion" - Imago asks:
"Why isn't that simply meaning then? Why would this not produce a
functional account of 'the meaning of xxx'??"
I agree a given notion could serviceably be termed "The meaning of xxx FOR
A GIVEN PERSON". And I agree that most of us who speak the same language are
likely to have roughly the same notions with many given utterances or
scriptions. (I'm semi-content at this stage to term such bits of consciousness
"entities", even though they are IIMT. Though it bothers me that I'm also
inclined to call consciousness as a whole an "entity".)
But I submit that when one speaker says, "John, that's not the meaning of
the word!" and John says, "Well, that's the meaning for me," they have in
mind quite distinct notions behind their use of the word 'meaning'. The first
speaker believes that regardless of what Mike thinks, the word has a "THE
correct meaning", an entity that is mind-independent, and because Mike's
notion
does not "correspond" to "THE meaning", Mike is flatly wrong. Mike might
reply, "Look, when you say that word that's what comes to my mind, that's what
it means to me. I can't be wrong about what the word means to me."
(En passant: Wittgenstein's assertion that "a word's meaning is its use in
the community" has several faults, one of which is its insinuation that
there is a uniformity to each word's use in the community. Wittgenstein would
have been a bit closer if he had said, "a word's meaning is its effect in the
community" - that is, "a word's meaning is the notion it occasions when
heard by the audience in the community". That's still faulty - it too
insinuates
a uniformity where there isn't any - but it avoids the vast ambiguity of
'use'.)
My idea of "mind-independent meaning" may be clearer when I plug in
specific words: "Mike, that's not what 'murder' means!" Or, "Mike, that's not
the
meaning of the play!" The speaker of both those lines clearly believes in the
existence of "meaning-entities", abstractions that are neither material
things, nor solely notional things.
In sum, I believe the notions behind those two usages of 'meaning' are
quite distinct. So when Imago says, "Why isn't [Mike's notion] simply
meaning
then? Why would this not produce a functional account of 'the meaning of
xxx'??" I have to suspect he either isn't seeing or he simply rejects the
idea that the notions behind those two usages of 'meaning' are distinct. Those
who believe in mind-independent abstract meaning-entities believe Mike's
personal notion of xxx can be outright wrong.
Imago's remark, "After all, [Mike's usage] will produce the appropriate
inferential relations that allow people to keep track of one another's
usages,"
turns out not to be true in practice. Too often, disputants don't realize
that they are arguing at cross-purposes because they are entertaining
different meaning-notions of the same word.
Again, my central point in "The Trinary View of 'What There Is'" is that
there is no realm of non-material, non-consciousness "things" -- abstractions.
That alleged world of abstract entities is imaginary. I also maintain that
the point has an importance. One of those alleged abstractions is "meaning".
My point entails that none of the following terms in any way except
notionally "means", "denotes", "refers to", "names", "picks out" anything
except
notions, ideas that vary from mind to mind to mind.
THE meanings of
categories
qualities
sets
forms
absolute standards
referents
relations
language
referents
beauty
sin
justice
terrorism
art
Freedom Fighters
Freedom Flotilla
Islam
Catholicism
Humanitarians
Soul
Justice
Massacre
Slaughter
Aggression
New
Same
Life
Fair
New York
Racism
Elitismb&
I repeat: The list is effectively endless.
