Richard,

The discussion is becoming more complicated than I expected. ;-)

There are three related, but different issues:

(1) For AGI research, whether it is always a good idea to treat a
complicated AI system as a Turing machine.

My answer is "No", and the argument is given in
http://nars.wang.googlepages.com/wang.computation.pdf . However, it is
not what I want to discuss here.

(2) For AGI research, whether it is always a good idea to treat a
physical entity or event, like your cappuccino or a hurricane, as a
Turing machine.

My answer is also "No", but it is a different issue, which I would
rather not discuss in the near future.

(3) For AGI research, whether there is a qualitative difference
between a conventional computer and a robot.

This is the issue I plan to address in a new paper I'm working on.

Some people (such as Brooks and Harnad) argue that the sensorimotor
mechanism of a robot is necessary for AGI, and there is a fundamental
difference between a robot and a laptop, since the latter, as a Turing
Machine, is disembodied and ungrounded. I want to argue that this
opinion is based on a misconception.

My position statement is: If in a sense a laptop computer is a Turing
machine, then in the same sense a robot is also a Turing machine.

Of course a robot and a laptop have many differences, which are
relevant to AGI, but irrelevant to this discussion.

Pei


On 10/2/06, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

All right, Pei: I'm going to turn the question back on you and ask more
questions, by way of an answer.

Suppose I had a computational system that consisted of large numbers of
small units, each of which was approximately like a conventional
processor, but with some of its activities governed by real-world noise
sources, to make the overall behavior not-quite-turing.  (In other
words, a neuron!  Or in other words again, a turing machine plus noisy
inputs that were ultimately governed by quantum-scale noise).

Now, suppose that the thing was best modelled and understood by us as an
almost-turing-machine, because it was so close.

Suppose further that this was part of an intelligent system, in which
these processing units were playing a role down at a very low level
(roughly equivalent to the neural level in our brain), and that there
was a higher level (roughly equivalent to the conceptual or logical
reasoning level in our brain) where there was once again an
almost-turing level of description.

Now, to an outside observer, there is a choice.  They could go right
down to the quantum-turing level (as David Deutsch did) and declare that
the system is functionally equivalent to a Turing machine.  Or they
could go up to the unit level and say, well, it is almost a turing
machine there.  Or they could go up further and say that it is almsot
turing there too.

My point is:  what conclusions does one want to draw from the turingness
of something?  If I can (in Ben's words) take my cappuccino here and say
that it can be "approximated arbitrarily closely by a quantum Turing
machine", the currency has been debased so much that I don't see it
being any use.

Richard Loosemore


Pei Wang wrote:
> Sergio,
>
> I'm asking about your (b).
>
> Put it in different words, my question is whether there is fundamental
> difference between a robot and a conventional computer, such as my
> laptop. I see that both you and Charles think there is a difference
> (the sensorimotor capability), while Ben thinks there is no
> theoretical difference, as far as the current discussion goes.
>
> My own answer is the same as Ben's, though for a different reason ---
> I'd rather not involve concepts like quantum Turing machine. Before
> arguing for my position, I'd like to see what arguments are out there.
> ;-)
>
> Pei
>
>
> On 10/2/06, Sergio Navega <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> From: "Pei Wang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> >
>> > We all know that, in a sense, every computer system (hardware plus
>> > software) can be abstractly described as a Turing machine.
>> >
>> > Can we say the same for every robot? Why?
>> >
>> > Reference to previous publications are also welcome.
>> >
>>
>> That's a quite interesting question. Unfortunately, I don't
>> remember of any particular references (but I guess they might
>> exist). I classify this question in three steps:
>>
>> a) The computational component of the robot
>> This is as close as one may get to a turing machine, of course
>> without enforcing the physically impossible infinite tape.
>>
>> b) The computational plus the bodily component
>> (or just the bodily). Here we are not talking about turing-like
>> devices. Physical idiosyncrasies of the mechanical components
>> cannot be computed (it's a too complex problem).
>>
>> c) The system robot plus its environment
>> This is as far of turing formalisms as one can get. And this is
>> the situation most AI systems will have to face.
>>
>> Sergio Navega.


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