Jim, Sorry. Obviously I did not understand you. Ed Porter
-----Original Message----- From: Jim Bromer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 9:33 AM To: [email protected] Subject: RE: FW: [agi] WHAT PORTION OF CORTICAL PROCESSES ARE BOUND BY "THE BINDING PROBLEM"? Ed Porter said: You imply you have been able to accomplish a somewhat similar implicit representation of bindings in a much higher dimensional and presumably large semantic space. Unfortunately I was unable to understand from your description how you claimed to have accomplished this. --------------------------------- I never implied that I have been able to accomplish a somewhat similar implicit representation of bindings in a much higher dimension and presumably large semantic space. I clearly stated: "I have often talked about the use of multi-level complex methods and I see some similarity to the ideas that they discussed to my ideas." -and, "The complex groupings of objects that I have in mind would have been derived using different methods of analysis and combination and when a group of them is called from an input analysis their use should tend to narrow the objects that might be expected given the detection by the feature detectors. Although I haven't expressed myself very clearly, this is very similar to what Riesenhuber and Poggio were suggesting that their methods would be capable of. So, yes,I think some similar methods can be used in NLP." I clearly used the expression "in mind" just to avoid the kind of misunderstanding that you made. I never made the exaggerated "claim" that I had accomplished it. The difference between having an idea "in mind" and having "claimed to have accomplished" a goal, which the majority of participants in the group would acknowledge is elusive, should be obvious and easy to understand. I am not claiming that I have a method that would work in all semantic space. I would be happy to claim that I do have a theory which I believe should show some limited extensibility in semantic space that goes beyond other current theories. However, I will not know for sure until I test it and right now that looks like it would be years off. I would be happy to continue the dialog if it can be conducted in a less confrontational and more genial manner than it has been during the past week. Jim Bromer Jim, In the Riesenhuber and Poggio paper the binding that were handled implicitly involved spatial relationships, such as an observed roughly horizontal line substantially touching an observed roughly vertical line at their respective ends, even though their might be other horizontal and vertical lines not having this relationship in the input pixel space. It achieves such implicit bindings by having enough separate models to be able to detect, by direct mapping, such a touching relationship between a horizontal and vertical lines at each of many different locations in the visual input space. But the Poggio paper deals with a relatively small number of relationships in a relatively small (160x160) low dimensional (2d) space using 23 million models. You imply you have been able to accomplish a somewhat similar implicit representation of bindings in a much higher dimensional and presumably large semantic space. Unfortunately I was unable to understand from your description how you claimed to have accomplished this. Could you please clarify you description with regard to this point. Ed Porter -----Original Message----- From: Jim Bromer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 1:38 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: FW: [agi] WHAT PORTION OF CORTICAL PROCESSES ARE BOUND BY "THE BINDING PROBLEM"? I started reading a Riesenhuber and Poggio paper and there are some similarities to ideas that I have considered although my ideas were explicitly developed about computer programs that would use symbolic information and are not neural theories. It is interesting that Risesnhuber and Poggio argued that "the binding problem seems to be a problem for only some models of object recognition." In other words, it seems that they are claiming that the problem disappears with their model of neural cognition! The study of feature detectors in cats eyes is old news and I did incorporate that information into the development of my own theories. I have often talked about the use of multi-level complex methods and I see some similarity to the ideas that they discussed to my ideas. In my model an input would be scanned for different features using different kinds of analysis on the input. So then a configuration of simple features would be derived from the scan and these could be associated with a number of complex groups of objects that have been previously associated with the features. Because the complex groups of objects are complexes (in the general sense), and would be learned by previous experience, they are not insipidly modeled on one standard model. These complex objects are complex in that they are not all cut from one standard. The older implementations that used operations that were taken from set theory on groups were set on object models that were very old-world and were not derived from learning. For example they were non-experiential. (I cannot remember the term that I am looking for but experiential is the anthropomorphic term). All of the groupings in old models that looked for intersections were of a few predefined kinds, and most significantly they did not recognize that ideologically incommensurable references could affect meaning (or effect) even if the references were strongly associated and functionally related. The complex groupings of objects that I have in mind would have been derived using different methods of analysis and combination and when a group of them is called from an input analysis their use should tend to narrow the objects that might be expected given the detection by the feature detectors. Although I haven't expressed myself very clearly, this is very similar to what Riesenhuber and Poggio were suggesting that their methods would be capable of. So, yes,I think some similar methods can be used in NLP. However, my model also includes the recognition that comparing apples and oranges is not always straight forward. This gives you an idea of what I mean by ideologically incommensurable associations. If I were to give some examples, a reasonable person might simply assume that the problems illustrated by the examples could easily be resolved with more information, and that is true. But the point that I am making is that this view of ideologically incommensurable references can be helpful in the analysis of the kinds of problems that can be expected from more ambitious AI models. 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