Vladimir Nesov wrote:
Richard,

These last two messages with replies to Mark's questions clarify your
position more clearly than much of your prior writing (although I
didn't keep track of later discussions too closely). I think it's
important to show in the same example all the controversial aspects:
relatively simple rules, use cases where an aspect of global behavior
can be modeled by a simple theory (two-body problem, F-14, most of the
planets in short term, gliders in GoL), and use cases for the same
global system where there is no simple model (n-body problem, Pluto,
more general initial state in GoL).

Yes, I am coming to the view that this stuff needs to be explained with many examples, if the message has any hope of getting across.

More generally, I find it incredibly strange that these complex system ideas cause *so* much consternation. Back in the early 90s I read all about the early history of complex systems research, and it was noticeable that these ideas provoked some extremely strong reactions. People didn't just disagree with the ideas, they were besides themselves with fury. (I am not saying that Mark is doing that, btw, I'm talking about the broader reaction).

The funny thing is that I thought all of that was over, and that people now understood what the deal was with complex systems, but what I am finding is that I am fighting exactly the same battles as the earlier folks did, back in the 80s and 90s.


But all the same, problems that you describe as complex are just
numerical calculation problems. In the case of symbol interaction,
initial conditions (rules) are unknown and results are discontinuous,
which requires much methodical enumeration to find the rules that give
required global behavior, no clever tricks work.

I am not quite sure what you mean by this, but my general answer is that it really is not a matter of "numerical calculation problems".

I think the basic idea that nobody gets (because everyone just dances around the issue) is that if you had a God's-eye perspective, you would be able to plot a distribution graph showing the amount of difficulty that humans have in understanding various kinds of systems (natural and artificial).

Looking at that distribution, you would see that most of nature's systems just happen to be clustered in a hump quite close to the origin (i.e. they are low-difficulty), whereas most of the artificial systems in the universe are way, way off up at the high ened of the scale, in a second 'hump'. What this means is that there are two qualitatively different types of systems in the universe: low-difficulty ones, and a second group of extremely high-difficulty ones.

But the problem is that people assume that this graph does not have two humps, but is in fact continuous, and that as time goes on our ability to understand systems further up the graph becomes greater. According to that idea science is a relentless march into higher and higher regions of this "difficulty-space", so if you came back in a hundred years' time you would find that people are routinely deciphering systems that today require superhuman intellect.... and then in a thousand years time our elementary school kids will learn String Theory (if it survives that long!), and so on.

This view of the relentless march of the human intellect is so strong that I think it comes as a shock to people to be told that things might be different, and that it might be trivially easy to create systems of a certain sort which have a difficulty-level that is so far off the scale that we do not know where to start analysing them, and we may *never* know how to analyze them.

But this is exactly what the complex systems idea is about. It really is almost trivial to build an artificial system in which the overall, global behavior of the system is interesting and regular and "lawful", but where we have no idea how to prove that this behavior should emerge from the local rules.

In that context, it would be a complete misunderstanding to say that the "problems that you describe as complex are just numerical calculation problems." If all you mean is that we can simulate them if we want to understand them (the way we simulate the weather in order to predict it), then this is true, but in the context of the problem we have - the problem of building intelligent systems - this fact is of no practical use.





Richard Loosemore

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agi
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