OK, that's cool but the logical framework that Michalski is talking about is a representation system but not a true logical system. It can be used to represent some interesting relationships of thought-stuff.
Jim Bromer On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 3:00 PM, Piaget Modeler via AGI <[email protected]>wrote: > The forward and backward confidence parameters are adjusted by the type of > knowledge transmutation > performed over the knowledge base. > > My opinion is that Global Consistency is not important for an AGI system. > > Cyc handles consistency by using microtheories, or collections of > propositions and inference rules. > Each microtheory is consistent, but if taken altogether, there will be > global inconsistencies across > microtheories. > > In PAM-P2 we take a similar approach. We have viewpoints which are > similar to Lenat's microtheories, > but we also don't really care if premises are inconsistent. We embrace > inconsistency and rely more on > activation to sort things out. (PAM-P2 is still in process so we'll let > you know how things turn out, and > whether or not we modify our position on this point.) > > But I think Michalski's introduction of merit parameters and probability > into his logical framework has merit, > no pun intended. > > ~PM > > ------------------------------ > Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 14:42:31 -0400 > > Subject: Re: [agi] The Parts Knowledge Can be Used to Make Many > Generalizations > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > > > But what was the basis for the forward and backward confidence? The > problem is that this is still a logically inconsistent system posing as a > logically consistent system. I can't create logically consistent AGI > systems, but maybe I am just more honest about it. > > The consequence of this is that his logical system is merely a > representational system. I've known guys who tried to talk about ideas and > then thought they could emphasize them with pseudo-formalization (or maybe > partial-formalization). Nothing wrong with that - unless they thought that > they were actually formalizing their various conjectures. But they were > only simplifying the representation of very narrow ideas by using formal > symbols and stuff. > > So the formalization for these kinds of things are not truly consistent > abstract systems that can be used clearly as the programmatic basis's for > computer programs. It is a notation for an informal system that has limited > applications. Nothing wrong with that, but let's be honest about it. > > Jim Bromer > > > On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 1:09 PM, Piaget Modeler <[email protected] > > wrote: > > > Michalski injected probability into his system with the notion of merit > parameters, > for forward and backward confidence in statements, implying that a purely > logical > system might be insufficient to handle real world phenomena. > > ~PM. > > ------------------------------ > Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 12:25:22 -0400 > Subject: Re: [agi] The Parts Knowledge Can be Used to Make Many > Generalizations > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected]; [email protected] > > > Since false assertions can be mixed in with good assertions, the potential > complexity of an idea (a reference) cannot be neatly or easily categorized. > Michalski did mention that some logical relations are truth-preserving and > some are not but the whole idea of an underlying logical system is that > some important relations may be derived based on the abstractions. (Just as > new mathematical theories are discovered.) The important abstract relations > would typically be discovered by a close study of the applications of these > ideas to real world situations (or to the situations that the mind can > consider). But since references will contain hidden combinations of other > references and since false assertions will tend to be embedded along with > good assertions and since the reasons that would support the insights would > also be based on similar combinations of information, my conclusion is that > the potential benefit that the elaborated logical system might provide may > well be compromised and even fatally flawed by inappropriate assertions and > assumptions. > > So while I would use logic in arbitrarily constrained systems, I feel > strongly that the underlying 'logic' of an AGI system has to be comprised > of the description of the construction of the relationships of the > references. In other words it is a dynamic descriptive system that must > tend to limit the assumption that the systems are based on broad underlying > generalizations. The generalizations that I have in mind will tend to be > specialized (even though I do suppose that similar methods can be used with > them when the methods are fit to the application through trial and error.) > > I really don't have a solid idea what verification will consist of, but I > am supposing that systems of insight that can lead to reliable interactions > will have some value. > > Jim Bromer > > > On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 8:59 AM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote: > > Thanks for the reference to Inferential Theories of Learning. I found > something on the Internet. http://www.mli.gmu.edu/papers/ > 91-95/MSL4-ITL.pdf > I am glad to see that someone has been interested in looking at learning > as the ability to see how different kinds of inferences may lead to useful > knowledge. I have written (in these groups) about how I believe that > conceptual projection and the integration of different kinds of knowledge > is very important to AGI. So these can reasonably be considered as > different kinds of inferences similar to Michalski's definition. > > My feeling is that an emphasis of the formal - or general - processes that > the author likes to rely on may be a misrepresentation error. Some of his > ideas are good, and the examples are interesting. However, in detailing > some fundamental abstractions (programming abstractions) he is in effect > declaring these as special fundamental abstraction-to-generalization > methods. Maybe I should say it is a fundamental attribution error. > > The problem is that the combination will certainly, and the individual > application will probably lead to contradictions of the theory. In order to > avoid this one would have to create fundamental application definitions > which assert the kind of rule that is being applied to an actual problem. > > In other words, the attempt to rely on a fundamental abstraction or > general rule won't work. I realize that Michalski is aware of this, at > least at some level, but in his assertion that there is some kind of > competency test, (I forget what the test was based on) he is implying that > false assertions can be eliminated. They can't be. > > Sure, I will be using some kind of logic in my model. But, the underlying > principles in my model does not consist of an abstraction of logic but > simply an abstraction of construction that will describe, to some extent, > how the relations of a concept were formed. > > Jim Bromer > > > On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 1:15 PM, Piaget Modeler via AGI > <[email protected]>wrote: > > You may want to read *The Inferential Theory of Learning *by Ryszard > Michalski. > > He and Gheorghe Tecuci of GMU did some very good work in Reasoning. > > It may be helpful in your thinking about this topic. > > ~PM > > ------------------------------ > Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 12:51:40 -0400 > Subject: [agi] The Parts Knowledge Can be Used to Make Many Generalizations > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > > > In order to make detailed insights feasible, they need to be generalized. > I bet that almost everyone who will read this in 2014 will misunderstand > what I meant at first. I don't mean that many pieces of knowledge should be > generalized into one idea, but that the parts of many individual pieces of > knowledge can be generalized into many individualized generalizations. I am > sure that this is being implemented in some nlp, but only at a very > rudimentary level. > > The possible abstractions and combinations are uncountable. This > process then would have the capacity for immense individualization. But it > is not as simple as it might seem because computer programs that can keep > track of, refer to and wisely use an immense number of possible > combinations are not simple. > Jim Bromer > *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/19999924-4a978ccc> | > Modify <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/24379807-f5817f28> | > Modify <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > > > > > *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/24379807-f5817f28> | > Modify<https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;>Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-f452e424 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-58d57657 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
