Well, since you found my blog, you probably are grouping me somewhat with the "probability buffs". I have stated that I will not be interested in any other fuzzy logic unless it is accompanied by a careful account of the meaning of the numbers.
You have stated that it is unrealistic to expect a logical model to reflect the world perfectly. The intuition behind this seems clear. Instead, what should be hoped for is convergence to (nearly) correct models of (small parts of) the universe. So I suppose that rather than asking for "meaning" in a fuzzy logic, I should be asking for clear accounts of convergence properties... but my intuition says that from clear meaning, everything else follows. On Sun, Jun 22, 2008 at 9:45 AM, Jim Bromer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Abram Demski said: > To be honest, I am not completely satisfied with my conclusion on the > post you refer to. I'm not so sure now that the fundamental split > between logical/messy methods should occur at the line between perfect > & approximate methods. This is one type of messiness, but one only. I > think you are referring to a related but different messiness: not > knowing what kind of environment your AI is dealing with. Since we > don't know which kinds of models will fit best with the world, we > should (1) trust our intuitions to some extent, and (2) try things and > see how well they work... > Mathematics and mathematical proof is a very important tool... > Mine is a system built out of somewhat smart pieces, > cooperating to build somewhat smarter pieces, and so on. Each piece > has provable smarts. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Mathematics can be extended to include new kinds of relations and systems. > One of the problems I have had with AI-probability buffs is that there are > other ways to deal with knowledge that is only partially understood and this > kind of complexity can be extended to measurable quantities as well. Notice > that economics is not just probability. There are measurable quantities in > economics that are not based solely on the economics of money. > > We cannot make perfect decisions. However, we can often make fairly good > decisions even when based on partial knowledge. A conclusion however, > should not be taken as a reliable rule unless it has withstood numerous > tests. These empirical tests of a conclusion usually cause them to be > modified. Even a good conclusion will typically be modified by conditional > variations after be extensively tested. That is the nature of expertise. > > Our conclusions are often only approximations, but they can contain > unarticulated links to other possibilities that may indicate other ways of > looking at the data or conditional variations to the base conclusion. > > Jim Bromer > > > > ________________________________ > agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=106510220-47b225 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
