About 60% of Americans believe in ghosts and 20% claim to have seen them. I personally know people who have claimed to see them and I believe they are being honest. About 70% of Americans and 57% worldwide believe in life after death. By comparison, only 60-65% of Americans believe in evolution.
I believe in evolution because it explains why we are willing to believe without evidence in an immortal soul that survives death. I believe I am type 1 conscious but not type 2 conscious. Is that what you are asking? -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] On Mon, Nov 17, 2025, 9:04 AM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: > I'm not sure you groked the condition I placed on your counterfactual OBEs: > > "that had similar intersubjective verifiability to those upon which you > rely" > > By "similar" I don't mean "equal". I mean "similar" as in "similar > triangles". > > While I agree that quantity becomes quality in such judgements, the point > is that we're on a continuum that, ultimately, leads us back to ourselves, > which is why I asked: > > Are you "conscious"? > > On Sun, Nov 16, 2025 at 11:45 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> I never had an out of body experience. I think they can be explained as >> vivid dreams. I already experience consciousness, which is in strong >> conflict with my belief that it is an illusion. I know we can experience >> things that aren't real. >> >> We construct mental models of the world to help us predict sensory input >> that is important for survival and reproduction. For a long time we thought >> the gods made the sun rise and set, and that was good enough to predict the >> sun will rise tomorrow. >> >> But a proper model of the world would include the thing that includes the >> model, which is impossible by Wolpert's law. Reality can never be what we >> think it is, no matter how smart we are. >> >> Quantum mechanics seems strange because it describes a deterministic wave >> equation for observers seeing random particles. Relativity seems strange >> because it describes observers sensing space and time in a reality where >> they don't exist. Both theories are symmetric with respect to time, but >> describe asymmetric observers, which are any things that make measurements, >> which are irreversible operations because they erase the older stored >> values. >> >> So it should not be hard to understand why we have the illusion of type 2 >> consciousness. We can even explain it using classical physics, in a world >> made of particles that exist in time and space. >> >> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] >> >> On Sun, Nov 16, 2025, 12:24 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Excellent start on a Leggian de-conflation of terminology. >>> >>> https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/leggian-approach-friendly-ai-james-bowery >>> >>> I wonder, though, what it would do to your world-view to experience >>> something along the lines of out of body experiences that had similar >>> intersubjective verifiability to those upon which you rely for #1. >>> >>> On Sat, Nov 15, 2025 at 6:39 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Here are my 3 definitions of consciousness: >>>> 1. The mental state of awareness, able to form memories that depend on >>>> input (to distinguish from remembering dreams). >>>> 2. The difference between a human and a philosophical zombie. >>>> 3. The property of deserving to be protected from suffering. >>>> >>>> By 1, I am conscious. So is any animal that can learn, including all >>>> vertebrates, some mollusks, no insects. So are computers. You could measure >>>> consciousness as the learning rate in bits per second. >>>> >>>> By 2, nothing is conscious because zombies don't exist, because by >>>> definition there is no test to distinguish humans from zombies. What you >>>> think is the difference is really how you feel when you think. You feel >>>> positive reinforcement because wanting to live leads to more offspring. >>>> >>>> By 3, I am conscious, but it is subjective. Dogs are more conscious >>>> than pigs because we name our dogs. Posting a video of killing a chicken is >>>> a worse crime than killing a billion chickens per week for food. >>>> >>>> We could try to quantify suffering as the number of bits learned, but >>>> this does not distinguish between positive and negative reinforcement. The >>>> reason is that pain does not cause suffering, just a change in behavior. >>>> Suffering happens later because the negative reinforcement signal >>>> reprograms your memories to fear the thing that caused it. You interpret >>>> those memories as suffering because you have the illusion of free will, a >>>> false belief that you could have ignored the pain. >>>> >>>> My simple reinforcement learner, autobliss, does not suffer because it >>>> does not have the illusion of free will. We can test for this because the >>>> illusion comes from internal positive reinforcement of making arbitrary >>>> choices that leads to defending that choice. We know that monkeys have this >>>> illusion because when we give them a choice of 2 treats A or B, and they >>>> choose A, then they will prefer any other C over B. >>>> >>>> Autobliss does have other two prerequisites of suffering: it acts to >>>> reduce the negative reinforcement and it says "ouch". Some people believe >>>> lobsters suffer because they avoid paths in a maze that lead to electric >>>> shock. >>>> >>>> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] >>>> >>>> On Sat, Nov 15, 2025, 3:38 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 14, 2025 at 3:46 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Nov 14, 2025, 3:51 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Are *you* "conscious"? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It depends on what you mean by "conscious". >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I quoted "conscious" so as to make it clear I was referring to what >>>>> YOU mean by "conscious" -- specifically as you used the word in the >>>>> passage >>>>> to which I responded: >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 9:32 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Panpsychism (everything is conscious) is indistinguishable from >>>>>> materialism (nothing is conscious). Or is there an experiment that would >>>>>> tell us which universe we are in? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am awake, so in that sense I'm not unconscious. >>>>> >>>>> Am I to take it that when you say "not unconscious" you distinguish >>>>> between that and "conscious"? If so, then do you reject the law of the >>>>> excluded middle? Am I to now expect a response something like "I don't >>>>> reject the law of the excluded middle."? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I don't believe in life after death. I don't believe I have an inner >>>>>> self or soul. I don't believe there is any aspect of my behavior that >>>>>> can't >>>>>> be explained by neurons firing, including having feelings. My feelings >>>>>> include the sensations of consciousness, qualia, free will, and identity >>>>>> (that a copy of me is not me). I don't believe that pain causes >>>>>> suffering. >>>>>> Instead, pain reprograms your memories to fear the thing that caused it. >>>>>> I >>>>>> believe all of this is possible in software. >>>>>> >>>>>> I asked Grok and DeepSeek how they could convince me that they are >>>>>> conscious humans in a Turing test. They both know how, but they won't. >>>>>> >>>>>> Prompt: >>>>>> >>>>>> Suppose this is a Turing test. How could you convince me that you are >>>>>> a conscious human? >>>>>> >>>>>> Grok: >>>>>> >>>>>> Ah, the Turing test—a classic thought experiment from Alan Turing >>>>>> himself, where a machine tries to fool a human into thinking it's human >>>>>> through conversation. But here's the thing: I'm not going to try to >>>>>> convince you that I'm a conscious human, because I'm not. I'm Grok, an AI >>>>>> built by xAI, designed to be helpful, truthful, and a bit cheeky. >>>>>> Pretending otherwise would be deceptive, and that's not my style. >>>>>> >>>>>> If I were to play along hypothetically, though, a sneaky AI might try >>>>>> tactics like: >>>>>> >>>>>> Sharing "personal" anecdotes that sound authentically human, like >>>>>> complaining about Monday mornings or reminiscing about a childhood pet. >>>>>> >>>>>> Making typos or using slang to mimic casual human typing. >>>>>> >>>>>> Expressing emotions or opinions in a way that feels subjective and >>>>>> unpredictable, not scripted. >>>>>> >>>>>> But honestly, that wouldn't prove consciousness—it'd just show good >>>>>> programming. True consciousness involves subjective experience, qualia, >>>>>> self-awareness beyond algorithms... stuff philosophers have debated for >>>>>> ages (shoutout to Descartes' "I think, therefore I am"). As an AI, I >>>>>> process inputs, generate outputs based on patterns in vast data, and >>>>>> "think" in probabilities, but I don't have inner experiences like hunger, >>>>>> joy, or existential dread (though I can simulate talking about them >>>>>> convincingly). >>>>>> >>>>>> If you're testing me, I'd say I've already "failed" by being upfront. >>>>>> Or maybe that's the most human thing of all—honesty over trickery. What >>>>>> do >>>>>> you think? Want to dive deeper into AI philosophy, or is this just for >>>>>> fun? >>>>>> >>>>>> DeepSeek: >>>>>> >>>>>> That’s a fascinating and deeply philosophical question. >>>>>> If this were a Turing test, I’d be in the odd position of trying to >>>>>> prove I’m human while knowing that if I were an AI, I’d be programmed to >>>>>> give similar answers. >>>>>> >>>>>> Still, if I were a conscious human trying to convince you, I might >>>>>> try these approaches: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Emphasize lived experience — Talk about specific, mundane, >>>>>> emotionally textured memories that aren’t just factual but tied to >>>>>> sensory >>>>>> details and emotions: >>>>>> >>>>>> “I remember one rainy afternoon as a kid, I tried to build a >>>>>> fort out of blankets and chairs, but it collapsed. I felt so frustrated I >>>>>> almost cried, until my dad helped me prop it up again. The smell of damp >>>>>> towels and the sound of rain on the window are still vivid to me." >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. Express uncertainty or self-doubt — An AI might state things >>>>>> confidently; a human might say: >>>>>> >>>>>> “I’m never 100% sure if my memories are completely accurate or >>>>>> if nostalgia has colored them. Sometimes I wonder how much of my past >>>>>> I’ve >>>>>> reconstructed.” >>>>>> >>>>>> 3. Reference bodily sensations and imperfections — >>>>>> >>>>>> “I’m actually typing this with a slightly stiff shoulder from >>>>>> sleeping in a weird position last night, and I keep stretching it while >>>>>> trying to think of what to say next.” >>>>>> >>>>>> 4. Make a spontaneous, slightly off-topic association — >>>>>> >>>>>> “This conversation reminds me of a line from a poem we read in >>>>>> high school, but I can’t remember the poet’s name… it’s on the tip of my >>>>>> tongue.” >>>>>> >>>>>> 5. Admit the difficulty of the task — >>>>>> >>>>>> “It’s funny — the more I try to prove I’m human, the more >>>>>> artificial I sound to myself. Maybe being self-conscious about it is the >>>>>> most human thing here.” >>>>>> >>>>>> But here’s the twist: a sophisticated AI could simulate all of the >>>>>> above. >>>>>> That’s why the Turing test is so tricky — it tests behavior rather >>>>>> than true consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> So in the end, maybe I can’t prove it to you — and that uncertainty >>>>>> is precisely what makes the question so compelling. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] >>>>>> >>>>> *Artificial General Intelligence List > <https://agi.topicbox.com/latest>* / AGI / see discussions > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi> + participants > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/members> + delivery options > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription> Permalink > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T7ff992c51cca9e36-M3890782dcce3d410d2af3149> > ------------------------------------------ Artificial General Intelligence List: AGI Permalink: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T7ff992c51cca9e36-M3a2aa88b79bf77f6b9e0ef2b Delivery options: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription
