> > But what assumptions are you baking into that? > > Are you assuming that the set of human concepts is finite? Are you assuming > that human concepts do not contradict? Are you assuming it is meaningful to > measure an "error" of concept e? Are you assuming you can even count > concepts? Doesn't counting incorporate an assumption of equivalence, and > error? > > Is it really useful to make such abstract assertions about meanings, and then > work backwards to decide what they have to be to fulfil those assertions? >
Well I am working pragmatically with the notion that the meaning of concept C to mind M is the set of patterns associated with C in M. This can be approximated in e.g. an OpenCog system by running a bunch of PLN inference in that system to build IntensionalImplicationLInks hanging off of C and then looking at their targets and strengths. > > For a mathematical sense of meaning we have Goedel's proof that any > sufficiently powerful system will be incomplete. > > That's maths. Actually your gloss of Godel's 2nd Incompleteness Thm. is words not math ;) What the modern math tells us is that Godel's Thm in its standard form is a result of adopting an overly strong classical negation Adopt a nice paraconsistent logic and intuitionistic negation and Godel's Theorem becomes an interesting but not shocking existence theorem, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343838215_Godel's_Incompleteness_Theorems_from_a_Paraconsistent_Perspective PLN's probabilistic logic is isomorphic to a fuzzy version of paraconsistent Constructible Duality logic... so that the specific sort of meaning we use in OpenCog (using PLN intensions) accords w/ the interpretation of Godel's result as an unproblematic existence theorem... > So that's two senses of "meaning", actual useful senses, where I say there is > evidence that semantic primitives do not exist: mathematical, and > (structural) linguistic. The. math evidence you cite is better described as evidence that classical logic is the wrong tool to be using to combine primitives ;) > Potentially all we need to do is accept this profusion of contradictory > structure our "learning" procedures give us is the expansion that it seems to > be. We can go on finding meaningful structure the same way. Only not be > puzzled it doesn't reduce to primitives anymore, which it never did! Hmmm, paraconsistency is all about accepting contradictory structures Also, non-well-founded structures can be primitives from which other non-well-founded structures can be derived So as I see it, approximative reduction to primitives requires neither logical consistency nor well-founded-ness... > But, by all means. Barge on. Seek semantic primitives. Start with a > mathematical assertion and work backwards to the way the world ought to be. > Who needs a solution for freewill, consciousness, creativity, one-shot > learning... If semantic primitives suit your mathematical conception of how > the problem ought to be formulated, then I'm sure that's the way the world > should be, even if it's not! > > Just quietly in the wings here, amused to see the topic of semantic > primitives come up again. > The whole reason for Chalmers' massive tome on the topic, I suppose, was to try to separate the deeper meaning behind the hypothesis of primitives from the sloppy ways that the hypothesis was raised at various points in the history of philosophy... But I'm not going to try to replicate his lengthy arduous and tedious argumentation in that regard here ;) ben ------------------------------------------ Artificial General Intelligence List: AGI Permalink: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T0f3dcf7070b3a18e-M620ca26bf88a3ddde5cbe091 Delivery options: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription
