I take Wittgensteins builder example to illustrate that the idea of an associative connection between word and thing is neither necessary nor sufficient for comprehending the utterances. the different ways in which eg 'slab' is spoken illustrates that the word itself has no (specific) meaning (it is as if the punctuation does more work than the word -- !, ? are the meanings that are important). That seems to refute both Augustine (the 'meaning of the word' is its referent) and you (meanings are associations), since there's no obvious way in which these interogative and emphatic features are learned associatively (we would geometrcally increase our vocabulary to the point of uselessness were we to assert that).
So it strikes me as a basic misinterpretation to say that Wittgenstein went wrong by attributing goals to words. He does not. He attributes goals to people, who use language to help fulfil them. Language is a means for advancing particular goals, a kind of playground, as Wittgenstein puts. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein their is no meaning to words outside of their contextual implementation/use. But that does not in any way imply, as you suggest, that eg builder and utterance are 'fused,' nor does it imply that words are more than insensate sounds. This does not follow any more than it would follow to say that my hand and keyboard are fused when I type. And, from what I recall, Wittgenstein never makes reference to the meaning of words in other people's minds. In fact, the whole private language/beetlebox discussion seems to show that there is no such thing as 'private meaning'. Again, you seem to be inventing positions that Wittgenstein does not hold in order to castigate him. In any case, I have noticed that you tend to isolate individual words for analysis. This is highly problematic (for reasons Wittgenstein identifies, but for even more basic reasons), and presupposes a semantic atomism rather than arguing against it. You are, in short, begging the question, and trying to disprove something only you seem to presuppose. On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 12:02 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Imago writes: > > "I am not sure I understand your criticism of Wittgenstein . From what I > can > surmise from the passage you quoted (i do not have the Investigations at > hand), he is arguing precisely against the kind of position you hold." > > I don't think LW is rejecting the entire Augustinian view of > language-learning. LW's position is that that view is all right as far as > it goes, but it > doesn't go far enough - it leaves too much unaccounted for; language is > often used with an intent in the user's mind that is beyond simply hoping > to > stir a simple image in the listener's mind. I'll quote from your > translation of > LW: > > "One can say that this ostensive teaching of words creates an associative > connection between word and thing. But what is that? Well, it may mean > different things, but one can certainly conceive that an image of the thing > passes before the mind's eye of the child, when the child hears the right > word. But if that now occurs, is that the GOAL of the word? Of course it > CAN > be, and I can imagine such a use of words (series of sounds)." > > You write: > > > "Wittgensteins remarks do seem to offer a fair characterization of your > position, and a criticism > of it. What exactly do you think is wrong here? What does he say that > misses your point?" > > In my last posting I tried to suggest some ways I feel LW went wrong -- > e.g. attributing the speaker's purpose/goal to the tool he uses to achieve > the > goal. I'd love to go through LW's PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS line by > line, > agreeing and disagreeing, but I know I don't have the time. It would take a > book to do that. And since I think his most basic positions are flatly > wrong, I don't feel too guilty about passing over him. I'd rather spend my > time doing what I'll megalomaniacally term "creative" work. Like every > other > deluded philosopher before me, I think I'm on the right track, but I'm > aware > there's a lot of track in front of me. > > For example, LW (and Michael Brady and you) have expressed doubts about how > my "it's all association" theory can account for conceiving of and > communicating abstract "bits of consciousness". I hinted at this by > pointing out how > a young child eventually "gets your abstract idea" when you say "No!" or > "Good boy!", but there's lots more to do.
