Since false assertions can be mixed in with good assertions, the potential complexity of an idea (a reference) cannot be neatly or easily categorized. Michalski did mention that some logical relations are truth-preserving and some are not but the whole idea of an underlying logical system is that some important relations may be derived based on the abstractions. (Just as new mathematical theories are discovered.) The important abstract relations would typically be discovered by a close study of the applications of these ideas to real world situations (or to the situations that the mind can consider). But since references will contain hidden combinations of other references and since false assertions will tend to be embedded along with good assertions and since the reasons that would support the insights would also be based on similar combinations of information, my conclusion is that the potential benefit that the elaborated logical system might provide may well be compromised and even fatally flawed by inappropriate assertions and assumptions.
So while I would use logic in arbitrarily constrained systems, I feel strongly that the underlying 'logic' of an AGI system has to be comprised of the description of the construction of the relationships of the references. In other words it is a dynamic descriptive system that must tend to limit the assumption that the systems are based on broad underlying generalizations. The generalizations that I have in mind will tend to be specialized (even though I do suppose that similar methods can be used with them when the methods are fit to the application through trial and error.) I really don't have a solid idea what verification will consist of, but I am supposing that systems of insight that can lead to reliable interactions will have some value. Jim Bromer On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 8:59 AM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote: > Thanks for the reference to Inferential Theories of Learning. I found > something on the Internet. http://www.mli.gmu.edu/papers/ > 91-95/MSL4-ITL.pdf > I am glad to see that someone has been interested in looking at learning > as the ability to see how different kinds of inferences may lead to useful > knowledge. I have written (in these groups) about how I believe that > conceptual projection and the integration of different kinds of knowledge > is very important to AGI. So these can reasonably be considered as > different kinds of inferences similar to Michalski's definition. > > My feeling is that an emphasis of the formal - or general - processes that > the author likes to rely on may be a misrepresentation error. Some of his > ideas are good, and the examples are interesting. However, in detailing > some fundamental abstractions (programming abstractions) he is in effect > declaring these as special fundamental abstraction-to-generalization > methods. Maybe I should say it is a fundamental attribution error. > > The problem is that the combination will certainly, and the individual > application will probably lead to contradictions of the theory. In order to > avoid this one would have to create fundamental application definitions > which assert the kind of rule that is being applied to an actual problem. > > In other words, the attempt to rely on a fundamental abstraction or > general rule won't work. I realize that Michalski is aware of this, at > least at some level, but in his assertion that there is some kind of > competency test, (I forget what the test was based on) he is implying that > false assertions can be eliminated. They can't be. > > Sure, I will be using some kind of logic in my model. But, the underlying > principles in my model does not consist of an abstraction of logic but > simply an abstraction of construction that will describe, to some extent, > how the relations of a concept were formed. > > Jim Bromer > > > On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 1:15 PM, Piaget Modeler via AGI > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> You may want to read *The Inferential Theory of Learning *by Ryszard >> Michalski. >> >> He and Gheorghe Tecuci of GMU did some very good work in Reasoning. >> >> It may be helpful in your thinking about this topic. >> >> ~PM >> >> ------------------------------ >> Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 12:51:40 -0400 >> Subject: [agi] The Parts Knowledge Can be Used to Make Many >> Generalizations >> From: [email protected] >> To: [email protected] >> >> >> In order to make detailed insights feasible, they need to be generalized. >> I bet that almost everyone who will read this in 2014 will misunderstand >> what I meant at first. I don't mean that many pieces of knowledge should be >> generalized into one idea, but that the parts of many individual pieces of >> knowledge can be generalized into many individualized generalizations. I am >> sure that this is being implemented in some nlp, but only at a very >> rudimentary level. >> >> The possible abstractions and combinations are uncountable. This >> process then would have the capacity for immense individualization. But it >> is not as simple as it might seem because computer programs that can keep >> track of, refer to and wisely use an immense number of possible >> combinations are not simple. >> Jim Bromer >> *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> >> <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/19999924-4a978ccc> | >> Modify <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Your Subscription >> <http://www.listbox.com> >> *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> >> <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/24379807-f5817f28> | >> Modify<https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;>Your Subscription >> <http://www.listbox.com> >> > > ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-f452e424 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-58d57657 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
