> I think Augustine has also failed to make you understand him. At no time in > the entire Augustine quotation cited by LW does Augustine use any form of > "to mean". >
Neither does Wittgenstein, really. But you are looking at the face of a scription too closely. Augustine uses "signify," which is a cognate of "to mean." So, to speak loosely, forget the individual word, and look at the context as a whole, look at the role or function being asigned to the word. Similarly, your "stir notion" and its cognate forms seems to be captured by Wittegensteins "piano of the imagination," which he ultimately rejects as a theory of meaning. Again, my point is quite simply. You have failed to identify a salient distinction, or have not sufficiently motivated this distinction. Past pointing out a different word here and there, I do not actually see you pointing out a difference. And frankly, saying that "an utterance stirs associations" is just as spooky and ill conceived as saying that it denotes etc. If it is inert or non-causal, then no verb form can be applied to it. Either it is identical to a subjective set of associations or it is not. I see no way for you to dodge this problem. Especially not by simply saying otherwise. As a friend of mine once said, Wishing it were otherwise does not make it so. Now about the builder language, you write: > It seems to me your take is wrong. When the builder says "Slab!" if the > assistant's mind does not connect that sound with his image of a slab, how > would he know not to bring a pillar or a block? > That is, of course, one the great problems of the whole Investigations, which Wittgenstein is trying to diagnose. But you will not find an answer before the problem has even been fully developed! Before solving, we need to explicitly articulate it. On My reading of the text, to reiterate, the basic problem is that 'meaning' has been conceived in terms of associations in individual heads. Wittgensteins example and subsequent discussion illustrates that the image in one's head is neither sufficient nor necessary for understanding the utterance "slab!" and therefore cannot be a theory of meaning, learning, or communication. If the utterance ALSO conjures an image of a slab, that is fine. But this "stirred notion" is ultimately accidental (it is like Bacons discussion of the concept 'heat,' whose definition includes 'the effect produced by certain spices on the tongue' -- but it would be a mistake to think that that sensation is mean molecular kinetic energy). Qua accident it might be helpful, but that does not change the fact that it is neither necessary nor sufficient. Blondes (natural or unnatural) may have more fun, but being blonde is neither necessary nor sufficient for fun. Finally, Meantime I'm sorry you can't agree that when LW talks of "the GOAL of a > word" or "the MEANING of a word" his locution harmfully conflates the > speaker > and the utterance. My lengthy earlier posting tried to convey the dangers > of > suggesting that tools -- whether they be words or wrenches -- have goals, > intentions, "meanings". > It is not that I cannot agree or even that I will not agree, it is simply that I do not see the conflation. You have asserted it, to be sure, but that does not make it true, and I do not see the warrent behind it. Perhaps you could explain your claim to me al little more? On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 2:50 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > In a message dated 8/4/10 12:45:03 PM, [email protected] writes: > > "That seems to refute both Augustine (the 'meaning of the word' is its > referent) and you (meanings are associations)," > > Imago, I realize I have failed to make you "understand" me. I would never > say, "meanings are associations". I would say the hearing of an utterance > stirs associated notions. > > I think Augustine has also failed to make you understand him. At no time in > the entire Augustine quotation cited by LW does Augustine use any form of > "to mean". > > You write: > > > I take Wittgensteins builder example to illustrate that the idea of an > > associative connection between word and thing is neither necessary nor > > sufficient for comprehending the utterances. > > > It seems to me your take is wrong. When the builder says "Slab!" if the > assistant's mind does not connect that sound with his image of a slab, how > would he know not to bring a pillar or a block? > > You write: > > > the different ways in which eg'slab' is spoken illustrates that the word > > itself has no (specific) meaning. > > > I agree with this. It's what I've been saying all along. > > You write: > > > (it is as if the punctuation does more work than the word -- !, ? are the > > meanings that are important). > > > "Pragmatics" -- how a word is said, the context, etc -- are certainly > important. The difference between you and me is, I believe, that I would > not > say > different emphases or contexts give an utterance different "meanings". I'd > say that the sound or context of the utterance will, in the hearer's mind, > cause the retrieval of different associated notions. > > Meantime I'm sorry you can't agree that when LW talks of "the GOAL of a > word" or "the MEANING of a word" his locution harmfully conflates the > speaker > and the utterance. My lengthy earlier posting tried to convey the dangers > of > suggesting that tools -- whether they be words or wrenches -- have goals, > intentions, "meanings".
