Robin Hanson wrote:

The anchor that I start with is my rough estimate of how long whole brain emulation will take, and so I'm most interesting in comparing AGI to that anchor. The fact that people are prone to take these estimate questions as attitude surveys is all the more reason to seek concrete arguments, rather than yet more attitudes.

If you want to compare AGI *relative* to whole brain emulation - unanchoring the actual time and hence tossing any pretense of futuristic prophecy out the window - then that's a whole separate story.

I would begin by asking if there was ever, in the whole history of technology, a single case where someone *first* duplicated a desirable effect by emulating biology at a lower level of organization, without understanding the principles of that effect's production from that low level of organization. I would not be surprised if someone could think of one example, but I would be surprised if they could think of three, or of a single *major* example.

The elementary reason why I am suspicious of whole-brain emulation is that the main arguments for it seem to proceed as follows: "Nobody has any idea why birds fly, or even a good definition of what "flying" means apart from the fact that birds do it, so we'll get flightiness by emulating bird biochemistry before we have de novo flying machines." This argument is intrinsically based on ease of imaginability with current knowledge, rather than probable future advances in knowledge. With current knowledge it "seems easy to imagine" that future technology could emulate a brain cell by cell, but "hard to imagine" that anyone will understand the sacred and mysterious principles of intelligence. And similarly, in 1890 it would have been easy to imagine a flying machine that looked just like a bird and flew just like a bird, and hard to imagine a flying machine that worked differently.

You cannot use ignorance as if it were positive knowledge.

Looking at history, we find two lessons:

1) Extremely mysterious-seeming desirable natural phenomena are eventually understood and duplicated by engineering; 2) Because they have ceased to be mysterious by the time they are duplicated, humans design them by engineering backward from the desired results, rather than by exactly emulating the lower levels of organization of a black box in Nature whose mysteriousness remains intact even as it is emulated.

Cars don't emulate horse biochemistry, sonar doesn't emulate bat biochemistry, compasses don't emulate pigeon biochemistry, suspension bridges don't emulate spider biochemistry, dams don't emulate beaver building techniques, and *certainly* none of these things emulate biology *without understanding why the resulting product works*.

The notion of whole-brain emulation *which preserves intelligence's mysteriousness* seems to me a device to preserve the future's nonabsurdity - to avoid violating the invariant "Intelligence is mysterious" in a futuristic prediction. But the future is always absurd.

Suppose I put it to you this way: *Given* the lessons of past history's engineering of formerly mysterious phenomena, what characteristics visible *without benefit of hindsight*, would have enabled ancient futurists to *distinguish* the extremely rare case of a desirable phenomenon that is first duplicated by emulating a lower level of biological organization while the higher levels remain mysterious and non-reverse-engineerable, from all the many cases where the high level was understood by insight and then engineered with a different lower level of organization?

I might try to answer if I could think of any cases at all of the first type. They may exist, but I don't know or am not recalling them (note use of availability heuristic).

I can think of nothing which separates the AI case from any of the historical cases of the second kind, except for various special pleading of the form "But this time it *really is* mysterious!", presumably as distinguished by various signs and portents (such as failed optimism) which were also present in past historical cases. I would mark this down as a failure to appreciate how failure to develop flying machines looked *at the time*, without benefit of hindsight.

None of this is an argument for AI happening quickly in an absolute sense, simply that it will not *first* happen through whole-brain emulation. It is not like arguing, in 1880, that powered heavier-than-air flight will happen before 1900 - it's hard to see how this could have been foreseeable at all, one way or another. But they might have validly guessed in 1880 that nonbirdlike flying machines would *precede* flying machines that emulated the tendons, muscles, skeletons, relative weights, and wing-flapping patterns of biological birds. Even though information of the second kind seemed "easy to imagine" a clever anatomist discovering and clever mechanic duplicating, while a nonbirdlike design seemed "hard to imagine". Even in 1880, they could have remembered that ships are not like fish, trains are not like horses, and elan vital turned out not to be so crucial in chemical reactions after all.

--
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky                          http://singinst.org/
Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence

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