I think an idiom has to be recognized as a phrase. Using co-occurrence is an interesting idea. However, this is on the edge of the area where I feel a little uncomfortable with the over-reliance on a conventional superficial method like co-occurrence.
Someone mentioned anaphora recently. While your semantic parser might pick out some variable-like words (especially superficial variables like "he" or "it") it is going to miss a phrase which refers to someone or something that had been mentioned or will be mentioned in a subsequent remark. While it is easy to figure a scheme to deal with this, the problem is that it could lead to a substantial increase in combinatorial complexity. For example, even if you looked at possible relationships to and from a noun-phrase to other noun-phrases you might still miss the relationships that form a broader subject. (For example, a number of sentences might be used to build a structure of a subject being discussed by using a diverse set of examples, and your relational searches might miss this or lead to misleading conclusions). One simple explanation (but not necessarily a solution to the programming problems) is that intelligence is always an active process of learning. So even when your mind is not working hard it is always figuring out relations. In one sense contemporary AGI programs are designed this way but in another sense they are not insightfully designed this way. So (for example) while the underlying programming that searches for possible relations might be actively searching for these relations, the nature of these searches may not be foremost in the programmer's mind as he writes his code. So the search might be constrained or broadened by the kinds of concepts that it is considering, but the search process itself is not being looked at by the programmer, or it is only being looked at in a superficial conventional way. I am saying that it might be possible to create something a little novel for the search process itself as well as rely on the more conventional kinds of searches which is essentially designed around a function that accepts a group of parameters. Jim Bromer On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 10:00 PM, Aaron Hosford <[email protected]> wrote: > I agree fully with regards to handling multiple possible meanings to a > sentence. My parser doesn't stop with a single interpretation. It builds a > long list of possible interpretations, along with scores based on the > parser's estimation of the likelihood of the interpretation. The client > code then iterates over the list of interpretations in order of score, > rejecting interpretations that aren't meaningful or don't fit the context. > The parser modifies its scoring according to which interpretation was > accepted. So it's possible to handle puns and other double entendres by > accepting more than one meaning. > > The client, which converts the parse tree into a semantic net, doesn't > restrict itself to a single interpretation of a given parse tree, either. > Links are given "soft" truth values, with frequency and certainty values > inspired by Pei Wang's NARS system. This means that the same network can > simultaneously represent multiple, competing interpretations through > lowered certainty levels. As new information becomes available, the system > updates the links' truth values and certainty levels until a clear winner > emerges. I think this ability to revise interpretation based on contextual > information received both before and after the sentence is parsed, as well > as to weigh competing or contradictory information, is key to the sort of > flexible thinking human beings exhibit. > > One thing which I have not yet implemented and am still undecided on is > the handling of idioms. I suspect this will end up being some sort of > lookup based on word or concept co-occurrence, i.e. a connected subnet of > the network representing the sentence will be encoded and used as a key > into a table of idioms. Identifying the idiom rapidly through this or > another approach is the hard part. Once an idiom is recognized, it's simply > a matter of applying a graph rewrite to generate an alternate meaning for > the sentence, and using links with soft truth values to identify the new, > competing interpretation. The system can then resolve between the competing > interpretations using the same mechanisms it would for more subtly > different interpretations. I think many idioms originate as crystallized, > highly re-usable analogies. Maybe that can provide some additional insight > into the design when the time comes. > > > On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 5:20 PM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Aaron Hosford wrote: >> I get the impression that you're saying (both here & in your previous >> emails on Algorithmic Synthesis) that claiming two things are associated >> isn't enough -- that the *kind* of association is important too. >> >> -Yes I do feel that way although I probably wasn't thinking of that when >> I wrote my message. An association may belong to many categories of a >> *kind*. This is important because we can usually abstract or generalize >> from an 'idea' or 'ideas' in many different ways and these different >> 'kinds' of abstractions are things that can become concepts of their own >> (referring to the nature of the abstraction). >> Aaron Hosford wrote: >> Roger Schank has provided quite a bit of inspiration to me, based on how >> he represents meaning as semantic links connecting basic concepts together. >> From the natural language perspective, it is relatively easy to see how >> this can be implemented. I'm not alone in having successfully built a >> parser that extracts a semantic network from a sentence which represents >> that sentence's meaning with a fair degree of accuracy. >> >> -I really liked Schank's work as well. I think that old world semantic >> networks simplified the potential for meaning too much. So while you might >> get closer to a single constrained meaning of a sentence, you would also >> lose many of the undertones, highlights and colors of the sentence that can >> help to make the sentence meaningful. So here it is again, it is not >> enough to take the shallow level of meaning that might be derived from >> a tightly constraining analysis of the superficial sentence. You have to >> be looking for other kinds of meanings to see if the words of the sentence >> (or 'ideas' of the sentences) can be better interpreted in other ways. >> >> I will have more to say about this. >> >> Jim Bromer >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Aaron Hosford <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> Well, I'm not really clear what you're getting at, mainly because when >>> talking about intelligence & thinking, all the terms we have to use are so >>> versatile & loosely defined that to narrow down what's being communicated >>> to a sufficiently narrow set of interpretations, we have to say so much >>> that the key point becomes a needle in a haystack of contextual >>> information. I'm sure what you're saying here makes perfect sense to you, >>> but the words you're using aren't sufficiently grounded (or are grounded >>> differently for you than for me) that I don't follow. >>> >>> I get the impression that you're saying (both here & in your previous >>> emails on Algorithmic Synthesis) that claiming two things are associated >>> isn't enough -- that the *kind* of association is important too. I agree >>> with you here. It's not enough to say, these are the parts and they go >>> together; how things connect must be considered to have productive thoughts >>> about them. This is directly analogous to the treatment of sentences as >>> bags of words: It's not enough to just look at the set of words to >>> determine the sentence's meaning; the way they connect to each other >>> matters. This is where I'm starting from in my system's design. >>> >>> #1: Figure out how the human mind represents meaning. >>> #2: Figure out how to work with meaning to produce intelligent thought. >>> >>> #2 cannot proceed until #1 is effectively implemented. Roger Schank has >>> provided quite a bit of inspiration to me, based on how he represents >>> meaning as semantic links connecting basic concepts together. From the >>> natural language perspective, it is relatively easy to see how this can be >>> implemented. I'm not alone in having successfully built a parser that >>> extracts a semantic network from a sentence which represents that >>> sentence's meaning with a fair degree of accuracy. >>> >>> From the perceptual perspective, it is also fairly easy to see how >>> semantic networks can be used to represent information. The visual field >>> can be broken into chunks or fields, each representing an object or a part >>> of an object. The objects are semantically connected to each other >>> according to the spatial or behavioral interactions they are participating >>> in, and the parts of objects are semantically linked to the objects and >>> other parts according to their arrangement. Nodes representing objects and >>> parts generated at a particular time can then be interconnected across >>> multiple time frames, resulting in a narrative description of the field of >>> vision as a sequence of events unfolds. Other senses can be integrated >>> directly with vision in the same manner. >>> >>> Higher levels of abstraction can be generated by looking at patterns in >>> objects (just as objects are generated by looking at patterns of parts) and >>> adding additional nodes which serve to group together the lower level nodes >>> into patterns based on link types. Memory stores only these higher-level >>> nodes (parts, objects, & upward), not the lower levels which served in >>> their construction, and memory fades from the lowest levels upward, causing >>> us to lose detail but not gist. >>> >>> Language (or rather the semantic nets which represent meaning) can then >>> be treated as predicates which match the upper levels of the perceptual >>> network, acquiring a non-Boolean or fuzzy truth value based on how well >>> they match perceptual information retrieved from memory. Thinking is >>> implemented at this level, as well. Thinking processes serve to generate >>> truthful predicates based both on direct observation of higher-level >>> perceptual subnets, and indirect reasoning based on observed patterns in >>> these perceptual subnets. Reasoning can reach as far down the hierarchy of >>> nodes as was stored in memory, but starts from the top-most level and does >>> not reach down to these lower levels except when higher-level abstractions >>> indicate that additional or finer-grained detail is needed. (This is how we >>> avoid the combinatorial bottleneck.) Predicates generated by observation or >>> reasoning can be directly read off and converted to natural language using >>> the same mechanisms as the semantic parser, but in reverse. (I've got much >>> of this mechanism working, too.) >>> >>> I have yet to start work on the perceptual systems, but the semantic >>> representation of meanings/predicates is rolling along nicely. Perception >>> is going to take a lot more work, because there's a lot more data to >>> process, but I'm watching the research as it unfolds, and I see a lot being >>> done in the direction of object detection. Even if we create a perceptual >>> system that isn't as detailed in representation as human perception (i.e. >>> it represents objects and their interactions, but not their parts or lower >>> level abstractions), it should be possible to start work on a reasoning >>> system that handles higher-level abstractions and is able to communicate >>> its thoughts verbally or in text. This is the key point at which artificial >>> general intelligence gains traction as a technology worthy of financial >>> investment. >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 9:21 PM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Well I just remembered why people have been so distracted by the >>>> analysis of superficial data. Because it is easy. Because it is easy for >>>> an automated program to analyze the superficial features of the input media >>>> and how the data environment of the medium is affected by the program's >>>> output but it is hard to figure out how the program would analyze hidden >>>> meaning. But, most of the people in this group talk as if their >>>> ideas would be powerful enough to discover underlying meaning or underlying >>>> relations in the data environment. So then what started as a first >>>> response to a problem description simply became the dogma. (Yes that is >>>> really what happened. Does anyone disagree? (No?!.)) >>>> >>>> >>>> So while the rehashing of the first step may have seemed like it was >>>> an important primitive to explain to the inexperts, as it became the >>>> reigning focus of all such conventions of presentation it became the dogma >>>> of the genre. Because people somehow found a rationalization to avoid >>>> taking the next step (to explain how deeper relations between ideas, >>>> concepts or operations in the IO data environment could be integrated and >>>> discerned) it became a blocking dogma. In order to join the club, so to >>>> speak, you had to start by avoiding the next question. >>>> >>>> You often feel that you have already thought about an idea because you >>>> have examined a high-level concept which might be a categorizing principle >>>> of the idea. For instance I was interested in 'associations' so when I >>>> encountered the word 'correlation' I simply felt that I had already >>>> considered the concept as a kind of association. A correlation can be >>>> considered as a type of association so it seemed like I had already had >>>> handled that relation. However, it just is not the same thing. A >>>> correlation may be a kind of association but it is bound with another >>>> association as well, the concepts that defines the nature of the >>>> correlation. So a correlation is not -just- an association. >>>> >>>> You have to take it to the next level and it has to start in your mind. >>>> >>>> Jim Bromer >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 8:39 PM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> I think that misunderstandings can occur when one person presents an >>>>> idea which possesses some features which resemble features of another idea >>>>> that a listener has already considered. If the resemblance is somewhat >>>>> superficial, especially if the superficial resemblances lie *at a >>>>> shallow underlying level, *a person who is listening to the idea may >>>>> feel certain that he was totally familiar with the idea even though he >>>>> might not really get what the speaker was saying. The listener may >>>>> casually >>>>> miscategorize the presented idea by thinking that it was the same as the >>>>> similar idea he had already considered. Good ideas are often unoriginal or >>>>> unsurprising and this vague familiarity can strangely have a >>>>> non-intuitive effect to further a misunderstanding. The reason that this >>>>> can occur is that ideas sometimes need to be emphasized or 'formalized' in >>>>> some way in order for them to be fully appreciated. >>>>> >>>>> I for one would like to be able to understand why people who should be >>>>> interested in something I have said aren't. The answer to this question >>>>> has >>>>> always been somewhat elusive. A primary characteristic that can produce >>>>> this kind of misunderstanding is superficiality in the listener. (Of >>>>> course the new idea may be poorly presented and we all make a variety of >>>>> mistakes, but I am often confronted with the experience where I have >>>>> repeatedly presented a commonsense idea and I can't find anyone who acts >>>>> like they understand what I am talking about). >>>>> >>>>> But is there anyway you can verify (at least for yourself) >>>>> that someone who should be reacting intelligently to what you are saying >>>>> is >>>>> actually reacting at a too-superficial level? I have found that there is >>>>> a way in this group because we are constantly talking about artificial >>>>> means of creating "personality" traits. If someone repeatedly emphasizes >>>>> superficiality of association as a presumption for the basis of >>>>> intelligence then there is a chance that he might unitentionally be >>>>> describing a method that commonly underlies his own thought processes. >>>>> >>>>> For example, I have described a process of synthesis where a new idea >>>>> is formed from the association of two pre-existing ideas based on a >>>>> reason. The reasons can be superficial, like a superficial >>>>> co-occurrence (of time or position) or a superficial similarity, but then >>>>> I >>>>> also emphasized that ideas may be related by complimentary conceptual >>>>> roles. Furthermore, I have emphasized the importance of conceptual >>>>> structure which is a term I use to stress that there may be a greater >>>>> complexity to putting ideas together than just relying on one superficial >>>>> feature. >>>>> >>>>> So now, if after expressing this and pointing out that the purpose of >>>>> combining ideas is to create some semantic or operational structure, I see >>>>> someone restating the insight that co-occurrence and similarity are the >>>>> basis of correlation and association I will have some substantial evidence >>>>> that my ideas were not appreciated by that person because he tends to >>>>> be over reliant on superficial methods of thought. Co-occurrence, >>>>> similarity, simple association and analogy are all examples of relations >>>>> between ideas that are typically shallow. The superficiality may not be at >>>>> the surface level, but it is usually not going to be that deep. The >>>>> declaration of these relations are all ok but I feel that if the presenter >>>>> is going to explain how intelligence works then he needs to take it to a >>>>> deeper level. >>>>> >>>>> Of course, misunderstanding can also occur when a phrase is taken to >>>>> refer to a superficial aspect of thought even though the speaker intended >>>>> it to refer to deeper relations as well. But I think the declaration that >>>>> the basis of correlation is co occurrence, similarity and associativity >>>>> has >>>>> just been too over-used to still be considered sufficient as a >>>>> presentation >>>>> of the basis of thinking. Thinking gets a little deeper than that. >>>>> >>>>> Jim Bromer >>>>> >>>> >>>> *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> >>>> <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/23050605-bcb45fb4> | >>>> Modify <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Your Subscription >>>> <http://www.listbox.com> >>>> >>> >>> *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> >>> <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/10561250-164650b2> | >>> Modify <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Your Subscription >>> <http://www.listbox.com> >>> >> >> *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> >> <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/23050605-bcb45fb4> | >> Modify <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Your Subscription >> <http://www.listbox.com> >> > > *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/10561250-164650b2> | > Modify<https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;>Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-c97d2393 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-2484a968 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
