What you have is a v. vague *hypothesis*. A *theory* involves evidence as to 
why it may work..

And you have no Operational Definition of what effect you’re trying to achieve. 
Not even the teeniest weeniest hint of an O.D.

Tch, tch.

From: Jim Bromer 
Sent: Monday, April 15, 2013 4:14 AM
To: AGI 
Subject: [agi] Re: Summary of My Current Theory For an AGI Program.

Part 4
Artificial imagination is also necessary for AGI.  Imagination can take place 
simply by creating associations between concepts but obviously the best forms 
of imagination are going to be based on rational meaningfulness.  An 
association between concepts or (concept objects) which cannot be interpreted 
as meaningful is not usually very useful. So it seems that if the relationship 
is both imaginative and potentially meaningful it would be advantageous.  An 
association formed by a categorical substitution is more likely to be 
meaningful so I consider this a rational form of imagination.  However, you can 
find many examples where a categorical substitution does not produce a 
meaningful association, so perhaps my claim that it is a rational process is 
dependent on the likelihood that the process will turn up a greater proportion 
of meaningful relations than purely random associations.  Some imaginative 
relations may exist just as entertainment, but I believe that the application 
of the imagination is one of the more important steps toward understanding.  In 
fact, I believe that all understanding is essentially a form of imaginative 
projection, where you project previously formed ideas onto an ongoing situation 
which is recognized or thought to share some characteristics with the projected 
ideas.  So from this point of view, the reliance of previously learned 
knowledge is really an application of the imagination.  Perhaps it is a special 
form of imagination but the imagination none the less.  Anyway, once an 
imaginative association or relation is created it has to be tested. I feel that 
relations of understanding cannot be appreciated out of context.  The basic 
rule of thumb is that it takes knowledge of many things to understand one 
thing.  This creates a problem when trying to test or validate an insight which 
was partially produced by the imagination or which had to be fitted using 
imaginative projection.  The only way an AGI program is going to be able to 
validate a new idea is by seeing how well it fits and how well it works in a 
variety of related contexts.  This is what I call a structural integration.  It 
not only represents a single concept but it also carries a lot of other 
information with it that can seemingly explain a lot of other small facts as 
well.  A new idea seems to make sense if it fits in with a number of insights 
that were previously acquired.






On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 3:30 PM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote:

  Part 3
  The program will make extensive use of generalizations and 
cross-generalization. The program will need to be able to discover 
abstractions.  These abstractions typically may be used to develop 
generalizations. A generalization may be formed from a group in which all the 
members share some common characteristics. However, generalizations may also be 
formed by various arbitrary processes. And, if the program works, 
generalizations may be formed in response to some educational instruction.  The 
most typical example of cross-generalization may be the consideration of 
similarities across individual systems of taxonomies or classes or subclasses.  
In this broad definition of generalization, the collections do not have to be 
grouped by any common characteristic and the same can go for 
cross-categorizations.  Although this might be a misuse of the term 
generalization, the generalizations that my program will create may not be 
trees because they can potentially branch off in different directions.  Indexes 
into data for internal searches may be formed in a similar way but I will have 
to think about whether the variety of branching makes sense as I am developing 
the program.  I believe that because of the variety of forms of generalization 
or categorization that the program will use it is necessary for the program to 
keep track of the different kinds of categorization and generalization that it 
develops.  And it will put transcendent boundaries around portions of the 
generalizations that it develops as it uses them in particular ways. These 
boundaries are transcendent in that overlapping relations may be considered 
across them (as in cross-generalization or cross-categorization). Perhaps the 
terms relations and categorization are more abstract than the terms of 
generalization.  So the program will be able to develop abstractions of 
relations and then build categorizations from these relations.  The categories 
that I have in mind may be somewhat free-wheeling.  Cross-categorization will 
be important because they will help the program find and consider similarities 
across the categorical structures. These categorical structures may need to be 
bounded, but since bounded categories may still be related across a relatively 
dominant categorical relation that means that they can be transcended by other 
associative relations.








  On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:34 AM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote:

    Part 2

    I believe that it takes a great deal of knowledge to 'understand' one 
thing.  A statement has to be integrated into a greater collection of knowledge 
in order for the relations of understanding to be formed.  And the knowledge of 
a single statement has to be integrated into a greater field of knowledge 
concerning the central features of the subject for the intelligent entity to 
truly understand the statement.  While conceptual integration, by some name, 
has always been a primary subject in AI/AGI, I think it was relegated to a 
subservient position by those who originally stressed the formal methods of 
logic, linguistics, psychology, numerics, probability, and neural networks.  
Thinking that the details of how ideas work in actual thinking was either part 
of some predawn-of-science-philosophy or the turn-of-the-crank production of 
the successful application of formal methods, a focus on the details of how 
ideas work in actual problems was seen as naïve.  This problem, where the 
smartest thinkers would spend lives pursuing the abstract problems without 
wasting their time carefully examining many real world cases occurs often in 
science.  It is amplified by ignorance.  If no one knows how to create a 
practical application then the experts in the field may become overly 
pre-occupied with the proposed formal methods that had been presented to them.  
Formal methods are important - but they are each only one kind of thing.  It 
takes a great deal of knowledge about many different things to 'understand' one 
kind of thing.  A reasonable rule of thumb is that formal methods have to be 
tried and shaped based on exhaustive applications of the methods to real world 
problems.

    In order to integrate new knowledge the new idea that is being introduced 
usually has to be verified using many steps to show that it holds.  Since there 
is no absolute insight into truth for this kind of thing, knowledge has to be 
integrated in a more thorough trial and error manner.  The program has to 
create new theories about statements or reactions it is considering.  This 
would extend to interpretations of observations for systems where other kinds 
of sensory systems were used.  A single experiment does not 'prove' a new 
theory in science.  A large number of experiments are required and most of 
those experiments have to demonstrate that the application of the theory can 
lead to better understanding of other related effects.  It takes a knowledge of 
a great many things to verify a statement about one thing.  In order for the 
knowledge represented by a statement to be verified and comprehended it has to 
be related to, and integrated with, a great many other statements concerning 
the primary subject matter.  It is necessary to see how the primary subject 
matter may be used in many different kinds of thoughts to be able to understand 
it.




    On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 6:39 AM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote:

      Part 1 

      I feel that complexity is a major problem facing contemporary AGI.  It is 
true, that for most human reasoning we do not need to figure out complicated 
problems precisely in order to take the first steps toward competency but so 
far AGI has not been able to get very far beyond the narrow-AI barrier. 

      I am going to start with a text-based AGI program.  I agree that more 
kinds of IO modalities would make an effective AGI program better.  However, I 
am not aware of any evidence that sensory-based AGI or multi-modal sensory 
based AGI or robotic based AGI has been able to achieve something greater than 
other efforts. The core of AGI is not going to be found in the peripherals.  
And it is clear that starting with complicated IO accessories would make AGI 
programming more difficult.  It seems obvious that IO is necessary for AI/AGI 
and this abstraction is a probably more appropriate basis for the requirements 
of AGI.

      My AGI program is going to be based on discreet references. I feel that 
the argument that only neural networks are able to learn or are able to 
incorporate different kinds of data objects into an associative field is not 
accurate. I do, however, feel that more attention needs to be paid to concept 
integration.  And I think that many of us recognize that a good AGI model is 
going to create an internal reference model that is a kind of network.  The 
discreet reference model more easily allows the program to retain the 
components of an agglomeration in a way in which the traditional neural network 
does not.  This means that it is more likely that the parts of an associative 
agglomeration can be detected.  On the other hand, since the program will 
develop its own internal data objects, these might be formed in such a way so 
that the original parts might be difficult to detect. With a more conscious 
effort to better understand concept integration I think that the discreet 
conceptual network model will prove itself fairly easily.

      I am going to use weighted reasoning and probability but only to a 
limited extent.




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