I suspect that this particular conversation will exhibit a diminishing
return, but I nevertheless want to point out two things. I will grant
Cheerskep his dualism for the sake of the argument. As I see things, (1)
Cheerskep's approach is to argue from example, which is not a deductively
valid argument scheme; it is defeasible, however. If Cheerskep could
illustrate that his examples were in fact structurally identical, then he
might have a plausible argument. Unfortunately (2) Cheerskep's argument
trades on an equivocation, which illustrates two contextually distinct uses
of the phrase, 'the mening of xxx'. Despite the fact that we can use the
same expression to different effects in different contexts (hence my claim
that we need to focus on pragmatics, rather than metaphysics), Cheerskep
constantly take this variation to be metaphysical evidence of no stable
meaning, instead of taking context into account as a feature of 'meaning'
itself. I suspect he will simply deny this criticism, but allow me to
illustrate:
Cheerskep offers us two examples of 'the meaning of xxx': (1) the meaning of
some rather technical term, 'murder' (whose 'home domain' is juristic), and
(2) 'the meaning of a specific object' (the meaning of a play, a novel, and
artwork). My question for Cheerskep is thus, What structural identity among
contexts of use, allows us to treat these examples as Identical, and hence
as supporting your claim that 'there is no unique meaning of xxx'?
So far as I can see, there is no such identity, and hence Cheerskep's
argument is not acceptable, for it equivocates between distinct
uses/contexts. Context (2) ('that's not the meaning of the play') could be
easily reformulated as, 'your interpretation of the play fails,' where the
definite article does not imply a platonic entity, but rather that a
specific account of the play is insufficient in some way. Context (2), by
contrast, stipulatively defines a term in relation to a codified set of
practices so as to material imply other practices, while excluding others.
The meaning of murder is "unlawful homicide," which precludes homicide in
times of war, and in self-defense, which imply, in their turn a set of
practices etc. Although cases 1 and 2 are determined by pragmatic
considerations, they are not structurally identical.
To reformulate, then, if we grant Cheerskep's dualism, we might ask why he
thinks 'consciousness' is somehow locked up within his skull. Why isn't it
extended into the world (say as Andy Clark et al argue) as a series of
practices, and concrete structures (call them practices and institutions if
you like)? Would meaning not then be in the world to precisely the same
extent that my consciousness is? however one is inclined to see the matter,
and whatever the truth actually turns out to be, Cheerskep needs a better
set of arguments to convince people.
On Sun, Jul 18, 2010 at 11:06 AM, <[email protected]> wrote:
> We regularly puzzle ourselves by using the word 'meaning' with two
> different notions in mind. To make that clearer, first consider the way we
> also use
> the word 'sound' with two different, quite distinct senses in mind - and
> how
> that practice pushes us into bafflement. We've all heard the alleged
> profound conundrum, "When a tree falls in the forest, and there's no one
> around to
> hear it, does it make a sound?" The bogus puzzle hinges on the fact that
> sometimes what we have in mind with the word 'sound' is the
> mind-independent
> vibrations in the air outside our skull, and sometimes it's the
> aural/mental
> experience in our mind. Throughout these postings, with the word 'sound' I
> hope to have in mind the aural notion. For those external vibrations
> instead of 'sound' I'll use the word 'noise'. Thus my answer to the
> conundrum
> would be that though there is noise in that forest, there is no sound (not
> counting what animals might hear). There is no right or wrong to either of
> these
> usages. But my stipulated distinction dispels the puzzlement for me. ("Oh
> but not all noise is "noise"b&")
>
> About 'meaning'. We've all been in the following situation: We hear someone
> use a word, and we suspect he has it "wrong". We ask him to describe what
> he has in mind. He does it, and that often prompts us to say, "But that's
> not
> the meaning of the word!" When we say that, we're in the grip of the belief
> that "THE meaning of the word" is somehow a mind-independent entity.
>
> We've also been in the situation where we are observing two people in a
> discussion, and one says something that convinces us he is not
> "understanding"
> the other. "That's not Mike's meaning," we might say. Here we are
> thinking
> of the 'meaning' not as some sort of mind-independent entity, but as an
> entity in Mike's mind, his notion.
>
> Unfortunately, these two notions of "meaning" have no obvious different
> verbal handles to distinguish them the way 'sound' has 'sound' and 'noise'.
>
> Recall - I'm a dualist. Though I can't prove it, I believe there are
> material things outside my skull. And I believe "consciousness" -
> comprising
> my
> feelings, images, ideas - is the other kind of "thing" that "exists". There
> is
> materiality, and consciousness. (I shrink from calling consciousness, as
> some philosophers do, a "substance", but that's only because my
> idiosyncratic
> collection of notions that I associate with 'substance' contains too much
> that feels, to me, alien to consciousness.)
>
> What I do not believe in is a third kind of entity -- non-material,
> mind-independent "abstractions" like "meanings", "categories", "qualities",
> etc. I
> certainly believe we have conscious bits, "notions", of all these things.
>
> In commenting on the second usage of 'meaning' above - "an entity in Mike's
> mind, his notion" - Imago asks:
>
> "Why isn't that simply meaning then? Why would this not produce a
> functional account of 'the meaning of xxx'??"
>
> I agree a given notion could serviceably be termed "The meaning of xxx FOR
> A GIVEN PERSON". And I agree that most of us who speak the same language
> are
> likely to have roughly the same notions with many given utterances or
> scriptions. (I'm semi-content at this stage to term such bits of
> consciousness
> "entities", even though they are IIMT. Though it bothers me that I'm also
> inclined to call consciousness as a whole an "entity".)
>
> But I submit that when one speaker says, "John, that's not the meaning of
> the word!" and John says, "Well, that's the meaning for me," they have in
> mind quite distinct notions behind their use of the word 'meaning'. The
> first
> speaker believes that regardless of what Mike thinks, the word has a "THE
> correct meaning", an entity that is mind-independent, and because Mike's
> notion
> does not "correspond" to "THE meaning", Mike is flatly wrong. Mike might
> reply, "Look, when you say that word that's what comes to my mind, that's
> what
> it means to me. I can't be wrong about what the word means to me."
>
> (En passant: Wittgenstein's assertion that "a word's meaning is its use in
> the community" has several faults, one of which is its insinuation that
> there is a uniformity to each word's use in the community. Wittgenstein
> would
> have been a bit closer if he had said, "a word's meaning is its effect in
> the
> community" - that is, "a word's meaning is the notion it occasions when
> heard by the audience in the community". That's still faulty - it too
> insinuates
> a uniformity where there isn't any - but it avoids the vast ambiguity of
> 'use'.)
>
> My idea of "mind-independent meaning" may be clearer when I plug in
> specific words: "Mike, that's not what 'murder' means!" Or, "Mike, that's
> not
> the
> meaning of the play!" The speaker of both those lines clearly believes in
> the
> existence of "meaning-entities", abstractions that are neither material
> things, nor solely notional things.
>
> In sum, I believe the notions behind those two usages of 'meaning' are
> quite distinct. So when Imago says, "Why isn't [Mike's notion] simply
> meaning
> then? Why would this not produce a functional account of 'the meaning of
> xxx'??" I have to suspect he either isn't seeing or he simply rejects the
> idea that the notions behind those two usages of 'meaning' are distinct.
> Those
> who believe in mind-independent abstract meaning-entities believe Mike's
> personal notion of xxx can be outright wrong.
>
> Imago's remark, "After all, [Mike's usage] will produce the appropriate
> inferential relations that allow people to keep track of one another's
> usages,"
> turns out not to be true in practice. Too often, disputants don't realize
> that they are arguing at cross-purposes because they are entertaining
> different meaning-notions of the same word.
>
> Again, my central point in "The Trinary View of 'What There Is'" is that
> there is no realm of non-material, non-consciousness "things" --
> abstractions.
