Interesting, according to that, the ISP DNS servers are recruited as part of 
the attack on the victim’s authoritative DNS servers, by sending queries from 
within the ISP’s network.

 

No spoofing, no amplification, no misconfigured DNS servers required, yet the 
ISP’s DNS servers are used to send the attack traffic.  All that is needed is a 
compromised IoT to send the query.

 

 

From: Af [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Josh Baird
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 12:42 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick

 

Right - crap IoT devices on the Mirai botnet were responsible for shoving 
620+Gbps of traffic at Akamai to take down Krebs (and over 1Tbps to take down 
OVH).  No spoofing involved.

 

Interesting article on the techniques used by Mirai:

 

https://f5.com/about-us/news/articles/mirai-the-iot-bot-that-took-down-krebs-and-launched-a-tbps-ddos-attack-on-ovh-21937

 

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Ken Hohhof <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

The amplifier would receive a query from a spoofed IP address, and respond 
using a legit IP address.  So the attacker needs to control some computers that 
can spoof the victim’s IP address, but the actual attack traffic comes from the 
amplifiers using legit source IPs.

 

In the case of IoT botnets, I’m not sure any spoofing is required.

 

 

From: Af [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf 
Of Josh Baird
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 12:21 PM
To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> 
Subject: Re: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick

 

It's a good start.  It attempts to prevent spoofed traffic originating from 
your network to leave your network (or BCP38).

 

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 1:19 PM, Josh Luthman <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

It can't be that simple...can it?




 

Josh Luthman
Office: 937-552-2340 <tel:937-552-2340> 
Direct: 937-552-2343 <tel:937-552-2343> 
1100 Wayne St
Suite 1337
Troy, OH 45373

 

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 1:17 PM, Mike Hammett <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

/ip firewall address-list
add list="Public-IPs" address=x.x.x.x/yy disabled=no comment="My IPs"
add list="Public-IPs" address=x.x.x.x/yy disabled=no comment="Downstream 
customer X IPs"

/ip firewall filter
add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop spoofed traffic" disabled=no 
out-interface="To-Upstream" dst-address-list=!"Public-IPs"

That was largely composed off of the top of my head and typed on my phone, so 
it may not be completely accurate.


You should also do it on customer-facing ports not allowing anything to come 
in, but that would be best approached once Mikrotik and the per interface 
setting for unicast reverse path filtering. You would then said customer facing 
interfaces to strict and all other interfaces to loose. They accepted the 
feature request, just haven't implemented it yet.



-----
Mike Hammett
 <http://www.ics-il.com/> Intelligent Computing Solutions
 <https://www.facebook.com/ICSIL>  
<https://plus.google.com/+IntelligentComputingSolutionsDeKalb>  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/intelligent-computing-solutions>  
<https://twitter.com/ICSIL> 
 <http://www.midwest-ix.com/> Midwest Internet Exchange
 <https://www.facebook.com/mdwestix>  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/midwest-internet-exchange>  
<https://twitter.com/mdwestix> 
 <http://www.thebrotherswisp.com/> The Brothers WISP
 <https://www.facebook.com/thebrotherswisp>  
<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXSdfxQv7SpoRQYNyLwntZg> 





  _____  


From: "Mike Hammett" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >
To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> 
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 11:21:35 AM
Subject: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick

There's another large DDoS going on now. Go to this page to see if you can be 
used for UDP amplification (or other spoofing) attacks:

https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/

Go to these pages for more longer term bad behavior monitoring:

https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/
https://radar.qrator.net/


Maybe we need to start a database of ASNs WISPs are using and start naming and 
shaming them when they have bad actors on their network. This is serious, 
people. Take it seriously.



-----
Mike Hammett
 <http://www.ics-il.com/> Intelligent Computing Solutions
 <https://www.facebook.com/ICSIL>  
<https://plus.google.com/+IntelligentComputingSolutionsDeKalb>  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/intelligent-computing-solutions>  
<https://twitter.com/ICSIL> 
 <http://www.midwest-ix.com/> Midwest Internet Exchange
 <https://www.facebook.com/mdwestix>  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/midwest-internet-exchange>  
<https://twitter.com/mdwestix> 
 <http://www.thebrotherswisp.com/> The Brothers WISP
 <https://www.facebook.com/thebrotherswisp>  
<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXSdfxQv7SpoRQYNyLwntZg> 




 

 

 

 

 

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