> > I see physics as a collection of patterns in the experienced > world. It's a > > very, very powerful and intense collection of patterns. But > nevertheless, > > it's not totally comprehensive, in the sense that there are > some patterns > > in the experienced world that are not part of physics, but are rather > > "complementary" to physics (in the Niels Bohr sense of complementarity). > > Qualia, perhaps, are in this set of patterns that are > complementary to the > > patterns comprising physics. > > Then you see qualia as something over and above (or next to) the material > world and you hold a kind of mind-bodydualism.
Not "over and above" -- of course not. "Next to" would be more accurate. It's not quite a mind-body dualism, because both mind and body can be viewed from both the scientific and experiential perspectives. Mine is a dualism (or more generally a multi-ism) on the level of perspectives rather than realities. > > In my own work on AGI, I have drawn on both of these > perspectives: both the > > mechanistic, scientific perspective AND the subjective, experiential > > perspective. > > The split psychological-physical does not coincide with > subjective-objective > and not-mechanical/mechanical. The intentional stance is purely > objective and > mechanical (in its ontology) but still completely psychological. I agree that not all psychology is experiential in focus. In fact, most of modern cognitive psychology is not. > You seem to forget the middle ground of objective psychology. No, of course, objective psychology is a valid and useful study of mind from the scientific perspective. I've done formal research in this kind of psychology myself. It's good stuff. >And > there is > also the philosophical behaviourism of Ryle and Wittgenstein (and > Dennett), > where mental terms like 'pain' 'believe' 'thought' are argued to have > objective meanings. W.: 'Internal events must have external > criteria'. The > evidence for pain is pain behaviour, to desire something is to act to get > that something, etc. I don't believe that internal events must have external criteria in order to be considered valid and existent. This may be true from the scientific perspective, but not from all possible (or all useful) perspectives. -- Ben ------- To unsubscribe, change your address, or temporarily deactivate your subscription, please go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
