Frances to William with thanks... It is understood from its literature that for integrationism any "nonlingual" action like a gesture or fracture or posture is a nonverbal but lingual construct whose meaning is translated into and interpreted via verbal language, in order for the event to be a sign at all. It is also agreed that for integrationism any constructed "meanings" is determined in the context of the communicative situation among linguists, and that communications and signs and meanings are the exclusive action of only competent humans.
The thorn for me now is to appreciate if for integrationism and its brand of linguistics there might be any referred "objects" of grammatic information that a sign in its context of usage may bear as collateral experience on the part of linguists prior to their communicative act of assigning what might be meant by the sign. My musing here turns to the immediate object of a word, but before its intermediate or dynamic object is engaged and the conferring of its selected meaning is assigned, which would be that the lingual sign is simply a verbal word such as a noun or term in the language of its use. This awareness on the part of the linguists would seemingly be necessary and clearly before or aside from any particular communicative context. The further thorn for me in regard to pragmatist semiotics and linguistics along with integrationist linguistics is whether the evaluated "meanings" of any sign, aside from its referred "objects" of information, is to be limited or restricted to the normal human realm alone, to the exclusion of all abnormal human and nonhuman signers or linguists. While "meaning" is allowed for signs in either its absence or presence from a situation by all these approaches, none of them clearly states what or who may be permitted to assign it. It is easy for me to accept that all signers and linguists might be able to engage the informative "objects" that any sign may bear, but hard for me to accept that other than competent humans might be able to engage the evaluative "meanings" that any informative sign can yield. It is however ironic that it is easy for me to accept that all signers and linguists of any nonhuman or human stripe might be able to engage the preparatory evaluative "values" that any informative sign can yield. In regard to the "values" of signs it is my tentative assumption that any object has value for any able user merely to the extent that the object can satisfy a need of the user in some situation, aside from any aesthetical or ethical or logical concerns. Finally, the evocative force or power and effect the informative and evaluative sign might prescriptively provide to users in situations must likely also be considered by any approach to signs, but this aspect of signs can perhaps be laid aside for now in the interests of our analysis. William wrote... For Harris the act of communication consists of an integrated action between communicators, at least two. The participants create a context and thus a sign and meaning. For instance, the teacher is at the front of the room. Johnny arrives late as usual. The teacher makes a grimace and simply points to the empty chair where she wants Johnny to sit. He complies. In a different situation, the teacher enters a room where her colleagues are standing. She grimaces and points to a chair. Her colleagues wonder what she "means" by this odd behavior. In the first instance the communication between the teacher and Johnny is successful and in the second case it's not even though the teacher's act was the same. It works with Johnny because he knows the macrosocial rule at hand (the teacher's gesture is a command) and he understands the circumstances (he is late and therefore expects the teacher's consternation -- the grimace -- and the silent command.) But among her peers, the teacher's communicative act fails because the macrosocial context is unclear and the circumstances don't fit her gesture. In written text the situation is far more complex but the same requirements of fitting language to the context created by the writer and the presumed context the writer creates for the reader (as in knowing the audience and addressing it appropriately) do apply. Again, nothing is prefixed. But since some contexts will be shared, usually local culture or larger, it's not difficult to create the right one and thus the right signs in specific instances. I agree, again, that it's counter-intuitive for us to think of words not having pre-determined meanings that are passed from one person to another whenever they are used. Yet also it's very easy to recognize that the meanings of words depend very much on how they are used in each instance. It's far easier to prove the second sentence than the first. Frances wrote... You have brought up some good points for me to consider in my continued reading of integrationism. The idea of a "context" however is still a little vague for me. My early assumption was that the integrationist context was aimed at the users, and therefore occurred when the linguists actually engaged in the situation of communicating together with language signs. It may be in the alternative that the context for integrationism actually entails the locating and utilizing of the lingual signs themselves by the linguists, and is not applied wholly or mainly to only the linguists. Each context after all is held by integrationism to be unique and unlike any other, thereby denying any global similarity for contexts. It would seem to me that the internal context of the signs being related together would be less prone to becoming members of general classes than would be external locales. This idea of an onsite context may become clearer for me in due course. In regard to the construction of some agreed "meaning" for a language sign, it has not yet been revealed to me in the integrationist literature if this making of meaning entails using the usual linguistic and grammatic processes of denotation and connotation along with extension and intension, and also if some previous collateral experience and predetermined competence might be required of the linguists. This thorn may also become clearer in due course. On the matter of any sign having some free or fluid or flexible meaning, it is likely that a metaphoric change should occur at least about every three centuries or so.
