I am corrected. But I would prefer InstanceOf to SubclassOf, and I assume that all concepts are internal. Instance(InternalRepresentationOfSign, Concept). Thanks for the clarification. ~PM--------------------- > Subject: Re: [agi] Semiosis > From: naoya.arak...@nifty.com > Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2013 20:39:59 +0900 > To: a...@listbox.com > > Hi PM, > > I'm replying to two of your messages here. > > On 2013/04/08, at 0:42, Piaget Modeler <piagetmode...@hotmail.com> wrote: > > > Can we say that signs are instances and concepts are types? > > > > So that there is a line where: > > > > Instance(sign, concept) > > > > exists as a fact in the concept hierarchy (or semantic net) > > and serves as the mapping relation between signs and concepts? > > > Now you defined Sign as a subclass of Concept in your ontology. > That may be OK if you will, but I don't think it a standard definition of > the terms. > I rather buy the definition with the regular semiotic triangle: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ogden_semiotic_triangle.png > in which a SIGN is a SYMBOL and concepts are within THOUGHT. > In my ontology, signs are out there in the world and concepts are in > the platonic universe. If a concept is in the platonic universe, a sign, > say, a road sign, which is a painted piece of metal, could not be an > instance of Concept. > > In cognitive modeling, we can posit 'internal representations' in lieu > of ontologically suspicious concepts (as internal representations are > realized as physical entities/patterns in our brain or in computers). > > Perhaps, you'd like to say > subClassOf (InternalRepresentationOfSign, InternalRepresentation) > which is a logical truth? > > > On 2013/04/08, at 0:18, Piaget Modeler <piagetmode...@hotmail.com> wrote: > > > "I agree with Andrew in not equating concepts and signs, > > but the above scheme is OK for me as long as the semantic > > net or conceptual space contains sub-symbolic nodes > > that do not correspond to signs." ~ AN > > > > Why, please explain this. I know most parsing distinguishes word forms > > from concepts. Is this an artificial distinction? > > Hmm, I certainly distinguish word forms from concepts (see above). > > In an associative network, one can distinguish three kinds of > nodes/patterns. > 1) those which correspond to (external) signs such as word forms > and represent what the signs refer to. > 2) those which represent something external, but do not correspond > to external signs. > 3) those which do not represent external things (probably not to be > interpretable), but serve as hidden states (like in HMM) for > cognition. > > One may say 1) & 2) are symbolic and 3) is sub-symbolic, but note > that 'symbols' here are in internal representation and not signs (e.g., > road signs) in the external world. > > > I hope my explanations clarified things a bit… > > Best, > -- > AN > > > > > ------------------------------------------- > AGI > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/19999924-5cfde295 > Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
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