On Mon, Mar 14, 2022 at 11:48 PM Ben Goertzel <[email protected]> wrote:
> The dynamically, contextually-generated pattern-families you describe > are still patterns according to the math definitions of pattern I've > given ... > Good. Then your definition can embrace my hypothesis that cognition is an expansion of the world, not a compression? It seems a pity nobody has tried it. > And yeah Coecke's category-theoretic explorations closely relate to my > comments on paraconsistent logic etc. Good again. It is nice that I don't see you actually contesting any of my points. I'm beginning to see how you can continue to seek "primitives" despite the evidence that meaning, even what appear to be meaning "primitives", are subjective, contradict, and are actually constructed. If you insist on resolutely finding Goedel incompleteness "not shocking", by the "not shocking" expedient of redefining logic to be "paraconsistent logic", and negation to be "intuitionistic negation"i, then perhaps superficially much formalism can remain the same. Equally, by paraconsistency we might expect paraconsistent primitives to be not quite the same as each other, and reach the equally "not shocking" conclusion that "primitives" too will contain a plurality of structure. Perhaps even an infinity of structure. Which is a sub-class of my point that there might be an infinity of meaning. Anyway, your formulation too seems to concede that "primitives" will have internal structure. "Primitives" which have internal structure sounds a bit to me like the flat earther who continues to be a flat earther by redefining flat to be curved. But OK. You have a point that such mountain peaks of semantic complexity which this definition of "primitives" implies, do commonly have a broad consistency. But once you've conceded they have internal structure, why not construct them instead? What is the true "primitive", the true simplicity of the system? Is it the structure, or the principle of construction? But yeah, possibly you can keep your top-down formalism. The infinity might be only within a finite number of "primitive" super classes. Though you might have to perform further violence to your definitions by allowing contradiction to become equated with consistency.... Or have you done that already? Anyway, some kind of top down formalism may still be appropriate. The problem remains how to find those highly structured "primitives". If you agree your move to paraconsistent logic is closely related to Coecke's category-theoretic explorations, what do you think of Coecke's comments that he is recently moving away from such elaborated top down structure, and seeking to derive everything from observations? Coecke: "We are adapting everything now to learn structure from observations, and we abstract away quantum theory." https://twitter.com/coecke/status/1450393276918468611 Which I interpret to be something like the content of this talk: (QNLP20) Bob Coecke and Vincent Wang: Redrawing grammar as compositional circuits https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XFR14CdsLp4 And to the extent I understand that, they appear to reduce quantum formalism to a circuit, which is to say a network, and then potentially group together the network on an ad-hoc basis, without the need for fixed formalism, and indeed fixed "primitives", top down. Which sounds to me similar to my suggestion for ad-hoc clusterings of networks. Though as far as I can see, still lacking an actual principle of clustering. But at least conceding the clusterings can be, indeed must be, ad-hoc, and maybe growing, expanding. ------------------------------------------ Artificial General Intelligence List: AGI Permalink: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T0f3dcf7070b3a18e-Md7c6778830275a91bee89de7 Delivery options: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription
